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Abstract
This thesis criticises a pervasive dualism in the philosophy of social science, the division
between natural science and society. It argues that analysis which relies on this division
misrepresents both natural scientific investigation and other social activities. From a
dualistic perspective, those activities that allow a successful interaction with the material
world, typically associated with natural science, are held to have a non-social aspect. Their
theories (or 'meanings') are said to have a ground outside of the historical development and
change which is characteristic of other social practices. It is this ground which is held to
explain the progressive character of science. Conversely, those activities that are seen as
fully social in character are theorised as if they were not variably successful in the
achievement of their goals. As an alternative to this division, a 'critical historicist' approach
is developed, drawing on post-positivist philosophy of science. It is argued that all social
activities, including scientific investigation, are constituted by meanings, develop historically
(rather than having a non-historical foundation), and are variably successful in character.
This conception of social activity is then used to criticise existing philosophies of social
science for their dualistic approach. Both anti-naturalistic approaches, represented by
structuration theory, and naturalistic approaches, represented by realism, are considered.
Structuration theory argues that natural science is distinct from other social practices because
the latter involve issues ofmeaning not encountered in the former. This claim is challenged,
and it is argued that issues of meaning are the same in natural science and other social
activities. Although realism's analysis of social life is inspired by natural scientific
investigation, it also distinguishes the properties of the two, suggesting that social activity
involves both an 'objective' (scientific) aspect and a 'social' aspect. The thesis argues that
this separation leads to analytical incoherence, and an indefensible conception of both
'science' and 'society'. It is suggested that the adoption of a critical historicist approach
would remove this incoherence.
The thesis then turns to consider the sociological analysis of science as a fruitful area for
examining conceptions of science and society. The first approach analysed is social
constructionism, which attempts to subsume science under a notion of social activity that
sees all social understandings as equally successful. It is argued that this produces a
contradiction in the constructionist framework. Constructionism both dismisses issues of
variable success and brings them back by employing the notion of 'interests'. The thesis
then examines actor-network theory, which explicitly rejects the science/society duality. It is
argued that the alternative it offers involves two problems. Firstly, although scientific
investigation is located historically, changes in understanding are projected into the realm of
ontology. This undermines the possibility of theoretical comparison. Secondly, actor-
network theory explains disputes within science and other social activities by calling on an
unlocated notion of conflict.
The conclusion reviews the arguments of the thesis to consider how understandings of
science and society can be reconciled.
ii
Declaration:





Thank you to the University of Edinburgh and the Overseas Research Scheme for funding
this research even though its relevance to the 'real world' was/is not readily apparent!
Thanks to those who contributed to the pleasant atmosphere at the Department of Sociology
and the Science Studies Unit, and especially to Sue and Bronywn for their help and humour.
I must also express my gratefulness to supervisors past and present; to Greg McLennan for
his early encouragement and to Russell Keat for offering useful and intelligent criticism.
Special thanks must go to John Holmwood, whose generosity in both intellectual and
personal terms has been incredible, as has his ability to provide an intellectual challenge
whilst being kind and supportive.
A big thank you to those people who helped with my work along the way. Cheers to Brian,
Akhil, Maureen, Sveta, Gill and Yuval for reading drafts and making helpful comments.
Thanks also to Sharani, Sara, Maureen and Gill for doing the boring proof-reading bit.
Just as important for getting the thesis done was the good company provided by my friends.
Thanks to Yuval, Nick, Paul, Jess and Jonathan for the musical (and conversational)
interludes. Cheers to Sara, Gill, Michael and Jon for being great friends, and for those
evenings spent with a pint (or alcopop) and a packet of 'Big Os'. Thanks to Maureen, for
interesting discussions about serious stuff, and for always keeping an eye out for a friend.
Cheers to Akhil and Hugo for being eminently reasonable office-mates. Thanks to Sveta for
giving my argumentative faculties regular exercise. Much appreciation, also, to Pauline, for
being a lovely companion over- a cup of coffee. And, thanks to Sharani for bringing light
when the end of the tunnel wasn't quite visible.
A final HUGE thank you must go to my family for their love and support. I very much
appreciate your indulgence ofmy obscure philosophical interests, and the care that you have










Science Reconsidered: New Philosophy of Science
1 Philosophy of Science: A Critical Historicist Perspective 8
1.1 Introduction 8
1.2 Science as an activity without guarantees 9
1.3 Theoretical mediation and problems of understanding 15
1.4 Realist alternatives 22
1.5 Assessing understanding: commensurability and progress 36
1.6 Conclusion: from science to social life 52
Part II
Science and Society Divided: Contemporary Sociological Theory
2 Antinaturalism in Sociology: Structuration Theory and 'Meaning' 56
2.1 Introduction 56
2.2 The double hermeneutic and actors' knowledge 57
2.3 Natural scientific knowledge and social scientific knowledge 67
2.4 Agency and social science 75
2.5 Conclusion 79
v
3 Sociology as Science? Realism and the Question of Agency 81
3.1 Introduction 81
3.2 Morphogenesis and realism 82
3.3 Structure, agency and interests 89
3.4 Culture, structure and interests 97
3.5 Conclusion 102
Part III
Science and Society Reconciled? New Sociology of Science
4 Science as a Social Construction: The Strong Programme and Success 106
4.1 Introduction 106
4.2 Theories of categorisation 108
4.3 The social and the instrumental 117
4.4 Social institutions and success 131
4.5 Conclusion 145
5 Science as Practice: The Actor-Network Approach 147
5.1 Introduction 147
5.2 Natural science in action 148
5.3 Beyond constructionism and realism? 154
5.4 Disposing with society: the theory of associations 166
5.5 Social science inaction? 171




This thesis attempts to transcend a pervasive dualism within philosophical and
sociological thought: the division between natural science and social activity. Proponents of
this divide suggest that science and social life have different characteristics. Natural science
is said to be oriented to successful relations with the material environment, with actors
supporting the most successful theories available. Successful relations with the environment
are attributed to features of science which are non-social in character, such as the direct
apprehension of the material world by scientists. Conversely, it is argued that social life is
not oriented to success, but is 'meaningful' and/or 'strategic' in character. Social
understandings are not held because they allow successful interaction with the environment,
but because they are meaningful to actors, or allow them to pursue their sectional interests,
which may be in conflict with what would be most successful.
In this thesis I hope to show that the division of science and society results in analytical
incoherence. Accounts that characterise science as non-social are ultimately indefensible,
and lead to a reification of the forms of reasoning or empirical categories that they take to be
constitutive of science's success. Likewise, accounts of social activity that exclude
considerations of success are unable to coherently theorise actors' commitment to beliefs.
To go beyond this problematic division, the thesis makes a double movement. In the first
move scientific investigation is reconceptualised so that its successes are explicable in terms
which do not require it to be non-social. The groundwork in this area has already been done
by post-positivist philosophers of science, whose accounts of scientific investigation allow
close parallels to be drawn with other forms of non-scientific activity. However,
philosophers of science have missed the opportunity to make this connection, and generally
defend a dichotomy between scientific reasoning and social influences. In the second move,
existing conceptions of the social are challenged for their insistence that the social realm has
a special logic which excludes issues of variable success. It is argued instead that social
activity is best understood as a knowledgeable attempt to successfully achieve goals through
interactions with the material environment. The success of this activity is variable,
depending on the adequacy of the knowledge that is employed in it. The result of these
shifts is that all human activities, including science, are said to be fully social in character,
and yet subject to assessments of their success or otherwise.
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Although philosophical and sociological conceptions of science and society are frequently
dualistic, a key exception to this is the work of John Holmwood and Alexander Stewart. In
Explanation and Social Theory (1991) Holmwood and Stewart argue that it is possible to
integrate the analysis of science and society using post-positivist principles. They suggest
that attempts to separate a specific social logic from the logic of successful relations with the
material environment necessarily result in contradiction. Holmwood and Stewart are
particularly concerned with the way in which this undermines the adequacy of sociological
accounts that call on such social factors to explain human activity. As an alternative, they
argue that sociological analysis must take into account the success or failure of social
activities. This thesis takes its inspiration from the approach of Holmwood and Stewart,
extending their work in two respects. Firstly, it offers a detailed analysis of the theories of
Archer, Barnes, Bloor, and Latour, which are given only brief consideration by Holmwood
and Stewart. Secondly, it draws out the implications of Holmwood and Stewart's work,
exploring how a non-dualistic mode of analysis can improve our understanding of natural
scientific investigation and other social practices.
The thesis begins, in Part I, Chapter 1, by considering recent developments within the
philosophy of natural science, particularly in the work of Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, Larry
Laudan and Dudley Shapere. Drawing on insights from these authors, I argue for a 'critical
historicist' analysis of natural science that is compatible with its character as a social
activity. Crucially, critical historicism rejects the notion that scientific investigation has an
unshakeable foundation in experience or method that guarantees the truth or adequacy of its
claims. Rather, both substantive categories (including those of experience) and
methodological rules are held to change over time, placing scientific investigation in the
flow of history. An important aspect of this non-foundational view is that scientific
categories are no longer conceived to be in direct contact with the world. They are, instead,
to be conceived of as 'theoretical' or 'meaningful' mediations which are more or less
successful in ordering the world. On a critical historicist view, the truth of these categories
cannot be inferred from their success, as further development may require their
reconstruction to expand the capacity of the theory. However, the absence of a claim to truth
does not undermine the nature of science as progressive or give rise to relativism as is
frequently alleged.
Chapter 1 also briefly introduces how this analysis of science can be used to question
attempts to divide it from other social practices. Social life is frequently differentiated from
scientific investigation, on the basis that social practices are constituted by meanings.
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However, the critical historicist view suggests that scientific investigation is constituted by
theoretical mediations (i.e. meanings) that change over time. Both natural scientific
investigation and other social practices are thus meaningful in character. This connection
can then be turned back on existing notions of social activity to criticise them. In
sociological theory, the meanings involved in social life are typically taken to be 'self-
validating', that is, adequate on their own terms. For critical historicists, although theories
are mediations and have no direct relation to the world, they may be more or less adequate,
depending on how coherently they can account for interactions with the material world. This
suggests a way to bring issues of success back into the analysis of social life while accepting
that social institutions are historically variable and constituted by meanings. It also retains a
parallel between natural science and other social activities as meaningfully constituted, and
of variable adequacy.
The other way in which science and society are typically contrasted is the claim that
scientific beliefs are held because of their generally accepted success, whereas in social life
beliefs may be held because they are in the interests of a particular social group. Social life
is argued to involve the strategic pursuit of interests in a way which natural science does not.
Contrary to this, I suggest that 'science' and 'interests' are not genuinely in tension with one
another. Critical historicism argues that coherent beliefs allow a successful interaction with
the environment to produce resources. As social interests are oriented to resources, their
pursuit is not contrary to the pursuit of scientific knowledge, but calls on this to achieve
desired outcomes.
These ideas are explored more fully in Parts II and III of the thesis. Part II addresses
existing approaches to sociological theorising. I argue that although there appears to be a
dispute within sociology over the nature of social science, and the extent to which it can be
modelled on natural science, both naturalistic and anti-naturalistic approaches call upon a
science/society dualism. I examine existing approaches to show that they fail to offer a
coherent account of the relation between science and society, which ultimately undermines
the coherence of their analyses. Chapter 2 discusses the anti-naturalist argument that social
science and natural science are necessarily different in character. This is based on the claim
that there are issues of 'meaning' arising in social life which do not occur in natural
scientific investigation. For this chapter, I focus on the ideas of Anthony Giddens, as his
work provides a useful compendium of anti-naturalistic arguments. I suggest that these
arguments are unconvincing, and that issues of meaning are the same across natural scientific
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investigation and other social activities, undermining the division between the two. As a
consequence, natural scientific investigation provides a viable model for social science.
Chapter 3 addresses the realist approach to sociological theory. Realists argue for a
qualified naturalism in relation to social science, portraying their analysis of society as
scientifically inspired. This stance is used to distinguish realism from anti-naturalistic
approaches. However, as with the latter, realism calls upon a dualism between science and
society, suggesting that society has special properties differentiating it from science. I argue
that this separation leads to theoretical incoherence, and show this by analysing the work of
Margaret Archer, who is an important recent exponent of realism in the social sciences.
Archer argues that the analysis of society must incorporate a consideration of the objective
logic discovered through science, but have an additional 'social' component to capture the
reflexive and strategic nature of human action. On this basis, Archer sets up a series of
dualisms such as structure/agency, culture/agency and structure/culture which she insists are
necessary to properly understand society. 1 examine these dualisms and argue that they
cannot be used to produce a coherent analysis. The realist attempt to differentiate a 'social'
component from the objective possibilities for successful action analysed by science cannot
be sustained. Conversely, Archer's account of science is overly-objectivistic, and fails to
recognize the historical and mediated character of scientific understandings.
Recent sociological theorizing calls on a science/society division, resulting in analytical
incoherence. In Part III of the thesis, I turn to sociological analyses of natural science to see
if these offer a way of transcending the dualism. This seems a potentially fruitful area to
consider, giving that such theories bring together questions about the character of natural
science and social activity. In Chapter 4 I consider constructionist analyses of science,
focusing on the work of Barry Barnes and David Bloor, founders of the Strong Programme.
Barnes and Bloor argue that natural scientific activity is fully social in character, a claim
supported by this thesis. However, they do so by analysing natural science in a relativist
fashion, arguing that all theories are equally adequate in their relations to the material
environment. When actors claim that one theory is more adequate than another, this is to be
explained by locating the social interests which they are pursuing.
This relativist approach takes the 'social' side of the natural science/society dualism and
attempts to subsume science under it. The analytical difficulty that emerges is that social
interests, which perform an important explanatory function, cannot be located in a successful
relation to the material environment and the resources that accrue from this, because issues
of success have been excised from analysis. I consider the problems this produces in some
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of the examples analysed by the Strong Programmers. As an alternative I suggest that
interests are intrinsically connected with the success of knowledge, breaking down the
separation of science from society. I then move on to consider Barnes and Bloor's analysis
of social institutions as self-referential and self-validating, which generalizes their approach
to science and applies it to phenomena such as money and status groups. I argue that this
attempt to analyse social institutions without incorporating issues of success suffers from the
same difficulties as the relativist analysis of science. This suggests that the conception of
social activity that emerges out of a science/society dichotomy is equally problematic
whether it is applied to scientific investigation or to other social activities.
In Chapter 5 I consider actor-network theory, which offers a more thorough rejection of
the science/society dualism than that of constructionism. Looking at the work of Bruno
Latour, I explore the actor-network idea that actors attempt to order the world around them
through a pragmatic process of definition, which, if successful, allows the actor to build up
their resourcefulness. Actor-network theory challenges the science/society divide by
suggesting that definitions of human and non-human actors should be treated in the same
fashion, rather than the human (social) and non-human (natural) being analysed as separate
realms each with its own autonomous logic. Latour puts this idea to good use in his critique
of constructionist accounts of science, which shows the difficulties in locating a realm of
purely 'social' interests, outside of human relations with nature. His alternative is to argue
that scientific debates involve disagreements over the nature of both human and non-human
actors, which can become redefined in the process.
I argue that Latour's account has two key problems. Firstly, although Latour correctly
identifies scientific investigation as a transformative process, he suggests that it is ontology
that is transformed and not just understandings of nature. This generates problems in
connecting the analysis of past, present and future science, which exist, for Latour, as
different ontological worlds, rather than being different representations of the same world.
Secondly, Latour does not locate disputes over the nature of human and non-human actors in
problems of ordering, but explains them by referring to the clash of opposed defining wills.
Although this avoids the science/society dichotomy, it fails to locate conflict any more
successfully than constructionist accounts of interests, or realist arguments about strategic
action. As an alternative I suggest that explanations of conflict must locate it in problems of
ordering the material world. The chapter concludes by considering Latour's criticisms of
social science, which he sees as having 'legislative' pretensions to impose its own order on
the world. I argue that this criticism is misplaced, and that social science can make
5
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arguments about the success or otherwise of modes of ordering without therefore being
legislative.
This brings us to the Conclusion, in which I review the arguments of the thesis to consider




New Philosophy of Science
1
Philosophy of Science:
A Critical Historicist Perspective
1.1 Introduction
Recent developments in the philosophy of science have significantly altered our
understanding of scientific activity. Writers including Thomas Kuhn, Mary Hesse, Imre
Lakatos, Larry Laudan and Dudley Shapere have all offered theories of science that attempt
to supersede those of their positivist predecessors. Although post-positivism can be dated
back at least as far as Thomas Kuhn's The Structure ofScientific Revolution (1962), it seems
fair to say that its ramifications are still being worked through. One reason for this is that
although recent writers share a rejection of positivism, they frequently disagree with one
another about the best alternative account of science (see for example Lakatos and Musgrave
(1970), Doppelt (1986), Laudan (1987)).
In this chapter I want to reflect on what can be learned from post-positivist philosophy,
and pull together various ideas from this current of thought to defend a 'critical historicist'
conception of natural scientific investigation. This account is 'historicist' in that it suggests
that scientific theories do not have solid foundations in empirical 'facts' or modes of
reasoning which guarantee their adequacy. I argue that instead of being outside of the flow
of history, both empirical concepts and theoretical standards change over time.
Nevertheless, this lack of foundations does not mean that we must accept the relativist claim
that all theories are equally valid. The account offered here is thus 'critical' in the sense that
theories and standards can be assessed as to their adequacy. This assessment is an immanent
one, based on the extent to which theories successfully account for interactions with the
environment on their own terms.
I believe that the argument of this chapter has intrinsic interest as an attempt to reconstruct
a viable account of science drawing on elements of post-positivist philosophy. However, it
also provides the basis for addressing the central theme of this thesis, that is, the division
between science and society. Both sociologists and philosophers have divided natural
science from society on the basis that its success in interacting with the material world must
be the result of its special epistemological characteristics. Scientific investigation is said to
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have unquestionable foundations because of the direct contact of concepts with the empirical
world, or because its modes of reasoning guarantee its success. Other activities are then
separated from science on the basis of their different orientation to success. This chapter
suggests that the foundational account of science is wrong, and argues that scientific theories
have no special epistemological properties, but are mediations which provide more or less
successful ways of interacting with the material world. By challenging the foundational
account of science, this chapter destabilizes the division between science and society, and the
rest of the thesis explores how other social activities can be directly paralleled with natural
science once this is properly conceived.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Firstly, I discuss post-positivist criticisms of
foundational conceptions of science, and use these as the basis of the critical historicist
approach. I then compare this approach to other recent conceptions of science, namely
epistemological and ontological realism. The remainder of the chapter explores why critical
historicism's rejection of foundationalism need not lead to relativism.
1.2 Science as an activity without guarantees
To demonstrate the importance of post-positivist views of science, we must begin by
considering foundational theories of scientific knowledge, and their weaknesses. One
foundational approach is 'empiricism', which argues that theories are based upon
observational facts that can be regarded as conclusively verified. Such a set of
unquestionable empirical facts (accumulating as scientific investigation continues) would
provide the basis for adjudicating between theories, and any theoretical disagreements could
always be resolved by reference to existing observational facts, or those that might be
accumulated, in order to solve a dispute. This kind of approach was defended most recently
by the logical positivists, but their work has been subjected to heavy criticism (for a general
discussion see Hanfling, 1981; Hesse, 1974). There are strong arguments to suggest that
there can be no concepts resulting from investigation which possess the status of
unchallengeable facts. By now these arguments are familiar and standard within the
philosophy of science, but it is worth reviewing them in order to understand their
consequences.
The idea that empirical claims can be conclusively verified is thrown into doubt by
arguments asserting that observation is theory-laden. That is to say, some philosophers have
opposed the notion that there can be 'direct' or 'unmediated' reports about the state of the
world. Observation reports are always made in a language that is theoretical, and invokes
9
Philosophy of Science
certain assumptions or claims about the world which are open to challenge from a competing
perspective. Taking a common sense example, Alan Chalmers argues that a claim such as
'Look out, the wind is blowing the baby's pram over the cliff edge!' invokes a range of low-
level theoretical assumptions, about the existence and character of 'wind', as well as implicit
expectations about the outcome of the pram's journey, and so on (Chalmers, 1982: 28-9).
When we move into the realm of scientific observation reports it becomes even more
apparent that claims such as 'The electron beam was repelled by the North Pole of the
magnet' cannot be taken as direct descriptions of a set of events in the world (Chalmers,
1982: 29).
The critical reader might argue that such examples involve assumptions that are all too
clearly 'theory-laden', and that what is required is a move to more basic and solid empirical
claims, such as 'Object X is red'. Perhaps if such claims could be conclusively established,
then more complex constructions could be made from these solid building blocks. Mary
Hesse considers this case in order to argue that even such an apparently basic claim is not
independent of theoretical assumptions. Hesse argues that for the claim 'Object X is red' to
be an observation report it must be intersubjectively verifiable, that is, open to confirmation
by all competent observers (Hesse, 1974: 17-8). If this is so, however, then it is possible to
suggest that an observer has made a mistake in predicating 'red' of an object. This would be
done by making claims like: 'It can't have been red, because it was a sodium flame, and
sodium flames are not red' (Hesse, 1974: 18). Such corrections do not make use of 'direct'
experience as such, and in fact can be used to challenge the claim that a 'direct'
apprehension of redness actually occurred in the first place. Thus, it seems plausible to say
that the correct usage of the term 'red' is subject to a public debate about the conditions of its
applicability, a debate that can invoke 'theoretical' assumptions about the connection of red
to other predicates. This being the case, observational reports such as 'object X is red'
cannot be taken as purely direct and unmediated.
To take this insight into the realm of science, Hesse examines a concept that appeared to
be highly stable and conclusively verifiable in its status, that of time simultaneity (1974: 19-
21). Hesse argues that before the theory of special relativity was developed, it was believed
that judgements about the timing of events, that is, about their simultaneous occurrence or
sequential ordering, were absolute and standard between all competent observers. Before
1905, such judgements would have been taken as paradigm cases of observational claims
whose application had the status of empirical fact, and which were non-theoretical.
However, Einstein argued that judgements about timing may indeed vary between differently
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placed observers, if, for example, one observer is travelling at a constant velocity away from
the other (Einstein, 1962). He also suggested, of course, that in certain cases' one can use
the knowledge of the time and spatial location of events as judged from one standpoint to
calculate the time and spatial location of events in another standpoint. This, as Hesse points
out, does not save the notion of 'simultaneity' from theoretical assumptions (such as the
constancy of the speed of light in a vacuum), but merely explicitly reformulates the
assumptions that were already implicitly present in the Newtonian conception (Hesse, 1974:
20). Consequently, we have here an example of the vulnerability to theoretical criticism and
reformulation of a previously stable 'observational' claim.
Another way of putting this is to emphasise the mutual implication of the 'positive' and
'residual' categories of a theoretical system. Following Talcott Parsons2, John Holmwood
suggests that we can conceive of a scientific theory as a structure of concepts which attempts
to offer a coherent account of all the relevant phenomena of some domain, and the logic and
development of its processes (Holmwood, 1996, especially Chpt. 3). When a successful and
consistent account of a process has been given, the categories used can be regarded as
'positive'. Until a theoretical structure has been perfected, however, there will always be not
only positive categories, but 'residual' ones as well, which are used to describe those 'facts
known to exist' but which the theorist cannot give a systematic account of (Holmwood,
1996: 36). The important point about viewing theory development in this way is to
emphasise the mutual implication of the positive and residual categories of a system.
For one thing, this means that those supposed 'facts' that contradict the existing
theoretical statements will be transformed in character, as theoretical reconstruction
necessitates their reinterpretation in order to make their character systematic (Holmwood,
1996: 37). One example of this is the theoretical development of Prout's hypothesis that ail
elements were composed of hydrogen, and thus that the atomic weight of each element
should be divisible by a whole' number into the weight of hydrogen (discussed in Laudan,
1977: 31). During the nineteenth century there were several well-known 'factual' anomalies
to this doctrine, such as the atomic weights of 103.5 for lead, and 35.45 for chlorine.
However, by the twentieth century, the theory of isotopes had been elaborated, and, after
separating out isotopes of the same element, each isotope was found to have a whole number
1 These are cases where one observer is not moving rotationally in relation to the other, and where one
observer's motion is uniform (of constant velocity and direction) in relation to the other (Einstein,
1962: 12).




atomic weight. Thus, the earlier 'facts', which were residual categories for Prout's theory,
were transformed in their character and became positive elements of the theoretical system.
This example also illustrates the converse aspect of theoretical development, which is the
transformation of positive categories in order to develop the applicability of the system.
Holmwood writes that the process of development 'transforms the positively defined
categories of previous statements of the theoretical system, as explanations are extended and
new relationships postulated' (1996: 37). As we can see in relation to Prout's theory, the
concept of a chemical element had to undergo what Lakatos calls a 'concept-stretching
expansion' so that, unlike the older approaches, isotope theory postulated pure elements
which behaved identically in chemical reactions, but could be separated by physical means
(Lakatos, 1978: 54). Thus, both the positive and the residual categories of the theoretical
system had to be reconstructed.
Of course, as Duhem argued, although we may be aware of a 'problem' in our
understandings, that is, an outcome or event that we cannot systematically locate, this does
not tell us which of our 'positive' categories will require alteration in order to remove the
problem. It may well be that the 'problem' lies in quite some other body of knowledge than
that which we are interested in developing. For example, we may argue that there is an error
in the optical theory which is implicated in certain 'anomalous observations'. This is exactly
what occurred in the development of Newton's work, in which he successfully challenged
existing observational theories used to determine the position of the moon (Lakatos, 1978:
45-6, fn. 5). In this way, our own positive categories could be left intact by locating the
problem elsewhere. More will need to be said about this, and the modes of developing
theories in response to problems. The general point here, though, is that the 'positive' and
'residual' categories of a theoretical system are both 'mediations' that are subject to revision
and development in the pursuit of improved understandings. Neither provides a direct
apprehension of the objects and processes that we are interested in understanding.
We have considered so far that there are no guarantees to be found for science in either the
positive observational reports and empirical facts or the anomalous 'falsifications' that are
the results of investigation. This is not the only way in which one could argue for the certain
foundations of science. Rather, it could be claimed that there are certain standards for
judging the validity of competing theories which would provide conclusive grounds for
preferring one theory over another. If these standards could be shown to have an




Theorists such as Larry Laudan and Alan Chalmers have questioned the notion that
standards for theory choice provide unquestionable foundations for science. Firstly, they
argue that such standards of validity have altered over time, and that this suggests their non-
foundational character. Laudan offers the example here of the 'method of hypothesis' which
holds that a hypothesis can be considered validated if all of its examined consequences are
true (Laudan, 1981b, especially Chpt. 2). Laudan convincingly suggests that the status of
this standard forjudging the validity of theories has oscillated over time. In the seventeenth
century Descartes supported the method of hypothesis, along with Boyle, Hooke, and others.
Into the 18th century, the method fell from grace, with writers such as Voltaire, Priestley and
Euler rejecting hypothetical reasoning in favour of strict induction. By the 19th century
however, methodologists such as Comte and Whewell had reinstated the method of
hypothesis as a viable mode of inference (Laudan, 1981b: 9-10). Likewise, we can see the
disputes over whether a falsifying instance should lead to the rejection of a theory (as in an
extreme version of falsification), or whether the prediction of novel facts provides support
for a theory (as in Lakatos, Leplin etc.) as suggesting the insecurity of such rules, and their
revisable nature. If these latter examples seem too abstracted from scientific practice, we can
examine the clash between Descartes' standards for knowledge requiring it to be 'based on
self-evident, a priori, first principles' and those of Newton's theory which in employing the
notion of gravity as action at a distance was treated as highly mysterious (Chalmers, 1990:
20).
There is a sense in which the defender of a foundational notion of rationality has nothing
to fear from these examples. After all, displaying the mere historical variability of standards
of validity does not provide a direct challenge to the idea that undeniable, foundational
standards could be located. However, there would seem to be little indication that the history
of scientific practice, as we know it, has been underwritten by such standards, and there are a
range of apparently important scientific episodes in which the standards employed to judge
theoretical clashes were quite different.
It is important to identify precisely the parameters of what is being argued here. The issue
at hand is whether unquestionable standards of judgement guarantee the theories produced
by science. All that needs to be established is that there are no standards consistently
operating across important episodes of scientific activity which can be relied upon to
produce definitively warranted theory choices. As such, we can leave unquestioned
Chalmers' claim that there is a general 'aim of science' which involves the push towards
generality and the growth of knowledge, as he accepts that this can only provide 'rough
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schematic guidelines' for methodology which will need to be worked out in practice
themselves (Chalmers, 1990: 39). In other words, this provides nothing like a foundation
that can guarantee the adequacy of scientific concepts.
This point should be born in mind when assessing Jarret Leplin's arguments about
scientific standards. Leplin takes issue with Laudan's claims about the diversity of standards
in science. He argues that there are 'general, sustained methodological and axiological
themes that survive changes in the localised prescriptions and constraints that scientific
discoveries introduce' (Leplin, 1990: 24). His list of such stable themes includes the
following claims: that there are laws of nature; that nature obeys exact regularities; that
natural laws can be given mathematical formulations; that greater precision in measurements
provides greater evidential support; that experiments reveal regularities not apparent in
experience; that science seeks truth and generality; that it counts empirical adequacy as a
criterion of truthlikeness; and that hypotheses must be tested (Leplin, 1990: 24-5). Leplin's
argument is that these consistent aspects of science are the 'central and guiding ones from
which unstable ones are derivative' (Leplin, 1990: 25).
Does Leplin's argument suggest that there are standards that guarantee theory choices in
science? Although arguing for the stability of certain features, Leplin accepts that there are
many lower-level changes in scientific standards (1990: 21, 25). If this is the case, then
scientific decisions based upon such standards cannot be considered to be foundationally
justified. We may argue that scientific standards are being improved as science goes along,
but the fallibility of judgements (demonstrated by previous changes) undermines the idea
that scientific decisions are conclusively warranted. For example, if theories were at one
time rejected because of their hypothetical character, the 'rational' justification of the
method of hypothesis at a later date suggests that previous scientific decisions were taken
using a misleading criterion. There seems to be no particular reason to think that debates
around standards such as these have reached a conclusive end-point, and what is presently
accepted as legitimate may later turn out to be rationally unwarranted.
As to Leplin's higher-level features of science, they appear to be too general to allow
decisive judgements about particular issues of theory assessment (something that Leplin
himself would probably accept). Furthermore, not all of these very general criteria can be
treated as uncontroversial. After all, Bas van Fraassen (1989) has recently argued that the
idea of a Taw of nature' can be brought into question, and quite what such Taws' consist in
is up for dispute between various positions (see arguments between realists and positivists
for example). As Laudan suggests in his reply to Leplin, what appears on the surface as
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commitment to the same standard may hide an underlying diversity which undermines the
apparent 'stability' of some particular feature (Laudan, 1990: 49). A close examination of
the idea that science is the search for 'truth' or that empirical adequacy is a criterion for
'truthlikeness' would likewise reveal a diversity of views on these subjects. These are good
grounds for arguing that there is no fixed set of standards which guarantee the outcomes of
scientific investigation.
This brings us to the end of the section, which has argued that scientific claims are not
founded upon unquestionable observational concepts, or modes of reasoning that guarantee
success. It should be noted that the former argument is less contentious than the latter,
which is still resisted in some philosophical quarters. I hope enough has been said to make
the argument against the certainty of scientific investigation somewhat plausible. As an
alternative, the critical historicist approach views scientific theories as a set of mediated and
fallible understandings produced through investigation. The methods by which these
theories are produced, and the standards by which they are assessed, have no solid
foundations, and change and develop along with more substantive matters during scientific
debate.
1.3 Theoretical mediation and problems of understanding
It is important now to turn our attention to the issue of the 'mediation' of theoretical
categories. I have argued above that an emphasis upon the mediated nature of all claims
about the world has been a fundamental tenet of recent philosophy of science. Now it is time
to examine carefully the consequences of 'mediation' in relation to natural scientific activity.
In order to do so, we should turn to the work of three important post-positivist thinkers,
Kuhn, Lakatos and Laudan3 to examine their accounts of natural scientific activity.
In the work of these thinkers, scientific investigation is necessarily based on an agreed set
of theories, standards and/or exemplary problem-solutions which organise the activity of
scientists. For Kuhn, this is a 'paradigm' which includes a variety of elements such as
symbolic generalisations, metaphysical commitments, values, and exemplary pieces of
3 In his recent Beyond Positivism and Relativism (1996) Larry Laudan is highly critical of
'postpositivist' philosophers of science. The grounds for this criticism are that writers in this category
(such as Kuhn and Feyerabend) respond to logical positivism in a way which does not escape its basic
assumptions, leading them to relativist conclusions. For the purposes of this chapter, however, I will
use the term 'post-positivism' to signify those recent positions in the philosophy of science which




earlier science which provide a model for further problem-solving4 (Kuhn, 1970: 182-7).
Kuhn argues that without the focusing of research that a shared paradigm allows there can be
no properly scientific research. Without a shared paradigm, practitioners all approach
investigation from different perspectives, using different principles and techniques, and the
result tends to involve continuing debate around first principles rather than the successful
development of understanding (Kuhn, 1970: 10-13).
Lakatos's account of scientific growth in terms of competing research programmes
contains similar features. The research programme guiding scientific activity is constituted
by basic methodological rules of two kinds, the positive and negative heuristic. The negative
heuristic or 'hard core' defines which claims are taken to be central to the programme and to
be defended at all costs from refutation, thus being allowed a certain distance from
experimental and observational claims. Defence of this hard core provides a stable base to
investigation from which further theoretical developments can be launched. These
developments occur through the construction and development of a 'protective belt' of
auxiliary hypotheses that are used to deflect apparent anomalies. Meanwhile, these
anomalies are taken up and theorised in a relatively systematic way, as defined by the
positive heuristic, in order to develop the scope and applicability of the programme (Lakatos,
1978: 47-52).
For Laudan, the key to understanding science is that it is a problem-solving activity.
However, the problems addressed by science are not directly given, and only arise within a
certain stage of inquiry, that is, a specific theoretical context. Laudan separates conceptual
problems from empirical ones, but this should not be taken as a separation of autonomous
theoretical issues from non-theoretical questions of empirical validity. Although Laudan
discusses particular conceptual issues such as inter- and intra-theoretical consistency (1977,
Chpt.2), he also suggests that empirical problems are necessarily conceptually formed. As
he states, empirical problems are not 'directly given by the world as veridical bits of
unambiguous data' (Laudan, 1977: 15). Rather they are seen by us through our conceptual
4 In the second edition of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions Kuhn attempts to clarify precisely
what the term 'paradigm' means, distinguishing two main uses that were prevalent in the first edition.
In its more restricted use, 'paradigm' refers to an exemplary problem solution that is used by
scientists as a model for developing solutions to current outstanding problems (Kuhn, 1970: 187-191).
In its more general use, 'paradigm' encompasses a range of important cognitive resources that are
shared by a community of practitioners, including symbolic generalisations, metaphysical beliefs,
cognitive values, and shared exemplary problem-solutions (Kuhn, 1970: 181-7). For the purposes of
this thesis I shall use the term 'paradigm' to refer to a disciplinary matrix. Models for problem-
solving will be referred to not as 'paradigms' but as exemplary problem-solutions.
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networks which preconstruct our understanding of the data, as well as providing expectations
from which problematic phenomena deviate.
In each case, we find the authors defending the notion that scientific investigation is
necessarily work within the theoretical realm. They argue that there is no direct connection
of theories with the material world, but rather an engagement of scientists with the world
mediated by theories. It is essential to stress, however, that the relative autonomy of
theoretical science does not in any way 'protect' scientists from the problems and difficulties
of their understandings. For all three authors considered above, the paradigms, research
programmes or theories guiding research are inherently problematic in their application.
Looking again to Kuhn's work, we find that he discusses a range of more or less serious
problems facing paradigms. The least serious problems are those that can be dealt with quite
comfortably in the framework of the paradigm, and include things like increasing the scope
or accuracy of the knowledge of important facts, increasing the match between a paradigm's
predictions and the experimentally generated facts, and extending a paradigm into related
areas of research (Kuhn, 1970: 24-9). This involves resolving problems which are of limited
scope, and which practitioners are confident can be dealt with. Nevertheless, it is important
to note that until a resolution is achieved, these are areas which a paradigm does not cover in
its understandings, and which require theoretical development in order to be coherently
grasped.
There are also problems of a potentially more serious nature. These are anomalies
generated in the course of routine problem resolution which violate the 'expectations that
govern normal science' (Kuhn, 1970: 52-3). Kuhn states that scientific research frequently
uncovers new and unsuspected phenomena and these provide a challenge to the existing
paradigm which will require its adjustment or replacement in order to turn an anomaly into
'the expected'. To Kuhn's mind, the awareness that an anomaly exists will not necessarily
cause the abandonment of any particular paradigm (1970: 81). It's essential to note, though,
that this is not because the mediated nature of theories protects practitioners from the
problems with their theoretical practice. Rather, this is because all paradigms generate
anomalies and discrepancies, and thus theory choices must be based on a sophisticated
understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of competitors. What is important here
is that Kuhn does not see paradigms as self-validating, and able to remove problems at will,
but as always requiring development or replacement in order to cope with persistent
difficulties in their application.
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This same emphasis on the problems generated by the application of scientific theories
can also be found in the work of Lakatos and Laudan. We saw above that Lakatos
emphasised the 'protection' of certain theoretical elements from refutation in order to
preserve the theoretical developments gained so far. This does not, however, dispel the
problems of understanding generated by the theory. Protecting the 'hard core' does not
allow the theorist to be rid of the difficulties with her or his understandings, and as Lakatos
states, 'inconsistencies (including anomalies) must be seen as problems' (1978: 58). Rather,
the defence of the hard core is a device to protect a certain set of insights and develop an
elaborated theory around them that can make progress in resolving problems. Although
theoretical development is often made, the existence of problems and anomalies for theories
is a permanent feature of investigation. Lakatos suggests that even as successful a research
programme as Newton's was "submerged in an ocean of 'anomalies'" when it was
conceived, and no matter how long theoretical development continues, Lakatos argues that
'anomalies are never completely exhausted' (1978: 48, 49). The recalcitrance of the world
presents a constant challenge to theories and for theorists.
Given Laudan's primary focus on problem-solving in science, it will not require a lengthy
argument to demonstrate that he does not see theories as untroubled by problems and
difficulties. Suffice to say, he argues that one of the primary activities of science is
converting the apparent empirical anomalies of a theory into solved problems. Such activity
recovers the initial meaning of the idea that 'it is the exception that proves the rule', in that
the test of a rule is its ability to deal with what appear to be exceptions (Laudan, 1977: 31).
Likewise, scientific activity involves attempting to remove conceptual problems such as
those that occur when well-grounded theories contradict one another.
The moral that we can take from this line of philosophy is that the 'theoretical' character
of scientific understandings does not result in the unproblematic 'construction' of the world
on the scientists' own terms. Instead, problems and anomalies emerge from the application
of theories, and these require theoretical labour and development to be removed. It is
important to emphasise this, as some relativists have argued that because scientific
knowledge is theoretical and mediated, problems of understanding can always be avoided.
Particularly relevant here are the founders of the Strong Programme, Barnes and Bloor, who
claim that a theory can always be construed as adequate to the phenomena that it deals with.
As Barnes argues:
Conceptual fabrics can always be maintained by Duhem-type strategies so that,
whatever their form, they remain both internally consistent and also consistent with
experience... (Barnes, 1982: 106)
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This would make theories entirely consistent on their own terms, generating none of the
anomalies and problems which necessitate theoretical reconstruction. I shall analyse the
Strong Programme argument in Chapter 4, but just indicate for the moment that post¬
positive philosophy of science does not license this move, instead suggesting that the
recalcitrance of the material world results in problems of understanding. As we have seen
above, three of the major figures within post-positivist philosophy of science argue that even
our very best scientific theories do not manage to avoid anomalies and problems. In their
view, even these theories are not adequate on their own terms. The only point at which a
theory could be said to be adequate on its own terms would be when it had such incredible
grasp and capacity that no practitioners could identify any difficulties or anomalies for the
theory. There is certainly no sign of such a theory emerging in any of the sciences, and its
achievement would require a Herculean investigative and conceptual effort, not a
philosophical argument about the nature of theories.
In opposition to a relativist account, a critical historicist approach suggests that we analyse
theories in terms of their conceptual adequacy, that is, the variable coherence they achieve
when accounting for the events of some domain. I will be discussing the notion of
theoretical success in more detail when we turn to look at epistemological matters in science.
However, on a first approximation, we can consider success to be a matter of 'coping' with
the subject matter of a theory, or 'making sense' of it. If failure occurs when a theory
generates anomalies and inconsistencies, success is produced by offering a coherent and
systematic grasp of the outcomes of interactions with the world. Success involves using a
theoretical framework to 'resolve ambiguity, to reduce irregularity to uniformity, to show
that what happens is somehow intelligible and predictable' (Laudan, 1977: 13).
Now, this is clearly a very general definition, and may seem entirely unhelpful because of
its vagueness. As I shall argue later on, there is a good reason for this, as 'success' denotes
the ability of modes of reasoning to live up to their own standards. Nevertheless, this idea of
success does offer a meaningful correlate to that of failure, in that it suggests that success
involves gaining a consistent and systematic understanding of the processes or objects in
question, such that when a theory is applied it can account for the behaviour of these. When
a theory is successful, we find that in applying it to explain the subject matter of its domain,
we produce experimental or observational outcomes that conform to our expectations. These
successes are the 'positive' categories of the theoretical scheme. When a theory is
problematic or inconsistent the result is that we cannot 'make sense' of outcomes, that
certain results of experiment and observation are unexpected, and we cannot explain why
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they occur as such. Such unexplained outcomes are the 'residual' categories of a scheme.
To illustrate this with reference to Proutian chemistry, we might say that until the theory of
isotopes was developed, those attempting to make sense of the atomic weights of elements
could not account systematically for the atomic weight of chlorine, which was a residual
category. It was only when the chemical theories were reconstructed to incorporate the
theory of isotopes that sense could be made of this element and it could be accounted for
within the positive categories of the Proutian theoretical scheme.
This conception of scientific knowledge thus locates both the successes and failures of a
theory within understanding (Holmwood, 1996: 106-9). This suggests a way of avoiding
two kinds of errors. Firstly, although a problem may be solved within a scheme, this does not
validate the truth or correctness of that scheme for all time. The positive categories of a
scheme encapsulate the best way presently known to account for some phenomena.
However, we should not assume that the achievement of some coherency implies the truth of
the theoretical claims, as categories may need to be reconstructed in order to achieve greater
coherence5. To illustrate this, Laudan gives the example of Ptolemy's theory of epicycles,
which resolved some of the difficulties in explaining the motion of planets, and thus
achieved greater coherence over earlier accounts, but which belongs to a theoretical scheme
now superseded by a more successful, coherent one (1977: 24-5). In another kind of case,
what is considered an adequate solution in relation to the understandings of one particular
generation may be rejected by succeeding generations as standards of experimental accuracy
and conceptual adequacy develop. This was apparent in the success of the models of both
Newton and Daniell Bernoulli in accounting for the relation between pressure and volume in
gases, only for these to need important modifications as further experimental data
accumulated (Laudan, 1977: 25-6).
The other error to be avoided is the assumption that because a theory contains
contradictory, residual categories, it must be rejected entirely. The difficulties with such a
move are illustrated by developments within falsificationist philosophy of science. On
Lakatos' account, nai've falsificationism takes a severe attitude to contradictions between
theories and accepted empirical claims, arguing that if contradictions exist, the theory must
be removed from scientific contention (Lakatos, 1978: 24-7). However, as Lakatos notes,
important theories have been considered scientifically acceptable even though they were in
contradiction with some accepted empirical claims (Lakatos, 1978: 39). This was true, for
example, of Einstein's theory when it was taken to be superior to that of Newton. Such
5 See the next section for further discussion of this point.
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acceptance did not display the irrationality of the scientists involved, but suggests another
policy in relation to contradictory theories. The existence of a contradiction is taken to
indicate the need for further theoretical development, rather than the necessity to abandon a
theory altogether. Taking this into account, the sophisticated falsificationist argues that the
key to scientific development is not the complete rejection of contradictory (falsified)
theories but the attempt to develop a theory by removing its contradictions in a productive
manner (Lakatos, 1978: 40-1). Holmwood concurs with this point, adding that even a
contradictory theory usually has some positive categories which offer a degree of
resourcefulness (Holmwood, 1996: 106-7). Where the theory is systematic and consistent it
allows us to account successfully for the world; where the theory is contradictory and
inconsistent, it generates confusion and unpredictable results. Until problems are resolved,
the use of an existing theory is the only option available to scientists.
The account so far has emphasised the importance of producing conceptual consistency.
The material pay-off for this, however, is an increase in the capacity for action. In general,
the more consistency that a scientist can generate in their accounts of the behaviour of
processes and objects, the greater their ability to deal with this domain successfully in the
future6. Within a scientific context, this may mean successfully producing desired
experimental outcomes, or contributing to the development of technologies for harnessing
the powers of the objects or processes in a domain. Interactions with objects that had
previously led to unpredictable and unintelligible outcomes become readily comprehensible
due to the increased ability to offer coherent accounts. It is this increased practical capacity
which provides the tangible material benefit of a successful conceptual understanding.
The practical impact of problem-solving upon action emphasises its necessity. This is in
contrast to relativist accounts, which suggest that problems with theoretical schemes can
always be removed in order to make those schemes completely consistent. If this was the
case, interactions with the world could invariably be shown to be successful by using
'Duhem-type strategies', and so there would never be any necessity to alter a theory in order
to improve its capacity for prediction and control. Events in the world would never pose any
difficulty for actors in their attempts to achieve their goals7. In opposition to this, the
6 Of course, conceptual resourcefulness may not always have a pay-off in practical resourcefulness.
Technical difficulties of collecting the relevant information before events occur may mean that even
though the processes at work are understood by existing theories, this knowledge does not translate
into increased practical capacity.
7 As we shall see in Chapter 4, Barnes and Bloor attempt to defend both relativism and




practical account offered here suggests that problems of understanding are 'lived' by actors,
who experience them as an incapacity to act successfully, and achieve the outcomes that they
desire. The inability of actors to deal successfully with the world generates a tension which
motivates problem-solving activity oriented towards an improvement of capacity.
Of course, not all kinds of conceptual sense-making necessarily contribute to action, and
so 'practical adequacy' is a subcategory of 'conceptual adequacy'. One particularly
important variety of sense-making which may not have any practical import is that of
historical understanding. For instance, we may ask whether Rasputin really did survive a
dose of powerful poison and three gunshot wounds only to drown in the Malaia Moika canal
into which his body was disposed8. One could of course argue that all historical knowledge
might have implications for future human activities. This is a possibility, although given the
sometimes minute details unearthed by historians, the probability of practical relevance may
be incredibly low. Nevertheless, these activities involve making consistency and regularity
out of disorder in order to understand events that have occurred. They can thus be assessed
under the rubric of conceptual adequacy.
1.4 Realist alternatives
In the previous sections I developed the critical historicist idea that scientific knowledge is
a form of sense-making activity which generates the ability for humans to interact
successfully with the environment. However, not all philosophers of science would be
happy with this characterisation, and there are two important positions in the field which
offer quite different views of the nature of scientific knowledge. These are epistemological
realism9 and ontological realism. For epistemological realists, an emphasis on the successful
sense-making activities of science provides an insufficient account of the nature of
knowledge. Epistemological realists argue that when a theory is successful, this gives us
grounds for thinking that it corresponds (to some extent) with the world. In other words
successful theories have some degree of truth. By contrast, ontological realists reject the
inference to the truth of our theories from their success. However, they wish to make a
strong separation between scientific understandings of the 'deep structures' of the world and
the successful accounting for patterns of events. For ontological realists, genuine scientific
8 Richard Pipes suggests that this was not the case, as the autopsy revealed Rasputin to have been
dead before he was thrown into the canal, and there is strong evidence that there were no traces of
poison in Rasputin's body (Pipes, 1990: 258-66). This raises new and interesting problems of
consistency, however, given that accounts of events leading up to Rasputin's death suggest that he
had consumed wine and pastries laced with potassium cyanide.
9 Also known as 'scientific realism' (see for example Psillos, 1996).
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knowledge is oriented to the structures of the world, and may not result in successful
accounts of the events which actually occur. I shall address epistemological and ontological
realism in turn, arguing that both have a conservative tendency to reify current, successful
scientific knowledge, implying its adequacy (either approximation to truth or explanatory
correctness) in the face of problems of understanding.
Recent debates over epistemological realism (henceforth E-realism) were fuelled by
Putnam and Boyd, among others, in the 1960s and 70s. Putnam suggests that the clearest
cases for inferring truth from success are the 'mature' sciences (such as physics) which have
a long and venerable history (Putnam, 1978: 21). In the mature sciences, we can assume that
the theoretical laws are 'typically approximately true' because there is no other reasonable
explanation for their long-term success. To take one of Putnam's examples, if physics is
wrong about the metric structure of space-time then 'it is a miracle that a theory which
speaks of curved space-time successfully predicts phenomena' (Putnam, 1978: 19). Leaving
aside the miracle 'explanation' as a last resort, E-realists believe the only plausible
alternative to be that in the course of long-term successful development scientific knowledge
converges upon the truth about the world. It is no miracle that physics is successful, because
it has discovered the true structure of the world, and captures this in its theories.
Epistemological realists thus use a form of abductive argument, or inference to the best
explanation. The best explanation for success is some form of correspondence with the
world.
Of course, not all sciences are mature, and some sciences that we might now call mature
have not always been so. Nevertheless, these sciences often have a certain degree of success,
and this also needs to be explained by the E-realist. In such cases, these theorists employ the
notion that a successful theory is 'partially true', and argue that succession in scientific
theories involves a 'partially correct/partially incorrect account of a theoretical object' being
'replaced by a better account of the same object or objects' (Putnam, 1978: 19). So, by E-
realist standards, even limited theoretical success is to be understood as the accurate
correspondence of a theory with some aspects of the world.
This connection between success and accurate correspondence is not only
epistemological. For E-realists, it also has important ramifications for our attitude to
theories. Firstly, if a field is mature, then laws which are intended to succeed those already
postulated (and so approximately true) must retain several of their features. The new laws
must not only conserve the true predictions of the old theory, but also retain the earlier
theory as a "limiting case" (Putnam, 1978: 21), that is, demonstrate the correctness of the
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values assigned to theoretical variables in the earlier theory within certain boundary
conditions (which are clearly to be more limited than those in which the later theory
operates). This is not to be viewed only as an instrumental connection between the two
theories but one which implies the 'approximate truth of the theoretical laws of the earlier
theories in certain circumstances' (Putnam, 1978: 20. Author's emphasis).
There are two further requirements derivable from E-realism, these applying to immature
science. Scientists should attempt to conserve the mechanisms of earlier theories 'as often as
possible', and be able to assign meaning to the referents of the old theories in the new
theories (Putnam, 1978: 20, 22). This conservation is to be encouraged because of the
connection between success and (partial) truth. Given the E-realist view that the only viable
explanation for success is partial truth, any time that a theory has been successful scientists
are obliged to retain at least some aspects of it - those which contributed to its success and
therefore partially correspond to the nature of the world. Citing Boyd's work, Putnam
suggests that scientists typically do follow these strictures, preserving the mechanisms of
earlier theories or showing them to be limiting cases of new mechanisms (Putnam, 1978:
20). If scientists actually do follow these policies, E-realism gives an account of the good
reasons why they do so.
The classic response to these E-realist views is Laudan's piece 'A Confutation of
Convergent Realism' (1981a), the substance of which also appears in his Science and Values
(1984). Although his discussion ranges across a number of issues, the central target for
Laudan is the claim that success and truth are closely connected in that the truth of a theory
(its accuracy in corresponding to the world) provides an explanation for its success. Laudan
disputes this claim in several ways.
One fundamental problem with the E-realist account, on Laudan's view, is the idea that
successful theories within science can be seen to be 'approximately true'. Laudan sets up his
argument by suggesting that theories can only claim approximate truth if their central
(success-generating) theoretical terms are held to refer (i.e. their postulated entities actually
exist). However, the history of science contains a large number of successful theories
whose main theoretical entities are not, by the standards of current science, held to exist.
These include: the humoral theory of medicine; the effluvial theory of static electricity; the
caloric and vibratory theories of heat; the vital force theories of physiology; aetherial
theories; and theories of spontaneous generation (Laudan, 1984: 113, 121). Because we do
not believe that the entities and mechanisms postulated by such theories exist, the success of
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the theories cannot be explained by their approximate truth in corresponding to those
aspects.
Laudan considers a possible response to this argument. The epistemological realist could
claim that the only valid grounds for claiming 'approximate truth' are that a science is
mature, and that this might eliminate many of Laudan's examples (1984: 116). However,
suggests Laudan, this is unconvincing for two reasons. Firstly, the definition of what
constitutes a 'mature' science by epistemological realists is very loose, and without rigorous
criteria for defining this stage, a lack of 'maturity' can be claimed any time a theory turns out
not to be (by our standards) approximately true. For E-realists, though, maturity is supposed
to be an independently specifiable criterion which, as we saw above, actually sets restrictions
on the kind of theory change that can legitimately occur. Without properly formulating a
definition of mature science, epistemological realists can always avoid confronting cases
which appear to challenge their account.
Secondly, E-realists are not only committed to the approximate truth ofmature science but
the partial truth of any successful science. This is an aspect of their inference to the best
explanation, because if some successes can be explained without using the notion of
adequate correspondence, this undermines the argument that correspondence is the only
reasonable explanation for the success of science (Laudan, 1984: 22). The cases put forward
by Laudan then provide a difficulty for this position. Although these theories had genuine
success, the fact that we no longer accept that their entities or mechanisms exist suggests that
we cannot describe the theories as even 'partially true'. We should note that an
instrumentalist explication of this concept is too weak to fill this requirement, as E-realist
theories are designed to push the notion of truth beyond instrumental success and connect it
with the really existing entities in the world. Accounting for the success of non-referring
theories thus becomes a problem for E-realism, and a challenge to its inference.
Aside from these epistemological concerns, Laudan also questions the E-realist emphasis
upon the retention of successful theories. On the epistemological realist view, if a theory is
successful, and thus partially true, then scientists should only pursue later theories that
'retain the appropriate portions of earlier theories' (Laudan, 1984: 124). As we have seen, in
the case ofmature sciences the burden of past success is particularly strong, leading to strict
requirements to retain the entities and mechanisms which have produced that success.
Laudan's response to the argument for retention is to suggest that there are frequent cases
in the history of science where the key mechanisms of an earlier successful theory are not
retained by the later theory as a limiting case. The examples that he cites include the shift
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from Ptolemaic to Copernican astronomy, the move from classical to relativistic physics
(which did not retain the mechanisms of the aether), the move from Darwinian to modern
genetics (which did not retain Darwin's notion of pangenesis), and the move from the
corpuscular to the wave theory of light10 (Laudan, 1984: 127). Of course, we might view
these cases as aberrations on the part of the scientists involved, and see these as problematic,
irrational episodes in science. Given our positive evaluation of the successor theories, this
seems unlikely, and Laudan suggests that
some of the most important theoretical innovations have been due to a willingness
of scientists to violate the cumulationist or retentionist constraints which realists
enjoin mature scientists to follow. (Laudan, 1984: 127)
It seems, then, that epistemological realism offers poor advice to practising scientists".
One perfectly legitimate way for science to move forward is for a theory to be replaced by
one which is more successful, but which does not retain a commitment to the entities and
mechanisms of the earlier case12. As Laudan (1984: 130-1) points out, epistemological
realism is 'reactionary' in opposing such change, and forecloses the prospect of deep
ontological shifts in our existing theories (particularly in the mature sciences). Contrary to
E-realism, it is possible that future scientists will conclude that some or most of our
successful theories in fact do not capture the 'truth' about the world, but postulate entities
which come to be viewed as non-existent, in the same way as 'phlogiston', 'aether' and
'caloric' (Laudan, 1984: 131). The inference of approximation to truth as the 'best
explanation' of success comes to be a barrier to successful theoretical development,
10 Of course, listing such cases is merely indicative, and a proper evaluation of these issues requires
close attention to these examples. Laudan discusses further cases elsewhere (Laudan, 1976), one
example of which is the caloric and early kinetic theories of heat. He argues that one of the main
explanatory successes of these theories was their ability to explain the generation of heat by friction.
However, due to problems dealing with other phenomena, the kinetic theories of heat were rejected in
favour of substantial ones, despite, the fact that the latter could not explain frictional heat. Here we
have a theory change in which the loss of a successful mechanism did not cause the successor theory
to be rejected.
11 Furthermore, it is not at all clear that scientists do actually follow realist principles in their own
theory assessments. Obviously this a sizeable empirical question, but Laudan cites a number of
examples which at the very least cast doubt on this notion. He argues that in a range of important
theory shifts, from catastrophist to uniformitarian geology, from Lamarckian to Darwinian
evolutionism and from the corpuscular to the wave theory of light, none of the later theories were
criticised by scientists at the time for failing to preserve the theoretical mechanisms of the earlier,
successful theories (Laudan, 1984: 126).
12 Putnam misleadingly suggests that the desire of scientists to preserve theories in the face of
anomalies is good evidence of a retentionist strategy (Putnam, 1978: 20). However, it seems equally
likely that scientists are not preserving the specific mechanisms and entities of a theory (on the
grounds that they are somewhat truthlike), but are conserving success until a theory comes along that
can demonstrate its pragmatic superiority. As we saw above, given that all theories retain problems
and anomalies, these do not provide grounds for theoretical rejection on their own.
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recommending conservative theory choices over those which other sense-making criteria
support.
Of course, the debate over epistemological realism did not come to an end with Laudan's
contribution, and E-realists such as Leplin (1997), Kitcher (1993), and Psillos (1996) have
developed responses to Laudan's claims. Although their arguments are somewhat diverse,
the main E-realist tactic is to distil a notion of 'success' that is tight enough to warrant an
inference to the truth of a theory characterised as successful in that way. Leplin (1997) does
this by arguing that only a certain subset of theories, those which have produced novel
predictions, are best explained by their partial truth. Psillos and Kitcher take a somewhat
different approach, attempting to trace back through scientific developments to discover
which parts of earlier theories contributed to their success and which did not. On these
grounds they hope to show that the parts of theories which contributed to success were those
retained by later theories. If this can be done, then one cannot claim, as does Laudan, that
successful theories of the past have been falsified by new developments; genuine success can
be reconnected to truthlikeness.
Interesting though these arguments are, they fail to deal with the strongest argument
against epistemological realism. No matter how carefully demarcated the list of theories
argued to be true/partially true is, the claim for their truthfulness is being made in a situation
where science is incomplete, and some phenomena are as yet unexplained. In such a
situation, there is no guarantee that even our best, most successful scientific theories will not
have to be reconstructed in order to account for those unaccounted occurrences. In other
words, no matter how good the positive categories of a theory are, they may need to be
reconstructed in order to account for residual phenomena. The attempt to designate theories
(or parts of theories) as true operates to reify those categories that are currently successful,
even though scientists' attempts to continue improving knowledge may require the
reconstruction of those theories. In many respects this reification is a more ambitious one
than that employed in defence of an unquestionable observation language, as the E-realist
argument for the truth of theories must rest on the indubitability not only of simple
observational predicates, but large chunks of theoretical argument.
Of course, if the success achieved by a superseded theory is not a product of chance, we
would expect that the regularity it accounted for will be made explicable by a later theory'3.
13 Laudan argues that this should not be taken as a necessary criterion for the greater adequacy of a
later theory, as there may be other grounds for preferring it (Laudan, 1977). However, we would




It is important to see, however, that this is not the same as a theory being 'partially true', in
the sense referred to by epistemological realists. In E-realist terms, partial truth means the
adequate correspondence of some part of the theory to the world as it actually is, with the
consequence that some categories must remain unchanged because of their truthfulness. In
the analysis offered here, if a theory is 'partially adequate', it usefully grasps a regularity
which should be accounted for by later theories, although those later theories need not use
any of the terms of the earlier accounts.
I would argue that this undermines the force of the E-realist 'no miracle' argument, which
articulates the intuition that the success of a theory must be a mystery if it is not at least
partially 'true'. The critical historicist response is that we expect the regularities discovered
by earlier theories to be explicable, but they may well be part of a wider pattern which can
only be accounted for in terms not reducible to those of the earlier theory. Once again, we
can think of the shift from Newtonian to Einsteinian theories of mass; Einstein's theory
makes sense of a wide range of regularities, including those accounted for by Newton's, but
does not do so using Newton's terms. E-realists imply that the success of an earlier theory
must be either 'miraculous' or the result of that theory's 'partial truth'. Instead, we can
argue that (a) a theory was successful because it accounted for some regular fragment of a
wider pattern of phenomena (thus its success was not a miracle); and (b) a change of
theoretical terms was required to account for the wider pattern (thus the earlier theory was
not partially true). Successful theories from earlier scientific activity need not be thought of
as partially true, but simply partially adequate (as are all theories until the completion of
science14).
If epistemological realists reject the sufficiency of conceptual adequacy on the grounds
that the required inference to truth is not made, ontological realists reject it on the grounds
that science is not oriented to the pattern of events that occur, but understanding the
structures generating those events. The key writer here is Roy Bhaskar, whose works have
been extremely influential within British sociology, particularly in its Marxist forms. I shall
be arguing that although his claims have different grounds than those of E-realists, they
ultimately produce the same effect by encouraging the hypostatisation of current successful
science.
14 It is important to note the extent to which this licenses 'pessimism' about science. Certainly, E-
realists are correct to see that pragmatist arguments encourage pessimism about the possibility that
our current theories are 'true' or 'approximately true'. However, if one takes the measure of science
to be pragmatic adequacy, then there is no cause for concern, given that later (untrue) theories are
often more adequate than earlier (untrue) theories.
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For Bhaskar, it is crucial to distinguish two domains of reality, the real and the actual,
between which there is an ontological gap15 (Bhaskar, 1975). The domain of the real is the
deeper level, and consists in the basic mechanisms which generate surface events at the level
of the actual. One way to illustrate this split is to use the example of a clock: inside a clock
there is a mechanism (the domain of the real) which generates the movement of the hands on
the surface (the domain of the actual). However, the parallel between a clock and the
complexities of event generation in the universe is limited, and this difference illustrates
Bhaskar's key argument. In a clock there is a single generative mechanism which (except in
rare cases ofmechanical failure) is constantly conjoined with the position of the hands on the
clock face. In the universe, conversely, there are many complex and heterogeneous
mechanisms generating the surface outcomes at the level of events. It is as if underneath the
clock face, there were hundreds or thousands of mechanisms all pushing and pulling the
hands in different directions, thus generating a complex and chaotic set of hand-positions on
the face itself.
The separation of the 'real' and the 'actual' necessitates a parallel distinction, between
explanatory and predictive knowledge. For Bhaskar, explanation is an activity concerned
with locating and theorising the deep structures that generate outcomes on the surface of
events, whereas prediction is oriented only to the actual events themselves. There are,
according to Bhaskar, some occasions when the two activities coincide. Such occasions
arise in 'closed systems', that is situations where only one generative mechanism is able to
express itself, the others being held constant or removed from influence. When there is a
closed system, explanations and predictions line up with one another, and if we can explain
the character of the mechanism at work, we can predict what the outcome will be. However,
closed systems rarely emerge spontaneously, and are typically brought about by human
experimental activity. The vast majority of situations involve open systems, characterised by
the chaotic play of complex and qualitatively different processes and objects.
When dealing with open systems, the tasks of explanation and prediction are quite
different. Explanation in open systems is concerned with locating the antecedent events and
underlying tendencies or processes that contributed to the events that actually occurred. It
thus deals with the level of the real. Prediction, however, is directed only towards the events
themselves, that is, the actual outcomes. Because of the chaotic nature of open systems,
although our predictions may be defeated, no explanatory theory is 'disconfirmed by the
15 In fact, Bhaskar separates off a third level termed the 'empirical' which is the level of experienced
events (Bhaskar, 1975: 56). However, this distinction is not important to my discussion here.
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contrary behaviour of the uncontrolled world' (Bhaskar, 1975: 119). We may have a
justifiable explanatory understanding of some mechanism(s) but find that in an open system
other mechanisms are influencing events, leading to unpredictable results.
According to Bhaskar, the difference between explanation and prediction is highlighted in
certain scientific areas where they are clearly distinct. For example, Bhaskar suggests that in
the field ofmeteorology the predictions that can be offered are fairly unsound because of the
'instability of the phenomena' (Bhaskar, 1975: 119). Nevertheless, good explanations can
be offered after the event, drawing on physical laws that have been confirmed by
experiments using closed systems16. Likewise, good explanations may be less useful for
prediction than simple generalisations or rules of thumb, because of the difference between
studying mechanisms and studying events (Bhaskar, 1975: 136). The difference between
explanation and prediction can also be emphasised by pointing to the distinct skills required
for each. Good prediction is holistic, involves thinking at different levels at once, and
putting together diverse bits of information, whereas good explanation requires
individuation, focusing only on the specific mechanism of interest, and filtering out
information about all others (1978: 120).
Having so far discussed Bhaskar's separation of explanation and prediction, it is important
to indicate that he does not view the two activities as equally central to science. Rather, the
purpose of science is to gain explanatory knowledge of the real mechanisms that operate in
the universe. As Bhaskar puts it:
the ultimate objects of scientific understandings are neither patterns of events nor
models but the things that produce and the mechanisms that generate the flux of the
phenomena of the world. (Bhaskar, 1975:66)
Science is concerned with an explanation of the level of the real. Successfully accounting
for the pattern of events, ofwhich prediction is one aspect17, is neither a primary concern nor
a necessary result of scientific investigation.
16 Bhaskar's position is that explanation in open systems must rely on laws confirmed in closed
systems. He states in his critique of falsificationism that 'events may be explained in open and closed
systems alike, but...law-like statements may only be falsified under effectively closed conditions
(where deductive test predictions are possible)' (Bhaskar, 1975: 136). As Collier (1994) notes,
however, this raises problems when it comes to explanations in social science. This is because
Bhaskar insists that societies are open systems, leaving no possibility of generating social scientific
laws through 'deductive test predictions'. Although Bhaskar makes some remarks in The Possibility
ofNaturalism about possible experiment analogues, these seem weak, and Bhaskar does not fully face
up to the problem of explanation in social science.
17 As noted earlier, accounting for events of the past properly may not have a predictive pay-off,
making prediction a sub-category of wider sense-making activities.
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On the face of it, these arguments undermine the idea introduced earlier that the
conceptual adequacy of a theory is to be measured by its ability to offer a coherent account
of events. If they are correct, we must distinguish knowledge of the objects and processes of
a domain from knowledge of events, prioritising the former. However, we can start to probe
Bhaskar's arguments by examining the gap between the real and the actual. Bhaskar is
certainly correct to emphasise that outcomes at the level of events are typically generated by
a large number of influences. By itself, this does not necessitate the inference that
knowledge of the real will necessarily be distinct from knowledge of the actual. In fact, on
this model, we can argue that in circumstances of complete knowledge, our account of the
real (i.e. postulated structures) and the actual (i.e. events that occur) should converge. As
explanatory knowledge improves, we understand more of the structures generating the
actual, and thus improve our understanding of the pattern of events. A full explanatory
understanding of the real would result in a completely coherent account of occurrences on
the level of the actual. On this view, any difference or gap between our account of the real
mechanisms and occurrences on the level of the actual is a problem of understanding.
Explanatory understanding in such cases is a limited form of the knowledge of events, not a
superior mode. Defending explanatory categories where they do not account for the
outcomes they are held to generate involves a refusal to reconstruct one's positive categories
in the face of explanatory problems.
On this basis, we can question whether Bhaskar's use of meteorology really backs up his
argument about the split between explanation and prediction. His claim is that although
meteorologists' predictions frequently fail, they use well-grounded explanatory laws to
'retrodict the antecedent events and states by means ofwhich they both explain what actually
happened and excuse their forecasts of it' (Bhaskar, 1975: 119). However, we can
legitimately ask why laws which provide a good post hoc explanation cannot be used to
provide an accurate prediction. Presumably, the reason for this is that information
contingently lacking beforehand is available after the event, so that scientists can then
propose an adequate explanation. The difference between prediction and explanation in this
case is thus no more than the difference between an account of events offered without all the
required information (prediction), and an account of events offered with all the required
information (explanation). There is no reason to postulate an ontological distinction to
account for this difference.
Apart from arguments which rest upon contingent issues of information, Bhaskar offers
other reasons why explanation and prediction, and thus knowledge of the real and the actual,
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must be viewed as distinct. These reasons are based upon there being an ultimate lack of fit
between the real properties of structures and things, and the events that occur on the level of
the actual. For this to be the case, it is not enough that the actual does not clearly display the
effects of one structure because of the multiple determinations operating. Rather, it must be
that even ifwe were to fully understand all structures, mechanisms and properties at the level
of the real, we would still be unable to account for all events on the level of the actual. As
Bhaskar puts it:
there is a distance between the laws of science and the ordinary phenomena of the
world, including the phenomena of our actual and possible experience. (Bhaskar,
1975:111)
Bhaskar puts forward two main types of case in which the actual events are not
determined by real structures. The first of these is the operation of agency, the second the
presence of heterogeneity and multiplicity of influence, and although they overlap to some
extent, I will treat them separately here.
Bhaskar's argument about agents is that there are items in the world whose behaviour
cannot be understood as a 'determined' response to some set of antecedent conditions. The
complexity of certain items means that no amount of knowledge of the causes operating
upon them can lead to an accurate prediction of the outcome. Scientific laws do not
determine the behaviour of such 'agents', but only set limits on their activities which act as a
constraint of possibility (Bhaskar, 1975: 105). Bhaskar thus argues for the 'autonomy of
things' (Bhaskar, 1975: 108), in that there exists agent-centred causation which is not the
result of an antecedent condition (1975: 107). Agents are not fully determined by the laws
of the universe, and even if we had complete knowledge of such laws, we would still be
unable to account for the actual events that occur. Bhaskar states:
From the normic and non-empirical nature of laws...I conclude that the world is a
world of agents incompletely described. (Bhaskar, 1975: 114)
Although Bhaskar's definition of 'agents' as 'particulars which are centres of power'
(1975:111) is a very broad definition, one of his paradigm cases is that of human beings18.
Human beings have to conform to physical laws in their activities but are not determined by
them.
18 This is unsurprising given that Bhaskar's philosophy of social science relies on the idea that one can
distinguish between 'structure' and 'agency'. In fact, it could be argued that Bhaskar's emphasis on




As Bhaskar puts it:
What I can do is constrained by the operation of natural laws. But I can hack my
way all over the physical world, defeating empirical generalizations. (Bhaskar,
1975:113)
For Bhaskar, then, agency operates in situations where the behaviour of items cannot be
accounted for solely by antecedent conditions (Bhaskar, 1975: 107).
The central case where 'agency' applies is that of emergence, where a new level of being
is generated whose behaviour cannot be explained by the laws of a Tower' level. This
process is well-exemplified by the emergence of organic life from physical or chemical
elements, generating a new set ofmaterials which have causal powers not reducible to those
operating on the physio-chemical level (Bhaskar, 1975: 113). Although organic life is bound
by those lower-level laws, it nevertheless has the ability to 'determine the conditions under
which physical laws apply' (Bhaskar, 1975: 113). For example, although human beings are
constrained by physical laws, they can nevertheless engage in a wide variety of activities, the
choice of which is not determined by those laws. The same partial autonomy from lower
levels is manifest in all cases of emergence, the higher level structures having properties
irreducible to those of the lower level.
Agency is thus associated with emergence. But it is questionable whether this establishes
the 'autonomy of things' referred to by Bhaskar. He seems to be arguing that agency
involves a certain degree of 'freedom' or even 'self-determination' within the parameters of
the real structural forces operating in the universe. It is on this basis that the real and the
actual might not line up with one another, our knowledge of the real not encompassing
agentic activities which would produce unpredictable outcomes on the level of the actual.
Thus, Bhaskar remarks:
There is a space between the laws of physics and physiology and what I do within
which deliberation, choice and voluntary behaviour have room to apply. (Bhaskar,
1975:111)
However, as Collier (1994: 129-130) notes, Bhaskar ends up arguing only that some levels
of activity are relatively autonomous from other levels. This does not establish that
occurrences at higher levels are not determined by real structural forces, just that they are not




...the behaviour of e.g. animate things is not determined by physical laws alone.
But that does not mean that their behaviour is not completely determined: only that
an area of autonomy is marked out which is the site of a putatively independent
science. (Bhaskar, 1975: 114)
Presuming, as seems reasonable, that the new science involves discovering the real structural
determinations operating at a higher level, it is not clear that we must invoke 'agent'
causality as well as 'antecedent' causality. It may well be the case that human activities
cannot be explained using physical laws alone. This does not entail that they are
inexplicable using any laws, merely that we need to add in our understanding of various
biological, psychological and socio-cultural structures to provide a full explanation. What is
required is a careful appraisal of the different causes operating at different levels and their
interplay. As our knowledge of 'real' determinations progresses, we should gain an
increasing ability to account for occurrences on the level of the actual. There is thus no
reason why the emergence of relatively autonomous levels of being should result in a
misalignment of the real and the actual, as Bhaskar implies.
The idea that emergence generates unpredictable agency is a sub-category of Bhaskar's
more general argument that the multiplicity of determinations operating in the universe
generates a split between the real and the actual. He suggests that:
...it is possible to give a complete explanation of an event without thereby being in
a position to deduce it, namely if the different generative mechanisms at work are
of radically different kinds... (Bhaskar, 1975: 137)
A complete explanation may fail to account for the actual events if the mechanisms involved
operate on different levels, because we may have no knowledge of the 'mode of articulation'
of these levels (Bhaskar, 1975: 119). For Bhaskar, lack of such knowledge should not be
taken to be a failing of science, but a consequence of the complexity and multiplicity of the
world (Bhaskar, 1975: 125). As Bhaskar states:
The transcendental realist sees the various sciences as attempting to understand
things and structures in themselves, at their own level of being, without making
reference to the diverse conditions under which they exist and act, and as making
causal claims which are specific to the events and individuals concerned.
(Bhaskar, 1975: 78)
Our knowledge can thus only extend to understanding structures 'in themselves' and 'at their
own level of being'. We may have full explanatory knowledge of structures but find
ourselves unable to understand the outcome of their interplay.
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This argument has not convinced all of those with realist sympathies. Ted Benton argues
that the existence of complexity and plurality does not rule out predictive understanding of
actual outcomes. After all, even if multiple mechanisms are at play, why shouldn't we be
able to calculate their resultant effects? Predictions made on such grounds may not be
perfect, and delimit a range of possibilities rather than a single outcome, but they could be
reliable none the less (Benton, 1981: 18). As with the case of emergence, complexity does
not necessarily lead to unintelligible outcomes on the level of events, but the need for
understanding of the actual to take into account several levels of determination.
For Bhaskar to avoid this response, he needs to argue that the interplay of different
mechanisms may generate event-level outcomes which cannot be explained by reference to
the 'real' characteristics of the structures involved. Only in this way can he insist that one
can have a full explanatory understanding of the real, and yet be unable to predict events at
the level of the actual. However, such an argument starts to look like dubious theoretical
protectionism in which the real structures proclaimed by the theorist to be generating events
are defended even though they cannot account for the events that actually occur. In other
words, the 'real structures' are revealed as the positive categories of the theorist's system
which s/he refuses to reconstruct even when they cannot account for the phenomena in
question, leaving some actual events unaccounted for (residual). The claim to be addressing
theoretical structures 'in themselves' and 'at their own level of being' operates as an
arbitrary restriction upon what we might come to know about the structures generating
events in the world19. If there are surprising interactions between different kinds of
structures, these must surely be explicable in terms of the real properties of those structures
involved, and thus a subject for knowledgeable investigation. We cannot assert that our
knowledge of the relevant mechanisms is explanatorily complete when these mechanisms
combine to make new and interesting outcomes that we do not understand. Rather, we
should view surprising outcomes as anomalies which we must account for by developing our
understanding. A full explanatory understanding of the real structures generating events
would thus Tine up' exactly with the pattern of events on the level of the actual. Neither
emergence nor the complexity of determinations involved in generating events suggests that
knowledge of the real and actual should be separated because of an ontological gap between
19 It is not clear what the phrase 'level of being' is supposed to delineate here. Presumably any time
that a structure influences events that constitutes a relevant expression of its 'being'. One can only
surmise that the 'level' Bhaskar is indicating is constituted by the properties of the structure already
known. To reify these understandings on the basis of ontology seems dubious given the possible need
to reconstruct concepts as 'structures' to better account for events.
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their domains. As Holmwood and Stewart point out, the attempt to separate the
characteristics of levels in this manner is a problematic response to explanatory failure. By
arguing that the levels have separate characteristics, theorists avoid acknowledging that the
lack of coherence between levels reveals problems of understanding to be resolved
(Holmwood and Stewart, 1991, especially Chpt. 4). Bhaskar's arguments create a gap into
which scientists can push their explanatory problems, helping them to avoid reconstructing
their explanations when they fail to deal successfully with reality20.
1.5 Assessing understanding: commensurability and progress
So far in this chapter I have been outlining a view of scientific practice as an ongoing
sense-making activity which has no guarantee of success. I have defended this critical
historicist approach against various forms of realism, claiming that by locating adequacy
outside of understandings (in 'truth' or 'real structures') successful understandings are
treated as if they need no further reconstruction. However, one crucial issue has yet to be
broached. We have yet to consider the validity of scientific theories, and the warrant that
can be claimed for them. Such matters are particularly pressing when we consider the
frequency with which conflicting theories arise within science. Here I will be arguing that
the notion of the most conceptually adequate theory can be developed to account for
progress in understanding in a way that requires neither external reference nor fixed
standards of knowledge in order to avoid relativism. Knowledge should be understood as a
repository of the best conceptual achievements developed so far, that is the most successful
modes of accounting for events in the world currently available. However, to establish this
will require discussing and rejecting claims that such accounts must collapse into relativism.
It was argued at the beginning of this chapter that scientific activity has no guarantees.
This claim involves two elements. Firstly, there are no 'facts' or 'structures' in the world
that we can apprehend with such certainty that our understandings of them may not be
reconstructed if necessary, in order to make better sense of our interactions with the world.
Secondly, there are no standards governing the validity of our understandings that guarantee
a successful interaction with the world. To some extent, we can see this as a good thing,
suggesting as it does the continued room for human creativity and ingenuity in the process of
making knowledge. Scientists are not mere automatons filling out routines that guarantee
20 One might suggest that Bhaskar's adherence to Marxism involves treating the structural
mechanisms proposed by Marx as real, and consigning the anomalies generated by them to agency
and complexity. This avoids the task of reconstructing Marx's categories to turn these anomalies into
elements that are systematically accounted for.
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the validity of the understandings produced. More problematically, it means that the spectre
of relativism lurks ominously over our claims to justification. Within the twentieth century,
a large proportion of the anti-relativist thinking within the philosophy of science has
attempted to employ stable empirical facts, referents or scientific standards in order to guard
against relativism. Many thinkers would argue that if none of these conditions can be
fulfilled, then relativism must ensue. Here, I will be attempting to provide plausible
arguments that this is not the case. To do so, I shall be drawing upon ideas from the work of
Laudan (1984, 1996) and Shapere (1984), both of whom offer historically sensitive accounts
of the development of understanding in science, while trying to avoid the relativist
conclusions of historically oriented thinkers such as Kuhn and social constructionists.
Issues of theory comparison and relativism have been tackled in a variety of ways within
the philosophy of science. Here I want to argue that theory comparison is a test of the
conceptual resourcefulness of theories. As such, I will focus on the logic of particular
theoretical disagreements and argue that the goal in such cases is to discover if one theory is
demonstrably more coherent and systematic than another. From this perspective, the most
important question is: does one theory provide a more successful mode of accounting for the
material world than its competitors? If we can reach reasoned decisions about the adequacy
of theories, then this provides a basis for our theoretical judgements. Such assessments of
validity can also be used to analyse whether a series of theoretical developments is
progressive or otherwise, depending on its increasing or decreasing resourcefulness.
The relativistic alternative to this perspective suggests that we cannot distinguish between
the validity of competing theories. However, this argument must be stronger than the claim
that it is not always possible to distinguish which of two competing theories is more valid at
some particular time and state of evidence. Those emphasising the rationality of theory
choice would accept that there is sometimes not enough evidence yet gathered to settle
competing claims. Rather, relativists must demonstrate that important theoretical disputes
cannot be resolved in principle. If this can be demonstrated, then we must accept that
competing theories are incommensurable, and that it is not possible to decide which accounts
better for events in the world. I will be hoping to avoid this conclusion by indicating how
theoretical disputes can, in general, be resolved.
In order to think about the development of understanding, it is useful to start from the
most elementary form of theoretical comparison, and use this as a basis to work towards a
more sophisticated notion. Such comparison is limited to assessing the adequacy of the
substantive categories of a theory. In discussing this, we must temporarily set aside the fact
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that theoretical standards may be different for competing theories, and examine how
judgements of superiority can be made if we assume a stable set of scientific standards
shared by competitors.
The most simple form of theoretical progress is that of a single theory developing over
time. From the post-positivist perspective discussed earlier, this kind of development is
achieved when a certain group of categories are persistently applied by a community of
scientists, in order to expand their ability to account for the world. In this situation there are
two types of element, the set of systematic understandings which orient scientific activity,
providing some ordering of the domain, and the set of anomalies which cannot be
systematically dealt with at the present time. The aim of scientists is to develop the existing
understandings, or positive categories, in order to incorporate more of the phenomena that
are currently anomalous, occupying residual categories. This is the kind of progress
envisaged by post-positivist philosophers of science, for instance, by Kuhn in his account of
normal scientific activity. In the terms of this thesis, as positive categories expand, this
increases scientists' scope to deal successfully with the impact of the material world. The
form of theoretical progress here is relatively unproblematic; by its own standards, a theory
is progressing if it can systematically account for more and more phenomena in its domain.
The picture becomes more complicated when we imagine that there are two different
theories which share the same standards, but have conflicting substantive claims. In such a
case, we want to be able to decide which theory offers the more resourceful interaction with
the world. Even if theoretical standards are shared between competitors there can still be
difficulties in making a reasoned assessment of competing theories. This is because the
substantive categories held by the competitors may be quite different to one another, as
exemplified by the clash between Newtonian mechanics and special relativity. The problem
faced by scientists is how to manufacture neutral tests of the theories that will allow us to
distinguish between the adequacy of two sets of understandings. It is this kind of difficulty
that Kuhn identifies when he argues that scientists who employ competing theories operate
in 'different worlds' populated by different substantive entities and processes (Kuhn, 1970:
150). Logical positivists would suggest that disputes could be resolved by using a
foundational observation language to establish which theory was in line with the
observational 'facts' of the matter. As we have seen above, the idea that such an observation
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language exists has been strongly challenged, in part because of Kuhn's work21. We are then
left with a problem of how to resolve disputes between scientists operating in different
worlds22.
The first thing to say about this situation is to underline the simple but fundamental point
that for there to be an issue of reasoned debate here, there must be real conflict and
competition at the substantive level and not mere difference. For example, molecular
biology and astrophysics postulate different kinds of entities in their theories. However,
their theories are not in conflict with one another, because they are not making different
claims about the same subject matter; there is no theoretical disagreement which they are
attempting to rationally settle. As Bhaskar usefully puts it:
Special relativity is in conflict with Newtonian mechanics, but not the Battle of
Hastings, Lymeswold cheese or the rules of chess, although these are all
undeniably different. (Bhaskar, 1986: 79)
Thus, we must not confuse situations of theoretical difference, where it does not make sense
to talk of a reasoned assessment of the superiority of one view to the other, with those of
competition, where disagreement may be productively resolved. The failure to explain how
we might reasonably decide between 'different' theories provides no support for the
relativist. Conversely, the inability to show how genuine disputes can be resolved gives
weight to the relativist argument.
The problem of resolving disputes between theories with quite different substantive
categories is not as difficult as it may seem. Theories which compete with one another are in
agreement that they, at some level, deal with the same phenomena. This agreement is the
shared premise of the theories, and is what indicates that they are competing and not
21 It is worth noting that Bhaskar's solution to the incommensurability problem is based on a similar
attempt to find a non-theoretical ground for theory communication and comparison. He locates this in
the realm of ontology, arguing that theoretical debate is only intelligible if theories refer to the same
intransitive objects (Bhaskar, 1986: 70-80). However, this runs into problems in relation to
apparently meaningful debates over objects which are held by later theories to be non-existent, such
as 'ether'. As Holmwood and Stewart argue, Bhaskar's approach displays the ontological realist
tendency to project current theoretical categories into the ontological level, rather than accepting that
these categories may be totally transformed by theoretical development (Holmwood and Stewart,
1991: 18-9).
22 I have set aside issues of 'communication' here in favour of focusing on issues of 'comparison'.
The remarks that Kuhn makes about strict problems of communication are rather banal. He suggests
that the same term may have a different meaning for different paradigms, and this can be a source of
confusion (Kuhn, 1970: 149). It is hard to imagine that linguistic confusions over the meaning of
terms like 'earth' cause continuing difficulties in communication, just as there is only a limited
amount of misunderstanding likely when I use the term 'plant' as both a noun and verb. The
problems indicated by Kuhn are really problems with grasping conceptual innovation, for example




complementary. The dispute results from the fact that, at the present time, different
conclusions can justifiably be drawn from the premises that are agreed upon. To decide
between the theories, tests must be set up which discriminate between the adequacy of the
different conclusions postulated. The existence of different conclusions will allow us to test
the theories, in order to see which line of thought provides the better account of experimental
outcomes. One potential block to producing decisive test-results is that theories may
describe the world in different ways, and thus describe the test-results differently. However,
as Hesse points out, in order to test theories we do not need to find an observation language
that is neutral for all time, just a way of characterising the results of tests which is neutral
between the two theories, and which both sets of scientists can agree will discriminate
between the theories (see Chpt.l of Hesse, 1974). Once we have worked out the theoretical
grounds which can neutrally characterise the dispute, we can go about designing a test that
will distinguish between the predictions made by the competing theories. It may take time
and ingenuity in order to devise such a test, and it may be the case that on our current
capability we cannot carry out this test because of limitations elsewhere in our knowledge or
available instrumentation. However, this does not provide support for the relativist position,
as relativists must suggest in principle that theories cannot be distinguished, not that we may
be unable to distinguish theories until we can gather the appropriate evidence. If we can
state what outcomes would distinguish the superiority of one theory from another, then we
have avoided relativism, although our actual capacity to make the decision may not yet have
been produced.
Hesse constructs a useful example of how a conflict between theories with different
substantive ontologies can be resolved (Hesse, 1974: 35-7). In this example, the goal is to
distinguish between Anaximenes' and Aristotle's theories of fall. For Anaximenes, the
universe has a preferred direction of fall, parallel and perpendicular to the surface of the
disc-shaped world on which Greece is situated. For Aristotle, items fall toward the centre of
the (spherical) world, always travelling in line with radii extending from the centre of this
sphere. As Hesse notes, the concept of 'fall' is theoretically loaded and somewhat distinct
for each thinker. For Anaximenes it refers to a particular direction of travel that is uniform
throughout space. Conversely, for Aristotle, it refers to motion towards the centre of the
earth along the lines of radii from that point. Hesse suggests, however, that even given their
substantive theoretical divergence, it is possible to design an experiment to distinguish
between these theories. What is required is that shared presuppositions can be employed in
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order to generate a neutral test-situation that does not favour one theory or other, but the
result of which will distinguish them.
The experiment would go as follows: Anaximenes and Aristotle are blindfolded and taken
to the other side of the earth (the blindfold is necessary to avoid predistinguishing the
theories based on the shape of the earth). They can agree that they are on the other side of
the world given the position of the stars, this being a presupposition shared by both theories.
They can also agree upon how to describe the motion of a stone that is released (it travels
towards the earth or away from it). However, each expects that when a stone is released it
will travel in a different direction. Anaximenes believes that it will travel away from the
surface of the earth (in line with the universe's direction of fall), and Aristotle believes that it
will travel towards the surface of the earth (along the line of a radii from the centre). As we
now know, if the experiment was conducted the stone would travel towards the earth,
suggesting the superiority of Aristotle's account.
We have seen here that it is possible to distinguish substantively different theories by
manufacturing a situation where they have competing expectations about some event. The
experiment does not rely upon a neutral observation language, but only a means of
describing the experimental situation and outcome which both participants can agree upon
(in the above example this involves factors like the position of the experimenters, and
whether a stone is moving towards the surface of the earth or away from it). Of course, the
theorists have different substantive expectations, but the experiment is designed so that both
can accept that their conflicting expectations are being tested in a neutral manner.
Translating the experimental result into critical historicist terms, the successful theory
demonstrates the power of its positive categories by being able to systematically account for
a new test result. Likewise, the unsuccessful theory has a new anomaly to deal with, which
remains a problem for the theory, and interactions with the world using that theory, until it is
given a systematic account. In relation to this problem, one theory has proved more
resourceful than another.
This cannot be the end of the matter, however. Extrapolating from arguments made by
Quine in 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' (1953), some thinkers have argued that theoretical
tests of the kind discussed above cannot be used to distinguish the success of theories in the
way I have defended above. The basis of this claim is the 'underdetermination' thesis, which
argues that the evidence that we gain from tests always underdetermines the theoretical
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consequences that we take from it. In its strong formulation23, it could be argued that the
outcome of a test cannot be used to distinguish which theory is more practically successful at
dealing with some particular phenomenon. I shall consider this strong formulation here, as it
provides the main challenge to the account given above24.
The argument for strong underdetermination goes as follows. When new evidence is
presented with which a specific theory is inconsistent (say that produced by a recently
conducted experiment), it is not the case that this simply demonstrates the lack of resources
of the theory to deal with this evidence. This is because what is being challenged is not
simply one theory but a whole web of theories and auxiliary information which all play some
part in producing the relevant theoretical expectation. In other words, the character of theory
testing is holistic. The understandings employed in tests can range from things like optical
theories, to theories of other domains, to basic presuppositions that evidence collectors were
reliable and were not hallucinating or otherwise operating suboptimally. Crucially, in the
face of recalcitrant evidence, we may alter a part of our understanding which is not directly
connected to the specific theory in question. So, to take an example mentioned above, if the
observed location of the moon does not fit with a particular gravitational theory, the scientist
may retain the gravitational theory and challenge the observational theory which was used to
locate the moon.
The strong underdetermination argument generalises from this possibility to argue that by
making alterations to other understandings and auxiliaries, any theory can give an equally
systematic account of some particular set of evidence. Whereas I argued above that evidence
can be used to discriminate the resourcefulness of theories, the underdetermination argument
claims that this is not the case. Apparently recalcitrant evidence can be given a systematic
account within any theory by making the appropriate adjustments elsewhere. Whatever
evidence that one might produce can be equally well accounted for by competing modes of
understanding, leading to relativist conclusions about the possibility of discriminating
theoretical validity.
Larry Laudan identifies what is wrong with this argument. It is certainly true that by
making appropriate adjustments, one can stop a body of theory from clashing with a
23 Laudan (1996) usefully clarifies different forms of the underdetermination argument and suggests
the need to distinguish the more conservative and defensible forms from those tending to relativism.
24 Weaker forms of the underdetermination thesis might suggest that the evidence derived from tests
does not uniquely support any one particular theory. However, this does not mean that carefully
chosen tests cannot distinguish the resourcefulness of some two specific theories that are currently
held to be plausible. That is to say, although evidence may not support one theory uniquely, this does
not mean that it supports every theory equally (see for discussion Laudan, 1996: 41-2).
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particular set of evidence. However, there is no reason to think that the resulting body of
belief will be as resourceful as any of its competitors (Laudan, 1996: 36-8). After all, in
order to avoid contradicting the evidence it may well be necessary to sacrifice a whole set of
beliefs that were resourceful in dealing with a certain area, and for which there is no
replacement.
As an example of this process we can consider the rejection of an observational theory
which is blamed for the lack of fit between evidence and a general theory. A scientist argues
that the observational theory should be rejected, and is the source of the inconsistency.
Nevertheless, unless a good alternative observational theory is produced, then this scientist
loses all the resources of systematic categorisation that the initial theory had, and decreases
his or her ability to deal successfully with the domain covered by it. Of course, as is the case
in the Newton-Flamsteed interaction, it may well be that the scientist does have a systematic
alternative conception, and that this expands the resourcefulness of the original. However,
this theoretical success cannot be assumed, and, like any theorising, requires work and
creative insight in order to be achieved.
The real issue here, then, is not to avoid clashing with a set of evidence, but to be able to
produce a consistent account of it. Producing a consistent and thus resourceful account is
not a simple or unproblematic process. While it may be possible to preserve the resources of
part of a theory by altering understandings elsewhere, without serious labour and theoretical
success, alterations are likely to decrease the general resourcefulness of the understandings
employed. Certainly, the most simple alterations that will avoid a clash with evidence are
those which simply hive off the capacity of some part of the general theoretical network.
Thus, emphasising the holistic character of theory testing does not mean that the adequacy of
theories can always be preserved regardless of the evidence. Rather it means that it is
possible to trade off the resourcefulness of one part of the theory so that (until further
evidence arrives) the adequacy -of another part is preserved. This still gives us grounds for
wider theory comparisons based upon the general resourcefulness of each theory complex.
The general underdetermination argument is pressing because it states that when we
compare any two theories with available evidence, we cannot distinguish between their
adequacy in accounting for this evidence. It should be noted that even if a theory which
initially clashes with evidence can be reconstructed in order to become consistent with it, this
does not establish underdetermination. This is because the evidence made it necessary for
theoretical reconstruction to occur, so that we are now assessing a new theory, even if part of
it has remained unchanged. Furthermore, unless this reconstruction has proved to be equally
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as resourceful as the theory complex that it is competing with, then we still have grounds for
favouring its competitor. For these reasons, the strong underdetermination argument is
unconvincing.
This concludes our examination of the most simple types of theoretical assessment, which
has raised three important points. Firstly, we must be very careful to distinguish mere
difference from conflict and competition. There is no reason to think that we can or should
be able to rationally decide which of two different theories is superior to the other. As such,
the crucial point for relativism is to establish that we cannot rationally decide between
theories that are in conflict with one another. Secondly, when comparing theories, our
understanding that they conflict with one another provides the basis for generating tests that
will distinguish the adequacy of one theory from another. We do not need to step outside of
these theories in order to do this, but instead locate the overlap between theories and use this
as the testing ground. It seems that the production of such tests is possible, undermining the
idea that some degree of object-level incommensurability leads to relativism. Thirdly, the
testing of theories is holistic, but this does not mean that we cannot make valid assessments
regarding which theory complex is currently the most resourceful, and deals most
successfully with particular problems.
It is now time to turn to more complicated cases of theory comparison. So far we have
considered only comparisons where substantive matters were at issue. However, our
understandings do not merely consist of substantive theoretical elements, but also contain
certain standards which delineate what is a valuable and productive approach to gaining
understanding from what is not. These standards may be low-level methodological rules,
such as those governing the proper use of statistical data, or outlining how a particular type
of experiment should be undertaken. Alternatively, they may be higher-level rules such as
those delineating good evidence from bad, or limitations on what forms of explanation are
legitimate.
The importance of these standards for considering issues of progress is emphasised by
Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. He suggests that science does progress
within the framework of a paradigm, whereby understandings are being developed in line
with a certain set of standards governing what is or is not a permissible move to make.
However, when we are assessing which of two competing paradigms offers the more
resourceful approach to some domain, there are serious difficulties with making a
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judgement25. This is because the very standards which we employ to judge the superiority of
an approach vary between paradigms (Kuhn, 1970: 103-9). Each paradigm has its own
methods, problems, and standards of solution, and changing from one paradigm to another
involves a shift in these elements. In relation to paradigm succession, Kuhn argues that
...as the problems change, so, often, does the standard that distinguishes a real
scientific solution from a mere metaphysical speculation, word game, or
mathematical play. The normal scientific tradition that emerges from a scientific
revolution is not only incompatible but often actually incommensurable with that
which has gone before. (Kuhn, 1970: 103)
This raises new difficulties for theoretical comparison. I argued that in the simplest case,
we can say that a mode of interacting with the world progresses as it extends its ability to
classify the world using the concepts and standards that it employs. However, when it comes
to comparing theories, we may find that they have different standards as to what is good and
bad practice. In such a situation, according to Kuhn, it is not possible to make a judgement
as to which theory is superior. This applies whether we are comparing the superiority of
predecessor and successor paradigms in the history of some particular field, or attempting to
decide at present which of two or more competing paradigms is more resourceful for dealing
with the domain in question.
It is this state of affairs that leads Doppelt, in his useful commentary on The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions, to refer to standards of judgement as 'normative' (1978: 41). By this
he means that standards have an irreducible element of what 'ought' to be done. Decisions
about which standards to employ, and thus which paradigm to pursue, are questions of value,
and not assessable by rational means. If Kuhn is correct, suggests Doppelt, we can compare
scientific conflict to conflict in ethical and political life26 (1978: 41). Conflicts may contain
elements of rationality, but the final decision is a choice between competing values which
allows of no rational resolution27. We can legitimately ask, however, whether Kuhn is
correct.
25 The incommensurability of paradigms at the level of objects was frequently taken to be the most
important problem raised by Kuhn for rational accounts of theory change (see for example, Laudan
(1976); Shapere (1984 [1964])). The fact that Kuhn himself supported this view helps to explain its
prevalence (Kuhn, 1970: 150). However, Doppelt has argued that this was somewhat of a minor
issue, and that Kuhn himself relied upon their being some degree of object-level comparability
between paradigms (Doppelt, 1978). Rather, suggests Doppelt, the feature of incommensurability
that supports relativism is the differences between paradigms at the level of standards.
26 This connection is already suggested by Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions when he
parallels scientific revolutions with those of a political nature (Kuhn, 1970: 92-4).
27 There is no evidence that Doppelt is thinking of any particular sociological position here, but his
account has a strongly Weberian ring.
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In response to some of the philosophical problems arising from the 'shifting standards'
thesis, Laudan and Shapere have attempted to reconstruct how we conceive of the standards
governing scientific enquiry. For Kuhn and Doppelt, these standards are monadic, ultimate
and self-contained. In this sense, their thinking connects with an older philosophical
tradition in which standards of reasoning are necessary truths which have no need of
empirical justification. Their twist to this tradition is to retain the formal, non-empirical
status of standards of reason, but emphasise their historical variability and the lack of means
to decide between alternatives. In contrast, Laudan (1981b) and Shapere (1984) make a
crucial contribution to critical historicism by arguing that scientific standards are as
empirical as any other aspect of science, and open to testing and acceptance or rejection
depending on how successful they are as standards. On this view, as science develops, so do
the rules that govern the legitimacy or otherwise of its forms of activity. Most philosophers
accept that by pursuing scientific activity we gain substantive understanding about the world.
Critical historicism would add that through scientific activity we also learn about reasoning,
and come to understand which forms of reasoning are practically reliable, and which are not.
As such, when we get into situations where modes of scientific activity clash with one
another, it may be the case that the competition between these modes is not only over which
has the better substantive understanding, but which uses the better rules of reasoning.
One way to bring out the empirical character of standards is to parallel them with the
substantive understandings that we gain through science. Our best substantive theories
provide us with the most systematic understanding of how to deal with entities and processes
in the world. Likewise, our best scientific standards provide us with the most systematic
understanding of the reasoning that we use when interacting with the world. These standards
are a repository of information about which modes of reasoning are more or less successful.
In this way, scientific standards are as empirical as substantive claims and should be treated
as such. Standards can and should be judged by their empirical and conceptual grasp of
modes of reasoning, and their ability to discriminate successful and unsuccessful methods of
interacting with the world. As with substantive claims, this cannot be done by comparing
our understandings with the external world. Instead, evaluating standards involves judging
their (internal) ability to systematically deal with our reasoning processes.
Laudan offers a useful example of how a new scientific standard arises through
connections with empirical investigation (Laudan, 1984: 38-9). In the field of
pharmacological testing, scientists used to test a drug by dividing patients into two groups,
giving one group the drug, and the other group nothing. If the first set of patients reported a
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higher rate of recovery than the second, it was concluded that the drug was effective.
However, this methodological approach was disrupted by the realisation that there was a
'placebo effect' in operation. That is to say, patients seemed over-responsive to the drug
administered, and it was discovered that the subjects' belief that they were taking a course of
medicine could induce a recovery, no matter whether the medicine was effective or inert. As
such, single-blind methodology had to be introduced, whereby all patients are administered
with pills, and they do not know whether they have received the drug or a placebo. This
methodology controls for the expectations of the subjects.
The development of single-blind methodology exemplifies certain features of the
development of scientific standards. The standard was produced by reflecting upon actual
practice, and what had been learned in the process of experimentation. It acts as a repository
of understandings about experimental practice, and the problems and advantages of some
kinds of experiment. Furthermore, because it can distinguish successful from unsuccessful
investigation, this provides a justification for its use. It is fairly clear, then, that single-blind
methodology is not a 'value' that cannot be rationally reflected upon. Rather it is a claim,
backed up by empirical evidence, about how to successfully investigate some range of
phenomena. As with any empirical claim, it is not certain or guaranteed, but in the absence
of a competitor which can successfully dispute its claims, it is a justified methodological
standard28.
Not everyone subscribes to this critical historicist account, however. Worrall (1989)
argues that although the 'empirical' approach to scientific standards may apply to low-level
methodological rules, it cannot work for higher-level scientific standards that make up the
'core' of scientific rationality. His argument is that although low-level methodological rules
do change in relation to empirical discoveries, the logic behind these changes must involve
higher-level, stable standards of reasoning. In the example of single-blind methodology
Worrall suggests that the development of this standard can only have been rationally
defensible if it conformed with a fixed, higher-level standard of reasoning, along the lines of
"when testing hypotheses, shield the experiment against other possible causal factors". So,
although it was true that the specific content of the methodological rule was related to
empirical investigation, the form of reasoning involved was neither empirical nor subject to
alteration. In order to make reasoned judgements about standards we must be using some
inflexible, non-empirical principles which provide the ultimate basis for these judgements.
28 It is worth noting that drug-testing methodology has developed on from the single-blind approach,
as it was discovered that the expectations of experimenters also had some influence on the test results.
This led to the development of double-blind methodology (Laudan, 1984: 39).
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To assess Worrall's arguments, I shall discuss two debates around high-level rules of
reasoning employed in scientific activity, and examine their character and rationality. For
reasoned outcomes to take place there need only be a general commitment to consistency,
which I shall suggest is a general standard of reasoning of an unusual kind. With this
commitment in place, we can argue that certain changes in standards can be rationally
justified.
The debate around the status of falsification as a rule of theory choice has been ongoing
since Popper's The Logic ofScientific Discovery (1959 [1934])29. I will rather brutally cull
out some of the main falsificationist ideas in order to set up the position to be discussed. The
impetus behind falsificationism is that the problem of induction is irresolvable, meaning that
any attempt to justify theories inductively must fail, including probabilistic variants (Popper,
1959: 27-30). Therefore, the only valid approach to theory testing is a deductive one, in
which theories and auxiliary information are mobilised to deduce certain consequences or
predictions. If such predictions clash with accepted basic statements then the theory can be
considered falsified, and scientists must search for an improved theory which would not be
falsified by existing evidence, and does not deal with this evidence in an ad hoc manner. We
should also favour daring theories with a large empirical scope, because these are more
easily falsified, and we learn more from them if they survive criticism. If a theory survives
rigorous testing, this gives no warrant for assuming its (probable) truth, but merely means
that it has survived tests where other theories have failed.
This sketch of falsification does nothing to capture its interest and subtlety. However,
even from this limited account, we can see that it is possible to have a rational discussion
about the falsificationist standard. Firstly, the standard cannot be construed as a monadic
'rule of reason' but is closely related to a variety of debates and issues. For example, it is
intended to avoid the difficulties with the problem of induction. However, if an appropriate
resolution to the problem of induction was found, then induction would provide a superior
mode of justification, as it would not only allow us to know which theories were false but
also which were the most plausible. Secondly, in the 'strong' version of falsificationism, a
theory must be rejected if it is falsified by relevant evidence. However, as Lakatos has
argued, many theories which became successful by falsificationist standards started off with
serious and obvious falsifiers (Lakatos, 1978). This includes both Copernicus' and
29 In actual fact, Popper discusses falsification in respect to demarcation and not methodology, but the
debate can be taken into the methodological realm.
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Newton's theories which ended up with large empirical scope and dealt successfully with
many potential falsifiers. Therefore, our knowledge of the historical development of
theories, and the need to shield theories from early falsification, suggests that the strong
falsificationist position must be revised. We should note that neither of these could be seen
as 'external' criticisms of falsificationism using a higher methodological standard. Rather,
arguments that have been used to make falsification plausible and appealing are examined in
order to see whether they are defensible on their own terms. The plausibility of
falsificationism rests on a body of empirical and conceptual argument that can be reflected
upon in order to support or challenge its tenets.
This example remains somewhat abstract because the standard examined was put forward
by a philosopher in a mode somewhat divorced from scientific practice. A more practical
scientific example is the debate around 'the method of hypothesis' (Laudan, 1984: 55-60).
During the 18th century, postulating hypothetical entities was considered improper, and it
was argued that scientists should not theorise about that which could not be directly
observed. However, by the 1830s, many scientific theories postulated such entities, leading
scientists to argue for the legitimacy of a 'method of hypothesis'. Although strict
inductivism from experimental data was the dominant standard of reasoning, a number of
scientific areas could not be successfully investigated in this way, including electricity,
embryology and chemistry. Some scientists investigating these areas set about to argue the
legitimacy of the method of hypothesis, indicating that many successful theories of the time
(such as Franklin's theory of electricity and Boerhaave's theory of heat) relied upon
hypothetical entities. They argued that although hypothetical reasoning could not produce
theoretical certainty, this was also true of other valid approaches such as inductivism. It was
further claimed that even theories ostensibly produced by induction alone always generalised
beyond their premises, and include a hypothetical element. The proponents of the method of
hypothesis won the day, and swayed the scientific community to the idea that hypothetical
reasoning could be scientifically productive.
Again, we can enquire into the rationality of this process. A relativist could claim that this
change was merely a shift in 'values', from the value of strict induction to the value of
hypothesis, with no rational grounds for choosing between them. It could be argued that
each was a self-contained standard of reasoning in its own right, and that there could thus be
no 'reasonable' choice between the two. I would dispute this by pointing out that standards




In the case of strict inductivism, one implicit claim is that theories that are not generated
by induction from observation are unreliable, that is, turn out to be spurious or misleading on
further investigation. It is also implicit that general theories can actually be produced using
strict inductive methods. On this basis, we can see that inductivism is not an isolated
standard of knowledge, but bound up with conceptual and empirical claims, which may be
supported or challenged by further investigation. It is this kind of investigation that goes on
when another standard, such as the method of hypothesis, is put forward as an alternative.
This comparison of two different standards should be viewed in exactly the same way as a
clash of substantive theories. It is possible that two different standards are intended to
measure quite different things (such as simplicity and empirical adequacy) and that they are
not in competition with one another30. The failure to chose between different and non-
competing standards does not give support to the incommensurability argument. On the
other hand, it may be that there is a genuine competition between the standards, and that they
dispute the adequacy of some mode of reasoning. In such cases, we must identify the
competitive overlap between them, and as with substantive disagreements, find a mutually
agreeable testing ground to compare the adequacy of the theories.
To return to the clash of strict inductivism and the method of hypothesis, proponents of
the latter scrutinised the conceptual rigour of the former, and suggested that important and
reliable theories such as those ofNewton involved a degree of hypothetical reasoning. They
also suggested that hypotheses could be reliable to some degree, and that the continuing
ability of hypothetical theories to meet other scientific criteria demonstrated this. They thus
provided conceptual and empirical support for the plausibility of the method of hypothesis,
which came to be accepted as a rational scientific standard.
In general, then, critical historicism suggests that scientific standards are neither arbitrary
matters of choice, nor fixed as some eternal set of standards of reason. Rather they are
claims about the best ways to interact with the world, which are supported by various kinds
of arguments and evidence. Criticism of a standard involves reflecting on these claims and
their adequacy, using other substantive knowledge and standards of reasoning. Just as with
substantive beliefs, it is rarely or never the case that a significant set of standards is
consistent on its own terms, when those terms are spelled out. Critical reflection can
improve standards by making them more conceptually consistent, or by increasing their
ability to discriminate between empirical cases. Because standards are supported by webs of
30 Of course, different standards can be used in claims about the general adequacy of theories, in
which case we need to treat them as competing and work properly through their competitive overlap.
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reasoning and empirical claims, clashes between standards are in principle open to reasoned
assessment. These clashes can be resolved by finding where the standards disagree and
testing out the competing claims in a neutral manner, to discover which is most resourceful
for discriminating successful practice.
The observant reader will have noticed that the discussions of the development of
substantive theories and of standards have emphasised the value of consistency. Substantive
progress is to be measured in large part by the systematic and coherent nature of the
categories produced. Likewise, scientific standards are to be assessed by the extent to which
they are internally consistent, consistent with other standards, and cohere with accepted
empirical understandings. One could well ask: why must we value consistency so highly?
Couldn't we reject consistency as an important part of theoretical development? If this was
genuinely the case, then the methods of developing understandings and resolving conflicts
proposed here would carry little or no weight, predicated as they are upon the value of
consistency.
However, it is a mistake to think that consistency can simply be rejected as a theoretical
value. I would argue that rather than being an optional standard, consistency is the implicit
presupposition of all analytical understanding that cannot be rejected without rejecting what
one regards highly. In other words, to say that someone is consistent is to say that they live
up to their own standards, that is, the values and beliefs by which they orient their thinking.
A lack of concern about consistency would involve a lack of concern for those things that
one ostensibly approves of.
The force of these remarks is most apparent when we connect conceptual adequacy with
practical activity, and the need to deal successfully with the material world. As Holmwood
(1996) has argued, consistency is important because it entails practical resourcefulness on
the part of actors. If actors employ contradictory beliefs in an activity, then they are in a
state of 'practical alienation' in which the contradiction results in outcomes which are not
those intended by the actor (Holmwood, 1996: 115-6). Thus failure to be consistent is
failure to achieve the outcomes one desires. The process of producing consistency is nothing
more than the process of becoming resourceful. Our postulated theories and standards are
tested out in their application, producing positive and residual categories. The
inconsistencies that result force us into a process of reconstruction, if we are to have
smoother and more predictable interactions with the environment. Some reconstructions will
be driven by comparison with other theories, which may demonstrate how certain problems
can be tackled more effectively. Others will be produced by reflection on a theory and its
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strengths and weaknesses. In these ways, theories are pushed forward, developing greater
resourcefulness and consistency in the process.
It is formally possible to reject improvements to a set of beliefs which resolve
contradictions within one's own understandings and produce greater consistency and success
on one's own terms. But to genuinely do this (rather than merely doing so in theory but not
in practice) is a form of self-denial which is destructive of the capacity to act. It is to accept
the pressures of the material world which disrupt one's claims but not to respond by
increasing capacity and consistency.
This is why consistency is a special kind of theoretical standard. It is not an imposition
from outside of thought, but a description of the nature of successful understanding on its
own terms. Combining this claim with the idea that the material world resists scientists'
understandings provides the basis for a historical approach to scientific understanding. All
elements of scientific practice are up for reflection and reconstruction as science develops,
and as theories attempt to deal with their problems of application. The general process of
increasing consistency is the process whereby standards and substantive theories become
more capable and resourceful at dealing with the world on their own terms. As long as we
can see that new standards and theories are connected to past understandings by their more
resourceful approaches to earlier problems, we can argue that theories have progressed by
increasing their consistency. Of course, new standards and theories also generate new
problems, necessitating further developments and reconstructions.
1.6 Conclusion: from science to social life
In this chapter, I have defended a 'critical historicist' view of science, which provides an
alternative to both foundationalist and relativist positions. In contrast to foundationalism,
critical historicism argues that natural scientific investigation has no special epistemological
privilege based on its relation to its object, or its mode of reasoning. On the question of the
knowledge-object relation, it suggests that we have no direct and unchallengeable knowledge
of the world. Furthermore, because of the mediated character of our understandings we are
never in a position to make an inference from our theories to claims about the nature of the
world in itself. Attempts to do so by claiming the truth of theories or their relation to 'real
structures' fix knowledge at its current level when further reconstruction may be required.
Instead, theories should be viewed as more or less coherent accounts of events in the world,
which, when successful, make those events intelligible and predictable. Likewise, there is no
special mode of scientific reasoning which guarantees the validity of natural scientific
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knowledge. Rather, modes of reasoning develop as science develops, and are repositories
for what is learned about inquiry as scientific investigation continues. This emphasis on
learning and the development of coherent theories through the course of investigation
distinguishes critical historicism from relativist accounts of science. Although science has
no foundations, it is not the case that all theories are equally valid. Theories do not
unproblematically construct the world 'on their own terms', instead having both systematic
categories and anomalies, the latter of which demonstrate the existence of theoretical
difficulties and confusion. Comparisons can be made of the extent to which theories render
interactions with the world coherent, and a theory may be able to show that what is
anomalous for a competitor can be coherently accounted for within its own framework.
Thus, contrary to relativism, the resourcefulness of theories can be assessed, and success is
something that has to be strived for by reconstructing understandings in order to produce
coherence.
This account of science is important to sociology because it challenges the common view
that there is a division between natural scientific investigation and other forms of social
activity. As we shall see, one version of this dualism focuses on issues of success and
meaning. It is argued that the success of natural scientific theories is achieved by some
direct apprehension which is non-social in character. Other social practices are then
differentiated from science on the basis that they are 'meaningful', with the consequence that
success is not an issue in the same way. The arguments of this chapter undermine such a
separation. On the one hand, the rejection of foundationalism suggests that natural scientific
theories are never 'direct', but always theoretically mediated. As such, they are constituted
by meanings in the same way as other social practices. On the other hand, it is crucial to
note that the mediated nature of theories does not remove questions of variable success from
consideration. This insight can be taken into the analysis of other social practices,
suggesting that their success can be gauged in the same way as natural scientific beliefs. As
with natural scientific theories, social practices are meaningfully constituted attempts to
interact successfully with the world. These meanings may be more or less coherent,
producing some expected results, and other, anomalous, outcomes. Thus, the critical
historicist argument is that both natural scientific investigation and other social practices are
meaningfully constituted and variably successful.
The other important version of the science/society dualism suggests that, in science,
beliefs are defended because of their rationally accountable success, whereas, in society,
beliefs may be defended because it is in the strategic interests of a social group to do so. The
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implication of this division is that it can be in the interest of a group to defend certain claims
even if they run contrary to the claims produced by science. Although I have drawn on some
of the ideas of Lakatos and Laudan to help challenge the science/society division, they
themselves accept this division, distinguishing internal and external accounts of scientific
development (see Lakatos, 1978; Laudan, 1977). On this approach, the theoretical decisions
made by scientists are split into those which can be accounted for rationally (internally), and
those which can only be accounted for using non-rational (external) factors, which are
paradigmatically social ones. Although they consider scientific investigation to be largely
rational in character, Lakatos and Laudan accept that social interests may sometimes disrupt
reasoned debate. In such cases, a group may defend a theory because it is in their interest to
do so, even if this theory clashes with rationally justified scientific knowledge.
Versions of this argument will be considered in more detail later in the thesis, particular in
the discussions of realism (Chapter 3) and social constructionism (Chapter 4). For now, I
want to indicate that critical historicism removes the need to place scientific analysis of the
variable success of beliefs and the impact of social interests in tension with one another.
Socially interested activity is oriented to achieving a certain outcome, but this requires
knowledge, and is more or less successful depending on the adequacy of this knowledge. As
science is a way of investigating which knowledge allows successful interactions with the
environment, it is not antithetical to 'interests' but is a mode of pursuing these and reflecting
on their success. For a group to have an 'interest' in contradicting scientific knowledge,
would be for them to have an interest in being unsuccessful in their relations with the
environment. In the remainder of this thesis, I hope to demonstrate that this is the case, and
show that the critical historicist position can be used to avoid the problems generated by the
separation of science and society.
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Structuration Theory and 'Meaning'
2.1 Introduction
The idea that social life has extra characteristics of 'meaning' over and above those that
are found in natural scientific investigation has a long history within sociology. Max Weber,
one of the founders of the sociological tradition, makes such a claim in his typology of social
action (Weber, 1968: 24-6). One type of action, that which is instrumentally rational, is
'determined by expectations as to the behavior of objects in the environment' where these
are means for securing the ends desired by actors (Weber, 1968: 24). Such action
exemplifies the technical orientation of natural science. In contrast, 'value-rational' action
has a different orientation, being concerned with the pursuit of certain meanings, that is,
values, which are outside the bounds of scientific reflection. As Holmwood and Stewart
note, although Weber's approach to this matter is usually held to be unsatisfactory, the idea
that social life is meaningful in a way distinct to natural science is commonly accepted in
sociology, and is to be found in the work of Parsons, Giddens, and Habermas, among others'
(Holmwood and Stewart, 1991).
The claim that social life involves extra issues of 'meaning' not present in natural science
invokes a division between the two forms of activity. In this chapter, I want to consider the
confusions generated by this notion, and the consequences for our understanding of social
science. In order to do so, I focus on the work of Anthony Giddens, whose structuration
theory is a prominent example of the approach criticised here. Giddens separates the 'social'
1 For example, in The Structure of Social Action Parsons defines the 'unit act', the basic analytical
element required to describe social action (Parsons, 1949 [1937]: 43-51). This act involves both: (i)
an initiation in the 'situation' of action, which is those aspects that have to be dealt with using
means/end (i.e. scientific) rationality; and (ii) a directedness to 'ends' which are independent of this
situation, and thus undetermined by scientific rationality. The existence of the latter element is what
distinguishes social action from the purely technical responses to the environment provided by
science. Likewise, Habermas' early work distinguishes between two forms of action, 'instrumental'
action that is oriented to a successful relation with the environment using scientific knowledge, and
'communicative' action which is grounded in intersubjective agreement rather than succeeding or




and 'natural' realms on the basis that the natural world is made up of mechanical,
meaningless occurrences, whereas the social world is constructed out of 'meanings' and
intentional activity. From this, he argues for an anti-naturalistic conception of social science,
that is, one that distinguishes social science from natural scientific investigation. According
to Giddens, the 'meaningful' nature of social life implies three kinds of differences between
natural and social science. Firstly, social science involves a 'double hermeneutic' where
there is not simply a relation between theory and object world (as in the single hermeneutic
of natural science) but a relation between a social scientific theory and actors'
understandings (giving two layers of meaning and the double hermeneutic). Secondly,
because the 'social world' is constituted by meanings, there is a special connection between
social scientific theory and its subject matter. Whereas natural scientific theories stand
outside their object world and have a technical relation to it, social scientific theories may be
taken up by social actors, and thus come to constitute the world that these theories describe.
Thirdly, actors in the social world do not obey the iron laws of mechanism found in the
natural world. Because social action is 'meaningful' it involves possibilities of freedom and
choice which do not exist for natural objects. Social scientists must take account of this
potential in their theories, whereas natural scientists have no such concerns.
In the course of this chapter I shall suggest that each of these arguments is problematic
and, ultimately, unsustainable. I draw on John Holmwood's work to argue that the
'meaning' involved in social activities should be directly paralleled with that in natural
scientific investigations, as the meanings of both are oriented to interacting successfully with
the world (Holmwood, 1996). As such, there are issues of meaning in social life, but these
are no different to the issues ofmeaning present within natural science.
2.2 The double hermeneutic and actors' knowledge
The idea that social science involves a 'double hermeneutic' is widely accepted within
social theory. Although Giddens was by no means the first to argue for the special status of
social science because of issues of meaning, his reference to these as the 'double
hermeneutic' (a term coined in New Rules of Sociological Method) has become standard
usage. Thinkers such as Habermas (1984: 109-11), Bohman (1991: 106) and Outhwaite
(1987: 76, 70) all argue for the relevance of the 'double hermeneutic' within social science,




The argument for a 'double hermeneutic' in social scientific inquiry is based upon the
claim that the 'social world' has characteristics that make it fundamentally distinct from the
'natural world'. Giddens states:
The difference between the social and natural world is that the latter does not
constitute itself as 'meaningful': the meanings it has are produced by men in the
course of their practical life, and as a consequence of their endeavours to
understand or explain it for themselves. Social life - of which these endeavours are
a part - on the other hand, is produced by its component actors precisely in terms of
their active constitution and reconstitution of frames of meaning whereby they
organize their experience. (Giddens, 1976: 79. Author's emphasis)
Giddens thus claims that unlike the natural world, society is constituted by the activities of
human beings, who are its creators. Because of this provenance, the social world is made up
of 'meanings', and social phenomena are inherently meaningful. As a result, investigations
into this realm necessarily differ from those oriented to understanding the natural world.
Natural science involves a single hermeneutic in which a pre-existing, meaningless object
world is interpreted by scientific theorists attempting to successfully describe its character.
By contrast, Giddens suggests that sociological analysis involves a double hermeneutic:
Sociology...deals with a universe which is already constituted within frames of
meaning by social actors themselves, and reinterprets these within its own
theoretical schemes, mediating ordinary and technical language. (Giddens, 1976:
162)
In other words, social science involves a theoretical description (one level of interpretation)
of something that is already meaningful in itself (a second level of interpretation). Social
science thus requires a double hermeneutic. Giddens believes that a range of consequences
follow from this basic, ontological point, and these will be considered throughout the
chapter. For the moment, however, I would like to reflect on the fruitfulness of using issues
of'meaning' to differentiate natural and social scientific enquiry.
As we have seen, Giddens accepts that natural scientific investigation necessarily involves
interpretation, a point he takes to be established by post-positivists such as Kuhn (Giddens,
1976: 162). Furthermore, he is aware of debates around incommensurability which highlight
the potential problems of understanding between natural scientists educated in different
paradigms, that is different modes of interpreting the natural world (Giddens, 1976: 142-4).
On this basis, it would have been quite reasonable for Giddens to argue that natural scientific
investigation already raises issues of the 'double hermeneutic'. That is, when scientists from
one paradigm try to understand the claims of those in another paradigm, they are attempting
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to 'interpret' something that is already meaningful2. In fact, it is hard to see how the 'double
hermeneutic' can be avoided in accounts of natural scientific debate, given that debates are
between scientists 'interpreting' the world differently. For these debates to be meaningful
interchanges, each collective must understand not only their own theory, but that of their
opponents, and thus engage in an attempt to comprehend a 'pre-interpreted' subject-matter.
In Giddens' terms, this would involve a double hermeneutic. I would suggest that the only
way to avoid this consequence is to revert to a non-interpretive position in relation to natural
scientific discourse, and argue that scientific concepts are not 'interpretations' of the world
but 'factual' statements guaranteed by their links with something like a non-corrigible
observation language. This drastic move would not return us to Giddens' view of natural
science as involving a single hermeneutic. Instead, it would remove issues of 'interpretation'
from science altogether. As recent philosophy of science demonstrates that no such step can
reasonably be taken, we should accept that natural scientific debate requires a double
hermeneutic. This is not to accept that the consequences which Giddens derives from the
'double hermeneutic' in social science apply also to natural science. Rather, I shall be
suggesting that as we examine these consequences, the parallels with natural science indicate
the implausibility of Giddens' claims. Furthermore, by reflecting on issues of meaning in
relation to natural scientific investigation, we can come to a more plausible account of these
matters in relation to social science.
A close correlate to Giddens' argument for the 'double hermeneutic' is his emphasis on
the knowledgeability of human agents. As Giddens puts it:
The production and reproduction of society ...has to be treated as a skilled
performance on the part of its members, not as merely a mechanical series of
processes. (Giddens, 1976: 160. Author's emphasis.)
This is a feature of Giddens' structuration theory that is intended to differentiate his work
from objectivistic social science, which, he contends, has ignored the fact that social actors
are always knowledgeable. For Giddens, this knowledge is carried predominantly in
'practical consciousness', a repository of the skills and abilities possessed by an actor which
they may not be capable of discursively expressing (Giddens, 1979: 57; Giddens, 1984: 6-8).
These points suggest a contrast between social and natural scientific investigation. Whereas
natural scientists study a preconstituted object world, social scientists study a world made up
of knowledgeable activities, a world created by the skilful productions of actors.
2 The quote above (Giddens, 1976: 79) also shows an awareness that natural science is a 'social
activity' which should surely imply that understanding it involves a double hermeneutic.
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It is not clear that this distinction is a useful or sustainable one. The argument of this
thesis is that natural scientific theories are not best thought of as describing properties of an
independent object world. Rather, I have suggested that natural scientific investigation is a
sense-making activity in which theoretical constructions are tested for their coherence. The
results of such tests are always to be understood as demonstrating the theoretical adequacy or
otherwise of a set of understandings on their own terms. Learning a theory is thus not a
matter of learning 'about' the object world, but of grasping a more or less coherent set of
categories. It then seems reasonable to argue that debating and employing a natural
scientific theory is a 'skilled performance' on the part of 'knowledgeable agents'. Much
recent work within the sociology of science has emphasised this point, early developments
being summarised in Knorr-Cetina (1983). Such work has also highlighted that natural
scientific investigation is sustained by the employment of tacit skills not discursively
acknowledged by participants (see for example Collins, 1985). One need not draw the
relativist conclusions often found in these studies to accept that natural scientific theorising
is a skilled and knowledgeable performance drawing on practical consciousness. In this
sense, the worlds of natural scientists and the worlds of other social actors are both
meaningful, knowledgeable constructions.
If this is true, are there still questions of meaning which might differentiate social and
natural science? Giddens thinks so, and a central aspect of his antinaturalism is his argument
that social scientific investigation generates problems of adequacy not faced by natural
scientists. In natural science, any set of beliefs about the object world held by professional
or lay actors is corrigible in the light of new findings. As Giddens puts it:
The natural sciences can in principle demonstrate that some of the things that the
lay member of society believes about the object world are false, while others are
valid. (Giddens, 1984: 335)
The validity of a natural scientific account is demonstrable by its superiority to competitors.
In the social sciences, because of the double hermeneutic, gauging the validity of an account
is not so straightforward. Giddens argues that because of its 'meaningful' subject matter,
social scientific investigation must have two different modes, one of understanding and the
other of criticism. When the social scientist is trying to grasp actors' meanings, these
meanings are treated as 'mutual knowledge'; when social scientific criticism is being
undertaken, actors' beliefs are treated as 'common sense'3 (Giddens, 1984: 336).
3 Other dichotomies introduced by Giddens such as 'sense' versus 'reference' (1976: 145) and
'credibility criteria' versus 'validity criteria' (1984: 339) are based on the same principle as the
mutual knowledge/common sense division.
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To take actors' meanings as 'mutual knowledge' is to insist that the social scientific
observer methodologically brackets his/her scepticism. Actors' understandings must be
analysed as if they were 'knowledge' rather than fallible 'belief (Giddens, 1984: 336). In
other words, actors' beliefs must be treated as fully adequate. For Giddens, this is a
necessary consequence of the 'double hermeneutic', in that grasping a set of actors'
understandings requires respect for their 'authenticity' and a suspension of doubt (Giddens,
1979: 251). As Giddens puts it:
Mutual knowledge, regarded as the necessary mode of gaining access to the
'subject matter' of social science, is not corrigible in the light of its findings; on the
contrary, it is the condition of being able to come up with 'findings' at all.
(Giddens, 1984: 336)
In other words, the social world is constituted by meanings, and to investigate it requires
grasping those meanings by treating them as if they were fully justified4. Successful
achievement of this is a prerequisite of an 'adequate' social scientific account in a way that
has no correlate in natural science because the latter does not have a 'meaningful' domain5.
Once the hermeneutic task is fulfilled, however, Giddens suggests that social scientific
investigation can take a critical standpoint. In this latter mode, the same understandings that
had been viewed as 'mutual knowledge' are now to be treated as 'common sense'. This
requires spelling out actors' understandings as propositions (where this is possible6) and
treating them as 'fallible belief, that is, as corrigible (Giddens, 1984: 337). The empirical
investigations of the social scientist are then directed towards an assessment of the truth or
falsity of actors' beliefs. This allows social scientists to perform a critical task as well as a
hermeneutical one.
Giddens illustrates the use of these modes in a discussion of the Zande witchcraft debate
(Giddens, 1979: 252). Taken as 'mutual knowledge', Zande witchcraft rituals must be
considered 'rational', being constructed out of 'internally coherent' frames of meaning
4 As we shall see in Chapter 4, Giddens' treatment of social beliefs as 'mutual knowledge' is not
idiosyncratic. Constructionists such as Barnes and Bloor also argue that actors' beliefs must be
viewed as 'self-validating', that is, fully adequate on their own terms.
5 It could, however, be argued that conceiving actors' categories as non-corrigible in the process of
scientific investigation gives them a status similar to that of a foundational observation language in
natural science (Holmwood and Stewart, 1991: 190, fn 23). Both are taken as the unchallengeable
basis of investigation.
6 Although the mutual knowledge/common sense distinction is essentially methodological, it may be
that some aspects of the former cannot be treated as the latter. This is the case when mutual
knowledge cannot be formulated propositionally, as 'beliefs that some states of affairs or others are
the case' (Giddens, 1984: 337).
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grasped by the sociologist to characterise the practice. However, suggests Giddens, this does
not preclude criticism. As Giddens states:
Mutual knowledge is the necessary medium of identifying what is going on when a
sorcerer places a malicious spell upon an individual in order to procure that
person's death. But this is no logical bar at all to critical inquiry into the empirical
grounding that can be marshalled to support the validity of the belief-claims held in
relation to this practice, or into their possible ideological ramifications. (Giddens,
1979:252)
Thus seeing Zande beliefs as 'authentic' does not block critical social scientific inquiry into
their validity. Nevertheless, social scientific accounts face two issues of adequacy
(hermeneutical and empirical/critical) whereas natural scientific accounts only face one
(empirical/critical).
I would suggest that Giddens' arguments for the dual character of social scientific
investigations are problematic. To begin with, we have seen that the distinction between
'mutual knowledge' and 'common sense' is a methodological one. That is to say, it refers to
two different ways of treating the same stock of belief. Holmwood and Stewart (1991) point
out that Giddens contradicts himself over the treatment of this stock in social scientific
investigation. As we saw above, when treated as 'common sense', a set of beliefs is argued
to be 'corrigible' in the light of social scientific findings. However, this same set of beliefs,
considered as mutual knowledge, was said to have been unquestionable for social science,
that is, 'not corrigible in the light of its findings' (Giddens, 1984: 336). Thus, treating
beliefs critically violates the conditions that Giddens sets up for hermeneutical understanding
(Holmwood and Stewart, 1991: 32-7). Criticism undermines the 'mutuality' of belief, as it
demonstrates a disagreement between lay actor and social scientist. It thus removes the
uncritical acceptance of belief which Giddens argues is necessary to comprehend the social
world. Critical social science must therefore involve a failure of understanding, as Giddens
describes it. Conversely, the. acceptance constitutive of understanding must block the
development of criticism (Holmwood and Stewart, 1991: 34).
This raises the question of whether a set of beliefs that is problematic (i.e. subject to
empirical criticism) can be accurately understood if it is treated as 'knowledge', that is, as
fully adequate. I would argue that this cannot be the case, and such a treatment must
necessarily misrepresent problematic belief, resulting in a failure of understanding on the
part of the observer. If a set of beliefs can reasonably be criticised on some empirical basis
then it must be demonstrably flawed on its own terms. According to the critical historicist
approach introduced in Chapter 1, a flawed belief system includes residual categories which
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do not cohere with those that systematically account for some phenomena. In other words, a
belief system that can be reasonably criticised is one that contains internal incoherence. For
Giddens, the 'hermeneutic' moment of investigation requires the social scientist to treat a set
of beliefs as if it is fully adequate. This must involve presenting its categories as completely
coherent, as any incoherence would demonstrate its inadequacy. However, if the set of
beliefs is genuinely flawed, as its openness to criticism indicates, then presenting it as
coherent must involve misrepresenting the relations between its categories7. Residual
categories will be presented as if they fit systematically into the theory, obscuring their
relations of tension and contradiction with positive categories. The result of applying
Giddens' procedure would be misunderstanding, rather than understanding. An adequate
comprehension of a flawed theory must involve grasping its flaws8.
One way to illustrate this is to consider the relation between a specific set of beliefs and
social scientific criticism of them. Here we can consider beliefs discussed by Betty Friedan
in The Feminine Mystique (1963). Friedan argues that throughout the late 1950s, American
housewives suffered from the 'problem that has no name'. These housewives had different
symptoms including depression, neuroses, listlessness and physical disorders such as fatigue
and blistering (Friedan, 1963: 17-8, 28). The generality of the problem was slow to emerge,
and Friedan argues that women's initial reaction was often to identify the cause as something
specific to their lives, such as individual psychological problems, or particular issues to do
with their husbands, children, houses or neighbourhoods. The social scientific criticism of
these beliefs, put forward in accounts like Friedan's, focused on the generality of the
experience across women, and postulated a structural explanation. This suggested that
women's problems were not based in individual difficulties, but in the gendered division of
labour which restricted their opportunities for self-fulfilment.
Let us now consider these lay beliefs and their social scientific criticism using Giddens'
approach to social scientific adequacy. According to him, producing a social scientific
account involves two phases, the hermeneutic and the critical. In the hermeneutic phase, the
investigator suspends their scepticism, and actors' beliefs are treated as 'mutual knowledge',
that is, as fully adequate. Applied to our example, this would mean treating the
individualistic account provided by a housewife as a fully coherent account of the causes of
7 Giddens almost seems to recognise this when he comments that belief systems may produce logical
contradictions on their own terms (1976: 152). However, this stray insight is lost in Giddens' formal
statement of his approach.
8 Charles Taylor makes an argument to the same effect, claiming that the hermeneutic 'understanding'




her problems. Then, suggests Giddens, we should treat beliefs as 'common sense', and
empirically assess them. In our example, such an assessment would show the greater
adequacy of a structural account like Friedan's in explaining the problems experienced by
women.
This highlights the difficulties with Giddens' approach. If we accept that the social
scientific critique of belief is valid, then we must also accept that the lay accounts were not
adequate, and contained problems of coherence. We might, for instance, note that explaining
neuroticism as an individual psychological quirk does not account for the prevalence of this
condition among a particular group within society, that is, housewives in 1950s America.
However, if the individualistic (lay) account indeed has flaws, then it cannot be correctly
comprehended, hermeneutically speaking, by treating it as fully adequate. Such a treatment
would misrepresent the relations between its categories, implying that they were fully
coherent, rather than showing its inability to systematically explain certain evidence. In
other words, Giddens' hermeneutical approach would require residual categories to be seen
as positive, and incoherence to be rendered as coherence. This can only result in the
mischaracterization of a set of beliefs. Surely, an adequate understanding of the lay account
of housewives' problems requires a grasp of both its systematic elements and those things
that it cannot account for. In other words, 'understanding' those beliefs means seeing their
flaws as well as their advantages.
These criticisms are relevant to an assessment ofGiddens' anti-naturalism. The separation
of a hermeneutical and critical mode is precisely what is supposed to differentiate social
scientific accounts from those of natural science. However, the above arguments suggest
that such a separation cannot be defended. Instead of separate moments of 'uncritical
understanding' and 'criticism', coming to understand a theory requires a comprehension of
its flaws and incoherence which provides the grounds for criticism. I would argue that this is
exactly the same process as can.be found in natural science. Learning a particular scientific
theory involves learning its positive and residual categories, where it is coherent, and where
it is incoherent. Understanding Aristotle's theory of motion, for example, means
understanding that he elides the notions of 'average speed over time' and 'speed at an
instant', producing some incoherence in his accounts. The same approach must be taken to
present-day science as well as superseded theories. Current theories are not 'understood' by
viewing them as fully coherent; instead, scientists who 'understand' them grasp their
problems, which provide the impetus for further development. Giddens' argument that
mutual knowledge be seen as coherent and unproblematic thus gives it a status that would be
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inappropriate even for the highly developed theories of natural science. To take a natural
scientific theory as 'mutual knowledge' would be to suggest its finality and complete success
in dealing with the world. In other words, it would be a form of epistemological realism. A
better alternative is to see that whether we are attempting to grasp a natural scientific theory,
or the beliefs of a social actor, understanding is not a matter of uncritical acceptance. In that
all belief systems produced so far by human beings are in some way contradictory or
problematic, such systems are misrepresented if they are characterised as perfectly coherent.
Some readers may agree that Giddens' treatment of social scientific adequacy is
problematic, but argue that it nevertheless addresses an important concern which this chapter
has not yet considered. In this light, Giddens' arguments could be seen as a flawed attempt
to avoid 'ethnocentrism' on the part of the social scientific observer9. That is to say, if we
argue that social scientists should take a critical attitude to the beliefs of their subjects, how
are we to be sure that our judgements are not simply an imposition of our standards on their
beliefs? Barnes and Bloor argue that cross-cultural judgements will always be ethnocentric
in this sense, being based on the ultimately unjustifiable standards of the group making the
judgement (Barnes and Bloor, 1982: 26-8). Their alternative, as we have seen, is to treat all
sets of belief as adequate in their own terms, a move that parallels Giddens' hermeneutic
phase of analysis (Holmwood and Stewart, 1991: 33).
The issue of cross-cultural judgement is a complex one, and is the subject of a vast
theoretical literature, including important sociological contributions by Archer (1988), Lukes
(1982), Hollis (1982) and Holmwood and Stewart (1991). There is no space to consider this
literature here, but some brief points can be made drawing on the philosophy of science
developed earlier and the work of Holmwood and Stewart (1991, especially Chpt. 3).
Firstly, it should be noted that criticism of another set of cultural beliefs must be pressing in
the terms of those beliefs. Criticism is oriented towards showing problems and difficulties
that exist in belief, and a criticism cannot be valid if it claims as problematic features which
raise no difficulties in the terms of the understandings being criticised. This could not be a
valid criticism, because it would not be able to demonstrate its superiority. Instead, it would
be a mere assertion of the importance of something which cannot be shown to be relevant in
the terms of the other. This would be like criticising quantum mechanics for not being
sociological. Such 'criticism' would have no purchase, and thus no validity, as it could not
demonstrate why quantum mechanics would be enriched by taking on a sociological aspect.
9 I use this term broadly to refer to the prioritising of one's own set of cultural beliefs over those of
another group, whether the differences map onto 'ethnic' distinctions or not.
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The point is similar to that made about incommensurability in Chapter 1. There can be no
genuine issue of comparison when theories are merely different to one another, and the
inability to compare in such cases does not establish the existence of incommensurability.
Likewise, the existence of different, non-competing theories does not demonstrate that
criticism must therefore involve non-rational assertion of one over the other. Rather, it
suggests that criticism does not apply in such cases, but exists where theories are disputing
with one another, and one can show the problems with the other.
Those concerned to avoid ethnocentrism may still not be convinced by these arguments.
It might be suggested that although a commitment to criticising beliefs in a way relevant to
the terms of the other is a good thing, this commitment may not be enough. Particularly
relevant here would be the concern that a critic might misidentify contradictions in the
beliefs of others, making criticisms appear adequate when this is not the case. We can then
ask: how can a critic test whether they have correctly grasped what is coherent and
incoherent in the beliefs of another? Put simply, the answer is that an adequate grasp of the
beliefs of others requires that one can successfully predict where their beliefs and actions
will be successful, and where they will be unsuccessful and lead to frustrations and
difficulties. To take an example from natural science, an Einsteinian physicist can say in
which situations Newtonian theory will produce adequate predictions, and in which
situations it will diverge from experimental results. Their ability to do so demonstrates a
correct grasp of Newtonian theory and its problems on its own terms. Likewise in social
science, we may be in a position to predict problems with a doctrine on its own terms.
Referring back to the Friedan example, the social scientist can predict that the attempts of
housewives to deal with neurosis through individual therapy would not remove the problem,
as it would not increase their capacity for self-fulfilment. If a grasp of success and failure
cannot be demonstrated, and the social scientist wrongly predicts where action will be
successful and where it will fail, then their grasp of concepts is indeed inadequate. The
important point is that the understanding of the social scientist is testable through such an
exercise, and is thus subject to scrutiny. Of course, this does not mean that achieving such a
grasp is straightforward, and it will frequently only emerge after lengthy and detailed study.
But to refer to this as a practical necessity is not to suggest that there are insurmountable
problems of cross-cultural criticism in principle.
If these arguments are correct, they cast doubt on the existence of one form of
ethnocentrism feared by social scientists. Those who are concerned with the ethnocentrism
of critical judgements frequently imply that a critical assessment can appear to be valid by
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the standards of one group (the social scientists) even when it is not valid by the standards of
another group (the subjects of investigation). If this situation could arise, the role of critical
social science would certainly be in doubt, as its judgements would appear to involve the
ethnocentric promotion of its own standards over others. However, I would argue that such a
situation is not possible, and that either the critical judgement is not valid on social scientific
terms or the beliefs of the subjects are not defensible on their own terms. This is because, as
I have argued, for a social scientific account to be valid for the social scientists, it must
correctly indicate problems experienced by the lay actors on their own terms. It does not
make sense to suggest that a criticism is 'valid' for social scientists but not for actors. As
Holmwood argues, if actors are not experiencing the problems that social scientists suggest
must exist, this points to an error in social scientific accounts10 (Holmwood, 1996: 118-121).
2.3 Natural scientific knowledge and social scientific knowledge
In the previous section, I considered how Giddens uses the idea of a 'double hermeneutic'
to argue for the differentiation of natural and social science, and paid particular attention to
his claims that social scientific investigation involves special issues of adequacy. In this
section, we shall consider further Giddens' use of the double hermeneutic, but this time in
relation to other supposedly distinctive features of social scientific knowledge. The issues
raised here are those relating to innovation in social science and the influence of social
science on human conduct.
Giddens continues his argument for antinaturalism by distinguishing natural scientific
knowledge and social scientific knowledge on the basis of their ability to innovate. For
Giddens, innovation in the natural sciences is quite straightforward. He writes:
Theories in natural science are original, innovative and so on to the degree to
which they place in question what either lay actors or professional scientists
previously believed about the objects or events to which they refer. (Giddens,
1984: xxxiv)
Natural scientific theories can be 'revelatory' in that their resourcefulness reveals to us the
errors of our existing beliefs about the object world. However, this is not the case in the
social sciences. Giddens argues that social scientific theories are founded upon lay
10 Holmwood rejects the notion that competing accounts are each valid on their own terms, because it
contributes to the protection of flawed sociological accounts (Holmwood, 1996: 118-121). He
suggests that this notion is invoked when the superiority of a social scientific account to that offered
by lay actors cannot be demonstrated due to the former's explanatory limitations. If each account is
considered to be valid on its own terms, then the social scientific theory does not have to be
reconstructed to improve its resourcefulness.
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understandings, and because of this, they cannot be purely innovative in the way that natural
scientific theories are. He states:
...theories in the social sciences have to be in some part based upon ideas which
(although not necessarily discursively formulated by them) are already held by the
agents to whom they refer. (Giddens, 1984: xxxiv).
In other words, the revelatory capacity is limited, because theories must be connected to the
existing knowledge and meaningful conduct of actors. Establishing the characteristics of an
already 'meaningful' world cannot produce surprises in the way that discovering new
features of a meaningless object world can. Clearly, these arguments have connections with
those concerning the adequacy of social scientific belief which were considered in the
previous section. Giddens argues that a dual theory of adequacy is required in social science
because social scientific theories must incorporate a non-innovative aspect, which is an
account of the existing beliefs of agents. Having already discussed the question of adequacy,
I would here like to critically reflect on Giddens' conception of innovation.
Once again, Giddens' distinction between natural and social science rests upon a
differential treatment of issues ofmeaning in the two spheres. However, there is no tension
between 'meaning' and 'innovation' in natural science, and once this is illustrated, the same
arguments can be made in relation to social science. Recent work on the process of theory
construction in natural science typically conceives of the production of new theories as
involving the modification and development of existing conceptual resources (see for
instance Kuhn, 1970). These resources may be existing theories about the specific domain
being analysed, or can be drawn from other places such as different scientific fields or
common sense. Once conceptual development has taken place, the resultant theory is
scientifically innovative insofar as it supersedes the resourcefulness of existing theories in a
field, and consistently accounts for phenomena that were problematic for earlier theories or
absent from them altogether. Theories are meaningful, and natural scientific debates require
the comparison of different meanings, but these meanings are considered as competitors, and
innovation is the production of new, more successful meanings.
When natural scientific innovation is viewed in this way, it is hard to see why social
scientific theory construction should be analysed differently. Certainly, it is plausible that
social scientists will start their considerations from a critical understanding of existing
activities within social life. However, this process is the same as natural scientists beginning
from the existing theories in a field and developing them in order to improve their adequacy.
Innovations in natural science result in theories that are more resourceful than those
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previously available. Likewise, innovations in social science may involve the production of
new theories which are more resourceful than 'existing theories of social life' that are
embodied in lay activities. Just as the natural scientific investigator competes against other
natural scientists (professional or lay), so the social scientist competes against other social
scientists (professional or lay). In order to make comparisons, the meaning of lay actors'
accounts must be grasped, but this does not restrict the possibility of innovation any more
than the need to grasp the meaning of competing accounts in natural science restricts new
development.
The apparent plausibility of Giddens' account actually rests upon an empiricist conception
of natural science in which its innovations directly reveal features of the object world. When
this is replaced with the notion that natural science attempts to produce more or less coherent
theories (i.e. 'meanings'), our notion of innovation can be located within and between
theories, and the production of more successful ways for us to deal with the world. The
same point can then be made in relation to social science; it is oriented towards improving
our dealings with the world, and producing better outcomes of human activity.
Having considered the question of innovation, we must now address Giddens' other
arguments regarding the difference between natural and social scientific knowledge. These
deal with the issues of transmission between 'meaningful' social scientific knowledge, and
the 'meaningful' social world that it studies. For Giddens, the possibility of transmission
between the two indicates a quite fundamental break between knowledge of the natural
world and the social world. To see the nature of the comparison, we must start from
Giddens' conception of natural scientific knowledge (Giddens, 1976: 79). Natural scientific
knowledge is, at the present time, produced almost entirely within specialised professional
institutions. This does not mean that concepts from natural science cannot filter down into
lay discourse, and become understandings that are called upon in lay activities. However,
this filtering process does not affect the laws of nature, which operate with the same
character regardless of knowledge of them, professional or otherwise. Giddens argues that
the same is not true of social scientific knowledge. This is because social scientific
knowledge may be taken up by lay actors, and thus help to reconstitute the very domain
which social scientists are studying. Giddens states:
...the appropriation of technical concepts and theories invented by social scientists
can turn them into constituting elements of that very 'subject-matter' they were
coined to characterize, and by that token alter the context of their application.
(Giddens, 1976: 79. Author's emphasis)
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Because social scientific knowledge is of the same meaningful substance as the constituents
of the social world, its appropriation by actors may reshape the social world itself, and
change the applicability of the knowledge. This has two main consequences. Firstly, it
means that old theories may have a continuing relevance that is not found in the case of
natural science. Giddens argues that an 'archaic natural scientific theory is of no particular
interest once better ones have come along' (Giddens, 1984: 353). In social science,
however, old theories are still important, and this is because they have shaped the social
world which we wish to understand. Drawing on a specific example, Giddens writes:
Why, now that we are well familiar with the concept and the reality of state
sovereignty, do seventeenth-century theories of the state retain a relevance to social
or political reflection today? Surely exactly because they have contributed to
constituting the social world we now live in. (Giddens, 1984: xxxiv-xxxv)
Thus, because of meaning transmission from scientific to lay discourse, old social scientific
theories cannot be forgotten.
Interesting though this is, it is not the most startling of Giddens' claims. Rather he argues
that the filtering of meaning from social scientific discourse to lay activities is one cause of
the radical difference in status of laws of nature and laws of society. In the natural sciences,
laws are held to be universally applicable. Giddens writes:
Universal laws state that whenever one set of conditions, specified in a definite
way, is found, a second set of conditions will be found also where the first set
causes the second. (Giddens, 1984: 344)
Laws are statements of causal mechanisms which operate regularly and have the force of
necessity: one set of conditions necessarily brings about another.
According to Giddens, this is not the case in the social sciences. The reason for this
difference is that the emergence of forms of knowledge, whether from social science or other
activities, can lead to a reconfiguration of the social world, so that conjunctions can never be
relied upon to continue, that is, to occur 'universally'. The reconstituting powers of
knowledge mean that any generalisation about regularities in human conduct may be
disrupted by actors learning about such regularities and altering their conduct accordingly.
Giddens illustrates this point by discussing Machiavelli's writings. Machiavelli advises
princes on how to gain the support of their subjects, offering insights such as:
When men receive favours from someone they expected to do them ill, they are
under a great obligation to their benefactor; just so the people can in an instant
become more amicably disposed towards the prince than if he had seized power by
their favour. (Machiavelli, 1961: 69 quoted in Giddens, 1984: 350)
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This appears to have the form of a universal conjunction. That is, when one set of conditions
is fulfilled (the unexpected receipt of favours) another results (a populace better disposed to
the ruler). However, argues Giddens, the knowledge of actors about Machiavelli and his
writings may undermine such a conjunction. For example, if a ruler is thought by her/his
subjects to be a student of Machiavelli, then actions such as the surprising distribution of
favours may not be well received, being viewed as an intentional manipulation of public
opinion (Giddens, 1984: 352). The conjunction between act and response is not a necessary
one, but is dependent upon the knowledgeability of actors.
Giddens thus makes the bold claim that 'Laws in the social sciences are historical in
character and in principle mutable in form' (Giddens, 1979: 243. Author's emphasis). Laws
are historical because the conjunctions they refer to may only apply within a given period,
until changes in actors' knowledge bring about new activities and new conjunctions
(Giddens, 1984: 347). Because of this possibility, apparently law-like connections in social
life are in fact subject to alteration. This provides a clear contrast with natural scientific laws,
which are universal in their application and immutable insofar as human activity and
knowledgeability cannot alter the laws of nature. This kind of argument is found in a
number of writers, with the unpredictability of action due to developments in knowledge
offered as an important consideration against naturalism (Maclntyre, 1985: 93-4) or a
decisive one" (Taylor, 1985: 55-7).
As before, I would like to take issue with these antinaturalistic claims. This does not
mean disputing all of Giddens' arguments, but suggesting that he looks for parallels between
natural and social science in the wrong place. We should certainly accept that human
activity does change with knowledgeability; it is this which gives the pursuit of knowledge
centrality in human affairs. Giddens is thus right to say that we will not find universally
applicable regularities of human conduct, if by that we mean invariant human responses to
certain conditions12 (as in the universalist construal of Machiavelli's principles).
Furthermore, this has the potential to undermine certain naturalistic programmes within
social science, such as that outlined by Jonathan Turner and Randall Collins in which the
empirical characteristics of the social world are said to be generated from combinations of 40
law-like processes (Turner, 1992; Collins, 1992: 192-3). Turner defends his naturalistic
position by rejecting Giddens' claims, and arguing that so-called mutable laws are in fact
11 Bhaskar takes this same argument to be a demonstration of the necessarily incomplete nature of
social science (Bhaskar, 1998: 48).
12 Excepting, of course, those which are based in properties of the human organism, which Giddens
recognises the existence of (Giddens, 1979: 244).
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low-level empirical generalizations, and the exceptions to those generalizations which give
the impression of mutability, can in fact be encompassed by higher-level, immutable
theoretical laws. He further suggests that although agents may come to know these laws, the
proof of their law-like character will be that no matter how much agents try to alter them, the
fundamental social processes which these laws describe will still operate (Turner, 1992:
162). This latter argument is somewhat self-contradictory. Turner accepts that agents may
learn about laws and thus attempt to change them. Even if we were to take these laws to be
immutable, it would seem that the discovery of a law has altered the course of social life, as
it has led to an agent performing an action (attempting to change a law) which would not
have occurred otherwise. The production of knowledge has then reshaped human activity in
a way which disrupts statements about the regularity of that activity. This point also
undermines Turner's first argument, as no matter what level one retreats to, if the discovery
of a 'law' alters human action in any way, then this suggests the ongoing evolution of human
activity cannot be captured by universal law-like generalizations.
If Giddens is correct in these respects, then how can the homology of natural and social
science be maintained? Let us first consider how to adequately characterise the natural
scientific case. I have argued that natural scientific theorising can be understood as an
attempt by human actors to find the most successful ways of dealing with the world through
their theories. Certainly, regularity and the necessity of outcomes are important within these
forms of investigation, and it is the universally consistent character of the results of
theoretical and experimental activity that give investigation its worth. That is, in any
specified situation, interacting with the world in a certain way will always produce the same
results (setting aside purely random factors). If this was not the case, we would have no
grounds for preferring one theory to another, as the coherency of a theory would be subject
to inexplicable variations. Of course, this is not to deny the complexity of the world, with
many factors feeding into actual outcomes. It is, however, to argue that this complexity is
not inexplicable in character, but can be explained by analysing the regular elements which
contribute to its construction. In this sense, the responses of the world to human activity are
not 'mutable' and understandings are reworked and developed in order to better account for
these consistent, necessary outcomes. Natural science can thus be characterised as a
meaningfully constituted practice involving interactions with the world that produce regular
effects. Scientific theories offer a more or less coherent understanding of these effects,
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depending on their adequacy13. It is important to note, however, that it is not the conduct of
natural scientists that is being analysed in terms of universal conjunctions. This conduct
changes and evolves over time, as natural scientists produce new understandings, and alter
their modes of interaction with the world. The regularity is not in their actual behaviour over
time, but in the consequences that any specific mode of behaviour produces, and it is the
latter which are formulated into laws.
This provides us with a model for understanding social activity. We should not envision
laws of society which mechanically predict the behaviour of actors, because, as with natural
scientists, this behaviour is altered when new understandings emerge. This does not mean,
however, that we should term the limited generalisations of conduct which emerge 'historical
mutable laws' and be satisfied with this, as Giddens suggests. Rather, we must insist that the
crucial regularities lie in the consequences of employing social understandings. As in
natural science, these are universally applicable, and action guided by the same
understandings will always have the same consequences14, which may be more or less
systematically understood by the actors involved. Using the terminology discussed in
Chapter 1, if the consequences have a positive location in the system of understanding, the
results of action conform to intention; if they occupy residual categories, the results of action
contradict what was intended, causing problems for actors.
As with natural science, the task of social science is to improve our grasp of the necessary
consequences of action, so that we can adjust our interactions with the world accordingly. In
both arenas, statements of law are statements of the necessary consequences of some
structure of activity. Marx's analysis of the 'capitalist mode of production' has this character,
as it predicts the consequences of interacting with the world in a certain way, arguing that
capitalism will necessarily lead to crises of overproduction and the immiseration of the
proletariat. Despite the fact that they turned out to be empirically questionable, such claims
have the correct form for laws, arguing for the necessary effects of a certain kind of
interaction with the world. Such effects should be thought of as neither mutable nor
historical (in Giddens' terms); so long as understandings of a certain kind are acted upon,
particular consequences will necessarily follow, and their occurrence is neither historically
bounded nor alterable by human beings. For example, whenever people engage in a
structure of activity which conforms to Marx's analysis as capitalist, it will necessarily have
13 Remembering, of course, that these 'effects' are not 'factual', instead being theoretical
constructions that are also reformulated in the process of inquiry.
14 Benton seems to make a similar point in relation to Bhaskar's version of the mutability argument,




certain consequences. But this does not mean, as Turner's naturalism implies, that
knowledge of a situation cannot change the course of human activities. Rather, the point is
that human knowledge alters our activities so that we relate more successfully to the
necessary outcomes of our interactions with the world. This is equally true in natural and
social science.
If these arguments are correct, what bearing do they have on Giddens' earlier claims
regarding the continuing relevance of old social scientific theories, and the relation between
social scientific knowledge and lay activity? Certainly, he is correct to argue that social
scientific knowledge may be incorporated into lay social action, leading to an alteration of
actors' conduct. Such situations can be characterised as a process of learning whereby lay
social activity (hopefully) becomes more successful through the incorporation of social
scientific insights. This provides no warrant for antinaturalism, however, as the same
process of learning occurs when an innovative natural scientific theory is produced, which
results in the reconstruction of the activities of other natural scientists to (hopefully) gain
from these insights. Natural scientists 'reconstruct' their theoretical worlds because of new
understandings in the same way that social scientists and lay actors 'reconstruct' theirs. The
filtering of meaning between scientific and lay actors has no special consequences for social
science. It has straightforward parallels with the filtering of meaning between different
natural scientific research groups.
It seems, then, that both social and natural scientific theories can be said to constitute the
world for scientists, and to alter the theoretical worlds of others. The lack of interest in old
natural scientific theories is not because they did not at some time act as constitutive
elements of scientists' worlds. The important point is that, due to the impressive rate of
advance in many fields of natural science, these worlds have been reconstituted by newer
theories which have greater coherence and consistency. Old theories are uninteresting
because they are less resourceful than our present-day theories. Thus, the issue in relation to
social science cannot simply be that its theories can reconstitute society. What Giddens is
implying is that old and superseded theories are still relevant in the social sciences, unlike
the natural sciences, because they are still constitutive of the social world. There are two
possible responses to this claim. Firstly, one could argue that the failure of new theories to
reconstitute the social world actually suggests that they are not more resourceful than those
they were intended to supersede. The persistence of old understandings would be evidence
that professional and lay social scientists have not yet come up with better ones. Secondly, it
could be argued that better understandings have been produced, but that the institutional
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structure of a society may not allow for the transmission of successful ideas and their
practical incorporation into human activity. Such a situation would have to be addressed by
investigating these social structures and how they themselves could be reconstructed. I do
not myself know which of these alternatives is correct. What should be noted is that both
raise issues of success in social life in the same way as these emerge in natural science,
contrary to Giddens' arguments.
2.4 Agency and social science
This chapter has already discussed a range of arguments that Giddens uses to differentiate
social and natural science. However, one more set of claims must be addressed before this
survey of Giddens' arguments can be complete. These relate to issues of agency that are
relevant in the social world, but have no correlate in the natural realm. According to
Giddens, social science has to accept the existence of agency in order to properly understand
the character of social activity. Agency is defined by Giddens as 'the stream of actual or
contemplated causal inter\'entions of corporeal beings in the ongoing process of events-in-
the-world' (Giddens, 1976: 75. Author's emphasis). A further crucial point is that agency is
not merely a matter of causal influence but necessarily involves the notion that an agent
'could have acted otherwise' (Giddens, 1976: 75). That is to say, an agent always has some
degree of choice about what course of action to follow, and is never simply compelled to act.
This lack of compulsion is intimately bound up with the meaningful nature of human
conduct. Action is not simply an automatic or mechanical response to some situation or set
of conditions, but involves a meaningful assessment of this situation, and a decision to act in
one way or another based upon the wants of the actor. Giddens terms this capacity 'agent
causality', which he discusses in New Rules ofSociological Method, stating:
That action is caused by an agent's reflexive monitoring of his intentions in
relation both to his wants and his appreciation of the demands of the 'outer' world
supplies a sufficient explication of freedom of conduct for the needs of this study.
(Giddens, 1976: 84-5)
Because actors can reflect about possible actions on the basis of their wants, they are not
compelled to follow any course of activity.
Giddens does acknowledge that there are situations in social life when actors appear to be
forced to act in one way rather than another. However, he suggests that situations which
seem to involve compulsion rather than choice only appear to do so when we leave out the
role that meaning has to play. For example, we typically think that when an agent is
threatened with death unless they follow a specific course of action, this is a matter of
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straightforward compulsion. However, suggests Giddens, this is not the case, as the threat of
death only carries weight if the individual values life, and the situation is thus mediated by
human meaning. Giddens argues that the example can be reformulated as follows:
To say that an individual 'had no choice but to act in such and such a way', in a
situation of this sort evidently means 'Given his/her desire not to die, the only
alternative open was to act in the way he or she did. (Giddens, 1984: 175)
In other words, the threat of death does not simply compel an agent by itself; it must be
mediated through the agent's understandings and desires, and it only has an influence
because of these15.
As is typical of Giddens' approach, the idea that forces and constraints are mediated in the
human realm is contrasted with the 'implacable' forces that are found in nature. When
Giddens discusses social structural constraints he writes that:
They [structural constraints] cannot be compared with the effect of, say, an
earthquake which destroys a town and its inhabitants without their in any way
being able to do anything about it...The structural properties of social systems do
not act, or 'act on', anyone like forces of nature 'compel' him or her to behave in
any particular way. (Giddens, 1984: 181)
The natural realm involves mechanical compulsion, and the social realm does not. Thus,
social science must acknowledge the possibility of agency in its analyses.
The problems with Giddens' arguments here are similar in character to those discussed in
the previous section. Giddens contrasts natural and social science on the basis that social
science must acknowledge the mediation of causal forces by 'meaning'. However, if we
consider both natural science and social life to be meaningful attempts to deal successfully
with the causal impact of the world, then issues of compulsion take on a different hue. After
all, even though the processes studied by natural science are forceful and mechanical in
character, no-one would argue that by that token natural scientists are simply impelled to
theorise them in one particular way. That is to say the natural world does not make theorists
categorise it in one manner rather than another. Clearly, there are aspects of the natural
world which have been theorised in different ways throughout human history, as evinced by
the competing astronomical theories of Ptolemy and Copernicus. Furthermore, no
mechanical force would stop human beings from giving up present-day theories, and
reverting to earlier ones in their interactions with the world. Nevertheless, our sense that this
would be an irrational decision indicates that the mediated and meaningful character of
15 Archer makes an analogous claim, suggesting that where constraints appear to be working in a
'hydraulic' manner, this is because we take the desires of the agents involved for granted, for example
the desire not to starve (Archer, 1995: 199).
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natural scientific theories does not make commitment to them optional. As argued in
Chapter 1, a theory is pursued because it systematically accounts for the impact of the
material world, and to revert to a theory that is less resourceful would be to opt to find the
world a more confusing place. Although our interactions with the natural world are
'meaningful', it is wrong to say that the understandings we employ are thus a matter of
choice. Rather, we decide between theories by assessing how systematically they allow us to
deal with the causal forces and influences that we encounter. To 'choose' to employ an
unsuccessful theory would be irrational.
When natural scientific investigation is viewed in this way, the activities of social agents
seem to have a similar character. Giddens suggeststhat agents make decisions based on an
assessment of their situation oriented towards meeting their particular wants. However, I
would argue that this does not introduce an element of 'choice' into matters. If, for the
moment, we take actors' wants to be fixed, then the compelling course of action to a rational
actor is that which comes closest to fulfilling those wants. A lack of choice is a feature of
the rationality of the situation, in that if actors want to achieve certain goals, then they must
act in accordance with the best available knowledge about how to do so. If, for example, an
actor values their life most highly of all, then it does not make sense to say that they have a
choice when presented with only two options: death or another course of action. They are
constrained to pursue the alternative course as the best available option for realising their
wants. As Holmwood and Stewart argue, to 'choose' against one's wants would be a denial
of self, that is the priorities which constitute one as a self6 (Holmwood and Stewart, 1991,
Chpt. 6). This does not mean that deciding to act in a certain way involves strict physical
compulsion, but the same is true in deciding between theories in natural science. In both
cases, meaningful reflection on alternatives is rationally compelling in that it locates the
most resourceful known option.
Is an element of choice introduced if we argue that wants may themselves be reflected
upon? It is hard to imagine that human beings could alter their wants with complete
freedom, given our biological basis and the construction of somewhat stable selves through
various psychological and sociological processes. Nevertheless, we do seem to be able to
reflect upon our wants, and reprioritise them, so that goals that were important at one time
later become subsidiary or irrelevant. It seems to me, however, that such reflection on
priorities cannot be seen as a matter of 'choice'. If reasons are found to reprioritise wants
16 If such a 'choice' was taken, the analyst would have to reconsider their conception of the actor's
wants, given that these are defined as the priorities which actors wish to pursue.
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then, as with the other questions of knowledge considered, these cannot be taken as
'optional', but are compelling insofar as they demonstrate why the changed order of
priorities is better for the actor. A person may decide that some element of self is repressed
in their current order of priorities and alter these as such. For example someone may realise
that their love of the outdoors is more important than their desire to understand the social
world, and thus resign their job as a sociology lecturer to become a lumberjack. Insofar as
the decision is a reasoned one, it does not involve a 'choice', but an apprehension of the best
way to achieve what one thinks is valuable, and a pursuit of this option17.
Thus, in the reflection on and pursuit of wants, issues of 'choice' do not have a central,
foundational position. Giddens argues that choice is central because he believes that the
meaningful character of social activity gives human beings a distance from the demands of
the 'outer world'. However, the existence ofmeaning does not give human beings a 'choice'
in relating to this material environment, as the meanings employed are more or less adequate,
allowing more or less resourceful activity. Given that activity is bound by what Holmwood
and Stewart call the 'constraints of competence', a choice to act against these constraints
would be the embrace of incompetence (Holmwood and Stewart, 1991: 100-1). Although
Giddens would surely reject this as an inadequate conception of agency, he does not show
how it can be given a more positive characterisation.
These arguments cast doubt on the notion that there is a special issue of agency in social
life. The issues of meaning invoked to defend such a notion are, in fact, the same across
natural scientific investigation and social activity more generally. To illustrate this, we can
return to Giddens' claim that social constraints, such as the threat of death, are not like
natural forces, such as an earthquake which destroys a town. These cases are slightly
disanalogous, and if this is rectified we can see that there is no issue of agency in the first
case which differentiates the social from the natural. A better parallel to the threat of death
in social life is an earthquake warning given to inhabitants that they are in serious danger if
17 Of course, it could be the case that knowledgeable reflection using some set of criteria produces
two equally viable options. There could, for example, be two ways to achieve the end of 'spending
more time in the outdoors' which were equally promising using all of the criteria of importance to an
actor. In such cases, it is reasonable to speak of a 'choice' in relation to action, but if decision¬
making criteria are truly exhausted then this choice must be a random one. This does not support
Giddens' general contention that 'choice' is analytic to agency, as it exists only in a subcategory of
cases, i.e. where there are equi-rational options. Furthermore, this kind of choice has a direct




they do not evacuate from a town18. As Giddens points out, the threat of death is irrelevant if
one does not value life. Equally, however, the possibility of dying in an earthquake is
irrelevant to those who do not value their lives. In both cases, human responses are
governed by a knowledgeable assessment of the best course of action. Given our wants and
our knowledge of possible actions, we have no reasonable option but to follow that course
which seems best for us.
2.5 Conclusion
In this conclusion I would like to emphasise the relevance of the arguments made here to
the overall themes of the thesis. The contention of this thesis is that natural scientific
investigation and other social practices have the same general characteristics. They are
activities oriented to a successful interaction with the world, whose success is not based in
some unshakeable foundation, but is instead a product of the resolution of problems of
understanding over a period of time. By contrast, Giddens' anti-naturalistic approach
divides the characteristics of natural science from those of other social activities. The
implication of his arguments is that because social activities are constituted by 'meaning',
issues of their success are different to those of natural scientific theories. I have argued
throughout the chapter that this distinction cannot be sustained. Giddens claims that actors'
understandings must initially be treated as perfectly successful 'mutual knowledge' before
they can be critically assessed. This differentiates them from the understandings of natural
science whose success can be straightforwardly assessed through empirical means. I
suggested that this treatment of actors' understandings must misrepresent them, and that, as
with natural science, comprehending the beliefs of actors involves understanding the
problems with them. The idea that social life involves agency also divides natural scientific
investigation from other social activities on the basis of success. Giddens' argument is that
because social life is meaningfully constituted, social actors have a 'freedom to do
otherwise' that is not present in human interactions with the natural world. The suggestion is
that the latter are bound by the consequences of action which will be more or less successful
in relation to the material world, whereas social action can escape these constraints.
However, I argued that Giddens fails to show that success is not binding in social life. Its
meaningful nature does not mean that actors have a 'choice' in their actions. As with natural
18 It would be wrong to argue that the option in Giddens' social example is always present in social
life and never present in human relations with the natural world. An actor may simply be shot with
no offer of an alternative course being given; likewise, we may be forewarned of events in the natural
world allowing us a chance to deliberate upon responses.
79
Giddens and Antinaturalism
science, the meanings involved are more or less successful in producing outcomes for actors,
and any 'choice' to go against what seems to be the best option must be suboptimal for
actors. Giddens' attempts to distinguish social practices from natural science lead him to
give an incoherent account of the former.
Giddens' approach also generates problems in his treatment of natural science, which is, at
the very least, ambiguous. He certainly acknowledges the importance of post-positivist
arguments that scientific investigation is constituted by 'frames of meaning'. He also
accepts that natural science is a part of social life (see for example, Giddens, 1976: 79).
However, Giddens wants to contrast the social and natural worlds, and in doing so, the place
of natural science in his analysis becomes unclear. As natural science is related to both the
social and natural worlds, Giddens must hold two contradictory postulates about it. On the
one hand, because science is a social practice, its world must be produced by the skilled and
knowledgeable activities of agents. On the other hand, because science is oriented to non-
social nature, its world must be that of external objects which exist independently of
meaning. To avoid this contradiction, Giddens underplays the meaningful (that is,
theoretical) character of science, and implies that it relates directly to the world of objects.
However, this leaves him with an unsatisfactory, foundationalist view of science. One
example of this is Giddens' account of the differences between natural scientific and social
scientific innovation. As we saw above, he argues that innovation in social science is
distinct to that in natural science because the social world is meaningfully constituted. In
order for this to be a genuine contrast, the inference must be that innovation in natural
science is not meaningful (that is, theoretically mediated) but is instead directly revealing of
features of the object world. It was argued in Chapter 1 that such a position is untenable, and
that even the most apparently 'direct' concepts of experience are theoretical mediations that
may be reconstructed in the process of investigation.
The move towards a foundationalist account of science is a result of Giddens' anti-
naturalism. His claim that social life has issues of meaning not present in natural science
pushes analysis of the latter towards the idea that natural science involves 'direct'
apprehension, rather than theoretical mediation. I would argue that it is more satisfactory to
avoid this division, and accept that both natural science and other social practices are




Realism and the Question of Agency
3.1 Introduction
Realist1 philosophy emerged in the 1960s and 1970s as a non-positivist account of natural
science, and has developed, in the British context, into the leading philosophy of social
science that continues to draw inspiration from the achievements of natural scientific inquiry.
As a contributor to the demise of positivism, realism distinguished itself from other critical
frameworks by placing a strong emphasis upon the 'reality' of material structures within the
natural world. Realists claim that natural science is possible only because of the existence of
such structures independent of human knowledge of them. They argue that the task of
natural science is to investigate the properties of real structures and make (fallible) attempts
to know their characteristics.
As a philosophy of social science, realism argues that social life contains structures which
can be known scientifically. In this respect, it claims to be naturalistic in orientation,
paralleling natural scientific and social scientific inquiry. Realists often contrast their
'scientific' approach to social life with professed antinaturalisms, such as that of Giddens.
From a realist perspective, Giddens' emphasis on the 'meaningful' constitution of social life
undermines a rigorous consideration of the objective structures of society, which realists
claim exist independently of subjective human apprehension of them (see for example
Archer, 1995, Chpt. 4 especially).
Nevertheless, it is the argument of this chapter that realism does not avoid the division of
science and society, and the problems that this entails. Although realism emphasises the
connection between natural and social science, its proponents argue that social life has
special features not present in natural scientific investigation. Roy Bhaskar, one of the
founders of the realist approach, claims that social life involves the activity of agents, in
addition to the operation of structures. Social structures are amenable to scientific analysis,
1 I used the term 'ontological realism' for this position in Chapter 1 to distinguish it from




but human agency adds another dimension which is not present in natural science (Bhaskar,
1998: 37-44). I shall be arguing that this division of science and society is as problematic for
realists as it is for anti-naturalists such as Giddens. On the one hand, realists cannot give
positive substance to the non-structural features of society bracketed under the notion of
agency. On the other hand, the conception of structural analysis offered by realism does not
successfully capture the historical and theoretically mediated character of scientific
knowledge.
To discuss these claims, I will be focusing upon the arguments of Margaret Archer.
Archer is an important exponent of the realist cause, and her Realist Social Theory: The
Morphogenetic Approach (1995) has been the subject of much recent discussion (see for
instance Healy, 1998; King, 1999; Zeuner, 1999). Realism is not a homogeneous
perspective, but it is fair to say that Archer's work is a development of the mainstream realist
approach that draws on the work of Roy Bhaskar (1978, 1979). In this respect, it is
consonant with important realist works such as Andrew Collier's Critical Realism (1994)
and William Outhwaite's New Philosophies ofSocial Science (1987). A critical appraisal of
the work of Archer thus addresses the dominant perspective within the British realist
tradition.
The argument of the chapter proceeds as follows. Firstly, I outline Archer's
morphogenetic approach and its dualistic attempt to analyse structure/agency, culture/agency
and structure/culture relations by separating each element out and then theorising their
interplay. The main body of the chapter is then devoted to a detailed consideration of
Archer's arguments and the problems that her separation of structure, culture and agency
generate. The concluding section reconnects these matters with the themes of the thesis.
3.2 Morphogenesis and realism
Archer's work is intended to offer a coherent framework for analysing the development of
cultural and social structures, and the processes which contribute to their stability or change.
Although the initial inspiration for her work was systems theory, Archer discovered the
connections between her morphogenetic2 approach and the realist perspective, arguing that
the former is a sociologically rich version of the latter (Archer, 1995). The important tenet
2 Archer draws the term 'morphogenesis' from Walter Buckley's work (Archer, 1995: 137) and it
refers to her theory of the causes of stability or change in systems. There is some potential for
confusion here in that the term is also used to refer to one of two possible outcomes of a system




which the two share is that the objective structures of a social system must be theoretically
separated from the agency of the actors involved in it (Archer, 1995; Bhaskar, 1998). Archer
thus subscribes to an 'analytical dualism' which separates out the influence of the 'people'
(agents) from that of the 'parts' (structures) and analyses their interrelation over time. In the
terms of this thesis, Archer divides science and society, arguing that society contains not
only scientifically analysable structures, but also human agents who may act independently
of these structures. To theorise this, Archer draws on David Lockwood's article 'Social
integration and system integration' (1992 [1964]) in which he argues that by separating the
characteristics of social groups and social structures the analyst can better account for social
stability and change. Lockwood's key claim is that although there may be tensions in the
relations of institutional structures to one another, this may not produce change if these
tensions can be suppressed by social groups with a particular interest in doing so
(Lockwood, 1992: 407-8). Archer expands on Lockwood's arguments to offer a dualistic
mode of analysis that applies to both social and cultural systems, which she then draws
together into a wider, more general framework.
To grasp the character of Archer's system we need to examine how she theorises the
separation of levels in her analysis. Her analytical dualism is intended to distinguish two
aspects of society that have distinct properties. On the one hand there is the 'system' level,
which contains relations whose objective character is independent of the knowledge of any
actor. This sets up an objective 'situational logic' which agents have to deal with. However,
this alone is not enough to understand the character of society and societal change, because
actors are not merely 'bearers' of the objective properties of the system (Archer, 1988: xiii).
Rather, how actors deal with these objective properties is an independent question, and one
which relates to the characteristics of the 'social' level in which the properties of groups of
agents and their strategic activities come to the fore.
In the cultural sphere, the 'system' consists of items of culture that can be expressed
propositionally and the logical relations between these, most importantly their relations of
contradiction or coherence3. These are combined with the 'necessity' or 'contingency' of the
relation between beliefs4 to make four possible combinations. One example is the
'constraining contradiction' in which belief A necessarily evokes belief B which contradicts
it (Archer, 1988: 148-9). Another example is the 'contingent complementarity' in which two
3 Archer adds that items could also be logically independent of one another, but argues that this is
unimportant compared to relations of coherence or contradiction (Archer, 1988: 105).
41 have referred to relations between 'beliefs' here, but Archer states that the items being compared




items within the Cultural System are coherent with one another, but neither ineluctably
invokes the other (Archer, 1988: 219). Archer argues that propositions and their relations
exist in what Popper (1972) calls 'World Three', which is the realm of objective contents of
thought. 'World Three' relations can be distinguished from the subjective beliefs of
individuals. As Archer puts it:
That the ideas of, say, Buddha agree with those of, say, Schopenhauer is to say
nothing about the subjective mental experiences of the two people - it is a logical
statement... (Archer, 1988: 105. Author's emphasis)
This 'objective' character is not only independent of subjective individual judgement, but is
also, according to Archer, cross-cultural. She disputes the claim put forward by
constructionists such as Barnes and Bloor that logic is culturally relative, arguing that
conceptions of logic in fact show a great regularity across history and culture, and supposed
alternatives are either minor variations or misconstruals on the part of the analyst (Archer,
1988: 112-127). Therefore, the relations within the Cultural System of any society can be
objectively characterised as having certain properties of contradiction or coherence.
Within the cultural sphere, Archer refers to the level pertaining to the properties and
strategies of groups as the 'Socio-CulturaT. Whereas relations within the Cultural System
are logical, those within the Socio-Cultural level are causal connections between groups and
individuals. These relationships are based in material and ideal5 interests, which provide
motivation for groups to uphold or challenge certain sets of beliefs (Archer, 1988: xx).
Actors take up beliefs to achieve the 'articulation, assertion, or legitimation' of their
interests, and a coherent defence of beliefs furthers these (Archer, 1995: 306; Archer, 1988:
235-42). This is also the level within which power operates to influence the uptake of beliefs
by different actors. So, for example, a group that is socially powerful may 'use their power
to control the visibility of inconsistent items' in their own doctrines, limiting access to the
ideas through means such as censorship (1988: xxi).
5 What exactly constitutes an 'ideal interest' is not defined by Archer. Its meaning is not explicitly
specified in her work, and the main clue in Culture and Agency is a brief list of exemplars given of
such interests which are said to include 'ethnic, religious or linguistic divides' (Archer, 1988: xx). In
Realist Social Theory, Archer suggests that there are objective but non-material benefits from
continuing to hold to the beliefs of one's community, including status, position, friendship and
support among members (Archer, 1995: 212). She calls these 'cultural benefits' but it seems
plausible to see these as the substance of an 'ideal interest'. If this is the case, then the notion of 'ideal
interests' is of poor explanatory value. It does not explain why the community holds these beliefs
rather than any others, something which Archer's materialist analysis at least purports to account for.
This could perhaps be attributed to chance. However, such a move then raises the question: why
would a community reward the defence of a set of beliefs that they have no material motivation to
defend, and which they came upon by chance?
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Having separated out these levels and their characteristics, Archer's theory of their
interrelationship is termed the 'morphogenetic cycle'. This cycle is a method of analysis
which 'breaks in' to the flow of activity for the purpose of theorising the change or stability
of cultural (and social) structures due to the interplay between the levels (Archer, 1988: 106,
144). The cycle begins with the Cultural System in a certain state, its constituent
propositions having objective relations of coherence or contradiction to one another. This is
a 'situational logic' which exerts causal influences upon actors at the Socio-Cultural level,
conditioning their possibilities for action (Archer, 1988: 143). When actors hold beliefs that
'stand in manifest logical contradiction or complementarity to others', this places a causal
constraint upon action (Archer, 1988: 145). One example of this is when actors find
themselves in the situational logic of constraining contradiction (1988: 148-9). In this case
actors wish to maintain a belief, A, for reasons that reside on the Socio-Cultural level.
However, belief A necessarily evokes belief B, which is in contradiction with A. This,
Archer argues, places the actors under strong constraints, because they cannot reject belief B
(due to its internal connection with A), but on the other hand, the contradiction involved
threatens to make A appear indefensible. So long as they wish to hold A, actors have a
logical constraint to deal with.
The strategies actually pursued by actors are the subject of the next phase of the
morphogenetic cycle, Socio-Cultural interaction. Although interaction is structured by the
properties of the Cultural System, these do not determine it. Rather Socio-Cultural action is
pursued on the basis of the interests of social groups, and the existence of human agency
means that this action may be original and creative (Archer, 1988: 187). Actors respond to
the logic of the cultural system and attempt to make their responses Socio-Culturally
efficacious. This in turn influences whether the outcome of action is system change or
system stability. To see this in operation, we can consider the aforementioned 'constraining
contradiction'. As we have seen, this places actors who have interests in defending belief A
in an awkward position. However, although the Cultural System is contradictory in this
respect, the Socio-Cultura! level may not be, and the group wishing to defend A may wield a
great deal of power and influence. If this is the case, suggests Archer, they may be able (for
a while) to conceal the contradiction from the general public and avoid the charge of
inconsistency (Archer, 1988: 189-197). The result of this is morphostasis, at least




This brings us to the final stage of the morphogenetic cycle, cultural elaboration.
Depending on the characteristics of the Cultural System, and Socio-Cultural response to
them, the system may either remain broadly stable or change in its characteristics. As we
have seen, the combination of constraining contradiction and a strong interest group
concerned to conceal it produces morphostasis in the short term, with no substantial
elaboration. However, other configurations lead to the production of new cultural items.
For example, competing Socio-Cultural groups may each choose to defend a different theory
in a situation where the theories are contingently contradictory to one another. In such a
situation, each is pushed to criticise the other's theory, and also to elaborate their own in
defence against criticism. The result is the production of new items in the Cultural System
which are strongly differentiated from one another due to the competition of interests that
produced them (Archer, 1988: 246). More generally, whether the Cultural System is
elaborated or remains the same, the objective relations between its elements feed back in as
the first phase of the next morphogenetic cycle, providing a situational logic that actors must
once again respond to.
Archer uses exactly the same form of analysis to theorise social structure, separating out
two aspects of society and then theorising their interrelationship. In analysing the System
level, Archer calls upon realism to argue that society contains objective structures which
have the character of necessity and materiality. Explicating the first of these, Archer argues
that structures are not made up of contingent combinations of elements which could dissolve
at any moment, but have a causal influence through their intrinsic nature, as do structures in
the natural world (Archer, 1995: 173; Bhaskar, 1975). Turning to the second aspect, the
'materiality' of structures is what distinguishes them from the objective elements of the
Cultural System, ideas. Structures have characteristics that are not based in ideas, and they
typically have causal influence independent of what is believed about them (Archer, 1995:
175). As a consequence, the meanings that can be 'imposed' on structures are limited by
their material nature (Archer, 1995: 176). By way of illustration, Archer refers to structural
factors such as famines, demographic structures, and income distributions which have an
'objective influence' independent of the interpretations of 'readers', and have an effect on
actors regardless of whether they comprehend it or not (Archer, 1995: 112).
Given that structure can have objective characteristics, we need to consider how the
configuration of the structural level impacts upon the possibilities for actors6. The most
61 have excluded discussion of Archer's notion of roles here, as it does not play a central part in her
analysis, and is not relevant to the criticisms that I will later offer.
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important feature of structures is that positions within them offer differential access to valued
resources that are socially scarce. Positions are defined by the relative advantage or
disadvantage they give to actors holding them, that is, the relative access to resources that
they offer (Archer, 1995: 204). The benefits or otherwise of a position give its holder a
vested interest in either the maintenance of current structures or their reconfiguration. Those
who hold advantageous positions in the current structure have an interest in its maintenance;
those whose positions give them disadvantages have an interest in its alteration (Archer,
1995: 203). This can be paralleled with Archer's analysis of the Cultural System in which
social groups have an interest in either upholding some belief (interest in maintenance) or
challenging it (interest in change).
We have seen so far that actors derive relative advantage or disadvantage from particular
institutional structures. Now we have to consider the influence of structural relations on this,
that is, relations of strain or compatibility between institutions (paralleling the logical
relations between cultural items). There are four types of objective relations between
structural elements, depending on their compatibility or incompatibility and the necessity or
contingency of their connection (Archer, 1995: 218-229). Each combination produces a
different 'situational logic' for actors, encouraging them to respond to the institutional
configuration in different ways. One example of this is the 'necessary complementarity', in
which institutions are necessarily related to one another, and their operation is compatible.
To illustrate this, Archer refers to the internal and coherent connections between 'ancient
Indian institutions' such as caste, religion, kinship, polity and law (Archer, 1995: 219). She
argues that this compatibility makes it objectively rational for all actors to support the
institutions because 'everyone has something to lose from disruption' (Archer, 1995: 220).
Even those who are lower down in the caste hierarchy have local control over certain
material benefits which would be lost if actors attempted to disrupt the institutionalised set¬
up (Archer, 1995: 220-1). The situational logic, then, is one of protection of the institutional
order. Of course, this varies with different institutional configurations and a situation in
which structures are contingently incompatible, for example, encourages a situational logic
of elimination whereby the supporters of each institution have something to gain by
eliminating the other (Archer, 1995: 225-6).
It should be emphasised again that, in a realist spirit, these are all 'objective' properties of
institutions that have a certain character regardless of how actors interpret them. To move to
the next phase of the morphogenetic cycle, from structural conditioning to interaction, we
need to consider the properties of agents. Archer makes a strict distinction between structure
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and agency, that is, between the characteristics of the parts and the people. In doing so, she
ties her work in with that of Bhaskar, who argues for the separation of structure and agency
in The Possibility ofNaturalism (1998 [1979])7. Archer's treatment of agency in relation to
structure is more complex than her analysis of the culture/agency relation. The two key
aspects of it are the activities of individual persons and those of social groups8. As
individuals, actors face an objective structural logic. However, because humans are reflexive
and have the ability to assess the situations in which they find themselves, agency must be
taken into account (Archer, 1995: 249-250). Agents are capable of an altruistic renunciation
of their interests, and acting in relation to moral concerns and not material ones (Archer,
1995: 206-213). Even though individuals are faced with objective structural reasons to act in
a certain way, it is still up to them to weigh these reasons and find them good (Archer, 1995:
209). The outcome of this process is not predetermined.
The other central aspect of agency pertains to the activity of collectivities. A 'collectivity'
is defined by Archer as a group of persons who, because of some structural influence, share
the same life chances (Archer, 1995: 257). There are two types of collectivities in Archer's
analysis, Primary and Corporate Agents. Primary Agents are those collectivities where
people share life chances but do not express their interests as a group or 'organize for their
strategic pursuit' (Archer, 1995: 259). Corporate Agents are collectivities in which the
members have organised into an interest group that self-consciously pursues their own
advantage (Archer, 1995: 258). In relation to agency, Corporate Agents are able to strongly
influence whether a system stays stable or changes, because of their organisational power
(Archer, 1995: 258). In contrast, Primary Agents may have an influence through the
aggregate actions of their members, but this is uncoordinated and unfocused in character.
(Archer, 1995: 259). Archer's point here is that it is not enough to know the structural logic
of some situation. Rather, one also needs to know the configuration of agents and their
powers to grasp what system state is likely to ensue.
This brings us to the final aspect of structural analysis, the elaboration of structures.
Whether structural morphogenesis or morphostasis occurs depends on a combination of the
properties of structure and of agency. A specific structural logic of advantage/disadvantage
gives existing agents reasons to either support the existing structure or try to alter it.
However, whether change occurs or not depends on the strength of the agents involved
7 Bhaskar writes: 'I want to distinguish sharply, then, between the genesis of human actions, lying in
the reasons, intentions and plans of people, on the one hand, and the structures governing the
reproduction and transformation of social activities, on the other...' (Bhaskar, 1998: 35).
8 Once again, 1 am leaving out the element of agency associated with social roles, which, although
relevant to Archer's analysis is not analysed in detail, and is not relevant to my treatment here.
88
Archer and Realism
(Archer, 1995: 297-302). This strength derives from the resources available to them as a
collectivity, their successful mobilization of these, and their position in relation to other
groups. So, for example, the institutional logic of 'necessary contradiction' will give some
Corporate Agent an interest in containing the contradiction as long as possible, to retain their
relative advantage (Archer, 1995: 303). However, their ability to do so depends on the
'relational negotiating strength' between the Corporate Agent promoting the state in question
and the others who might oppose it. In this case, if the agent is successful, then
morphostasis is the result. On the other hand, structural change may result in which groups
may reform and resources may be redistributed.
A final, brief, mention should be given to the interrelation between structural and cultural
levels, which completes Archer's Byzantine theoretical system. So far, we have considered
Archer's analysis of each level separately. However, Archer argues that the two
interpenetrate one another. In order to theorise the result of such interconnection, Archer
analyses the four possible combinations of system logic, which depend on the morphostasis
or morphogenesis of each system (Archer, 1995:308-324). When the two systems line up,
as, for example, when both are going through morphogenesis, then the process is intensified
in each system. On the other hand, when one system is going through morphostasis and the
other morphogenesis, then the stability of the one exerts a drag on change in the other.
3.3 Structure, agency and interests
As we have seen, when analysing the structure and agency relation, Archer insists on two
main points: (i) the objectivity of structure, which, due to its material character, has a causal
influence independent of agents' understandings; and (ii) the capacity of agents to be
reflexive and creative, taking a strategic attitude to structural possibilities. In this section I
want to argue that Archer has trouble defending both of these claims. The general difficulty
is that those activities attributed to agency either become sociologically inexplicable, or
appear to involve the suboptimal behaviour of actors in relation to structural possibility,
rather than demonstrating actors' reflexivity and creativity. Once society is divided from
science, it is analytically difficult or impossible to give social agency a positive statement.
As science is held to identify the most resourceful possibilities for action, any divergence
from scientifically identified structures must be problematic for agents.
This difficulty first emerges in Archer's account of the relation between structure and the
agency of individual persons. Archer argues that individuals inevitably act in a context that
is socially structured, and structures condition action without the 'compliance, consent or
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complicity' of actors (Archer, 1995: 200). Depending on their structural location, actors find
themselves with relative advantage or disadvantage in their access to material and cultural
resources. This gives them objective opportunities that they can take up to pursue their
projects, and if these options are eschewed, actors pay an opportunity cost (Archer, 1995:
205). It also gives actors a 'vested interest' in either structural stability or change, depending
on the benefits of their position (Archer, 1995: 205).
However, in characterising objective opportunities, Archer argues that these do not 'force'
actors to do anything, but rather serve as 'reasons' for acting in one way or another (1995:
208). Archer states:
...as with any reason, agents have to find it good and material considerations are
not the only motives to action. Nevertheless, as they weigh them in the balance,
costs and penalties tip the scales in one direction, meaning that countervailing
concerns would have to be strong enough to outweigh them. It is agents alone who
do the weighing, who assign values to the weight of incommensurables, and
determine the sacrifices and trade-offs that they can bear. (Archer, 1995: 209)
Given that objective reasons necessarily have a certain weight, what factors can
counterbalance them? The key influence mentioned by Archer is that of altruism, which
involves the renunciation of vested interests (Archer, 1995: 206). To act altruistically is to
opt for some course of action even though it will cost one as an actor. As an example of this,
Archer argues that those who are involved in caring professions would typically have been
better off as accountants, but altruistically refuse the benefits of the latter in order to perform
a moral duty (Archer, 1995: 210).
The difficulty that this raises for Archer is that she wants to account for altruistic
behaviour as both an act of undetermined agency and a phenomenon that is sociologically
explicable. Archer wishes to avoid the idea that altruism is based on an 'inexplicable whim',
and views it as a reasoned choice that makes sense in certain cultural contexts.
As such, Archer states:
Most sacrificial activities are embedded in cultural belief systems which may be
vastly more important to the individual than any other aspect of their social
context, but are still not of a person's own making (the Christian martyr did not
make Christianity). (Archer, 1995: 211)
Locating altruism as cultural belief, however, threatens to take away its character as a
genuine act of renunciation. As we saw earlier, Archer argues that cultural beliefs are taken
up and defended for the promotion of the material or ideal interests of actors involved. To
be explicable on Archer's terms, subscription to an altruistic belief system must provide an
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objective advantage to actors9. In this light, altruistic action looks less like the
counterbalancing of objective factors by subjective values, and more like the result of
weighing up different objective advantages in which those gained from upholding certain
cultural beliefs win out. On such an account, there is no moral agency operating, just actors
assessing objective structural opportunities to see which course of action will bring them the
most benefit.
The problem with Archer's account is that her sociological analysis of structure and
culture only gives an 'objective' account of behaviour that is oriented to accruing material
and ideal rewards10. When Archer wavers towards locating moral behaviour structurally, her
only viable option is to see it as self-interested. In contrast, Archer's attempts to give
morality an agentic character make it impossible to analyse sociologically. Some analysts
might find the latter option appealing, arguing that moral behaviour cannot be sociologically
accounted for because it is based in the human capacity of 'free will'. However, there are
good reasons to reject such a position. Firstly, within societies such as our own, there seem
to be structurally explicable differences among those engaging in altruistic behaviour.
Archer's example of the altruism of those in the caring professions exemplifies this point.
As is well known, within twentieth century Britain these professions have been dominated
by women. It seems unlikely that women's heightened moral commitment in this area can
be explained by chance, for instance, by claiming that women just happen to exercise their
moral agency more frequently than men. More likely, there are structural reasons accounting
for this, such as the gendered split of the public (masculine) and private (feminine) spheres
and the association of care with the private sphere. Secondly, it is hard to dispute that the
forms of moral behaviour which humans engage in vary between societies. Rather than
attributing this variation to the unpredictable operation of free will, we should attempt to
offer structural sociological explanations of it. Useful work in this area has been done by the
philosopher Alasdair Maclntyre who, in works such as A Short History ofEthics (1967) and
After Virtue (1985), attempts to make forms of moral conduct intelligible by locating them in
9 There is a brief passage in Culture and Agency which suggests that actors may engage in cultural
reflection and conflict which is not motivated by material or ideal interests (Archer, 1988: 284).
Altruistic commitments could be placed into this category. However, Archer offers no analysis
whatsoever of what might motivate actors to reflect on beliefs, commit to them, and defend them if
this is not motivated by interests of some kind. In the face of an analytical juggernaut in which
interests occupy the driving seat, such a remark seems under-revved. It certainly does nothing to
make altruistic commitments any more structurally explicable, which is the key issue here.
10 Lilli Zeuner (1999) makes a similar criticism although she fails to note that the rewards in question
might be 'ideal'. This omission is hardly surprising, given the undertheorised nature of 'ideal
interests' in Archer's account.
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their social context. Thirdly, placing moral behaviour in the realm of agency stops us from
comprehending it as a need of human beings which is as 'objective' as the other needs and
wants theorised by Archer. This blocks off from sociological analysis questions about the
forms of social relations which best actualise the human need to act morally and the forms of
moral behaviour which best meet this need. These questions are relevant to analysing both
the distribution of moral behaviour within a society and the differences in behaviour across
societies. Contrary to Archer's approach, treating morality in this way provides a structural
analysis ofmorality without reducing it to self-interested behaviour.
So far we have been considering the difficulties that arise when Archer analyses moral
agency. However, there are also problems with her use of the notion 'interests'. As we have
seen, Archer argues that social structures define what is in the objective interests of actors,
and operate regardless of actors' understandings. Archer writes:
Since positions on social distributions concern scarcity, then there is a bonus to be
lost with ceding a high position and penalties to be shed by not acceding to a low
one (compare the effects on life-chances of downward or upward mobility through
marriage). Those who fail to recognize this, or are induced to mis-recognize it, pay
the price uncomprehendingly, but quite objectively in terms of a worsening of their
situation or a perpetuation of underprivilege. (Archer, 1995: 206)
This kind of argument is consistent with Archer's realism, which emphasises the material
nature of structures and their causal influence independent of actors' belief. It provides the
warrant for a scientific analysis of society whose task is to describe the characteristics of
these structures. Nevertheless, having established the objective reality of structures, Archer
then works to undermine this.
One way in which this occurs is Archer's distinction between 'objective' and 'real'
interests. For Archer, the objective advantages or disadvantages that inhere in structural
positions are 'vested interests', which are the substance of her sociological analysis.
However, Archer argue that 'vested interests' are not to be confused with 'real interests'.
Writing of vested interests she states:
...they are wholly objective; they are not to be confounded with agents' mental
states...nor do they stand in any particular relationship to anyone's real interests.
(Despite the difficulties entailed in defining the latter, we can still conclude that it
might not be in the real interests of the idle rich to perpetuate their idleness, while it
is certainly in accordance with their vested interests.) In other words, agents'
vested interests are objective features of their situation which, it will be maintained,
then predispose them to different courses of action and even towards different life
courses. (Archer, 1995: 203. Author's emphasis)
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Coming from an avowed realist, the idea that there might be 'real' interests that are distinct
from and potentially contradictory to those that are the 'objective' substance of analysis is an
odd one. Surely, if real interests existed, they would share the character of vested interests
and exert a conditional influence on actors as an 'objective feature' of their situations,
likewise predisposing them to certain courses of behaviour? If this was the case, however, a
contradiction between real interests and vested interests could not be analysed as if only the
latter conditioned behaviour. Archer's treatment of real interests contravenes realism by
asserting that they need not be incorporated into a structural analysis even if they contradict
the existing processes that are postulated. The ultimate implication of Archer's analysis is
that people can act against their real interests unproblematically, but will suffer penalties if
they act against their vested interests. Quite what reality and influence the former have is
then open to doubt.
Problems pertaining to the unreality of structures also emerge in Archer's separation of
the system and social levels. As we have seen, the system level specifies the resources that
are available to actors for the pursuit of their projects. It also outlines the objective
characteristics of institutional structures and their relations of compatibility or strain to one
another. These characteristics influence the possibilities for actors, as action that calls on the
resources of compatible institutions achieves its goals unproblematically, whereas action
calling on conflicting institutions produces practical problems for actors (Archer, 1995: 215).
All of these structural features are characterised by their causal influence and necessity.
However, it is also essential to Archer's analysis that these structures do not operate alone,
but only work in combination with human agency. Crucially, it is possible for human agents
to cancel out the influence of these objective structural features. Archer states that:
People, in turn, are capable of resisting, repudiating, suspending or circumventing
structural or cultural tendencies, in ways which are unpredictable because of their
creative powers as human beings. In other words, the exercise of socio-cultural
powers is dependent inter alia upon their reception and realization by
people... (Archer, 1995: 195)
Having insisted on the reality of structural influence, Archer then argues that this can be
suspended or circumvented by actors.
The separation between system and social levels is a version of the science/society
division, in which social life is said to involve agency as well as objective structures
knowable by science. Archer thus attempts to find a place for agency as well as structure,
but it is hard to see what independent contribution the latter can make. As Holmwood and
Stewart point out in relation to the social/system distinction, statements of the system level
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are held to be scientifically justifiable claims about the most resourceful options for actors.
If this is the case, then forms of social organisation which do not fit with system possibilities
must necessarily be suboptimal (Holmwood and Stewart, 1991: 162-5). However, Archer
argues that 'social' deviation from a particular 'system' statement need not be suboptimal,
but can have a positive character because of its inspiration in the reflexivity of actors.
Considering an example of the 'independent variation' of parts and people will help to
clarify why this is not the case.
One instance of a system/social disjunction used by Archer relates to the 'poor of
modernity' who include the young unemployed, the old-aged, the homeless, single parent
families, and the 'handicapped' (Archer, 1995: 185). She argues that these groups share the
condition of poverty generated by 'late welfare capitalism' but do not have a sense of their
common lot and common interests (Archer, 1995: 185). In other words, this is an example
of a lack of fit between the system level, on which these groups share an interest, and the
social level, on which they do not organise together to promote themselves. To explain this
lack of social cohesion Archer states:
...the members of this collectivity [the poor of modernity] are more reflexively
concerned with their differences than their similarities. Thus generational
differences divide the young unemployed from the old-aged (two of the largest
categories of the poor), ethnocentrism erects a racial barrier to cohesion, whilst the
handicapped, homeless and single parent families increasingly pursue their
interests through special interest groups rather than by more generalized forms of
collaboration. Social affinities and antagonisms thus fuel fissiparousness: they do
not preclude the development of Corporate agents, but mean that these will be in
the plural (addressing single-issues) rather than in the singular (confronting the
plurality of vested grievances shared by the underprivileged). (Archer, 1995: 185)
The use of the notion of reflexivity is crucial here. While in general statements of the
system/social distinction Archer had argued that reflexivity allowed a 'creative' response to
structural possibilities, in this passage the reflexive concerns of actors are precisely what
gives them a suboptimal response to their interests. In other words, it is their reflexive sense
of differences that blocks them from organising together to pursue their 'true' interests.
Thus, agency has not suspended or circumvented structural influences but represents a
failure to grasp structural potentials which results in disadvantage to the actors involved. To
this extent, Archer's specific example subverts her general claims about agency. Agency
does not represent creativity so much as suboptimality".
11 This is the same problem that emerges in Giddens' discussion of agency. Giddens insists that
agents can choose how they respond to situations, but cannot explain how a choice to diverge from
the most successful known option can be reasonable for actors.
94
Archer and Realism
In order to preserve the system/social distinction, Archer has to then argue that this
suboptimality will not be a motivating feature for actors to reorganise themselves. As we
have seen, she argues that because of their reflexive differentiation from one another, groups
affected by poverty will not organise together in their shared interest. This claim is
problematic, because it suggests that the groups that presently exist will not change their
boundaries. In fact, when it becomes known to these groups that they share a common
interest, it seems plausible that this will reconfigure their 'social' sense of difference and
similarity. Archer's argument that this will not happen is based on an assertion of the social
differences between these groups, but she does not explain why these differences existed in
the first place nor, more importantly, why they should be sustained in the face of knowledge
of common interest12. To retain the system/social split, Archer has to reify the current,
problematic, understandings of actors about where their interests lie.
This problem arises in another form in Archer's argument that there are two levels of
'interests' to be considered in social analysis, invoking the science/society division once
again. One set of interests is based on the relations between scientifically knowable
structures of society that are drawn on in action. In institutional frameworks where
structures cohere with one another, actors can pursue their goals without problems.
Likewise, where structures contradict one another, activity is disrupted. It is therefore in
actors' interests to support coherent institutional structures, in parallel with the coherence
sought by natural scientists in their attempts to interact successfully with the material world.
However, Archer argues that there is also a 'social' logic of vested interests, where actors'
interests are understood in terms of 'relative advantage' rather than 'absolute well-being',
implying the necessity of competition between actors (Archer, 1995: 204). If actors are in a
relatively advantageous position in society, they have the motivation to maintain a social
system; if they suffer from relative disadvantage, they have an interest in change. Thus,
social life is said to involve certain interests that are not grounded in a successful relation
with the environment, but in the strategic/competitive nature of society.
I would argue that this dual logic cannot be sustained, and that the extra 'social' interests
postulated by Archer cannot be incorporated into a defensible analysis of society. This is
12 In fact, her claims play on the implicit notion that these groups actually have different interests
bestowed on them by the system level, which would then explain their social differentiation.
However, this contravenes Archer's initial premise that the groups actually share an interest. As it
happens, the idea that these groups have different interests is more plausible than the claim that their
interests are shared because they are all poor. It seems likely that the interests of these groups would
be served by different, potentially incommensurable, kinds of change, which suggests that there is a
structural basis to their social sense of differentiation.
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illustrated by Archer's analysis of the institutional framework that she terms 'necessary
complementarities' (Archer, 1995: 219-221). In this situation, institutional structures mesh
with one another and show a high degree of coherence in their operation, facilitating action.
As an example of this, Archer refers to the social system in 'Ancient India' in which
institutions of caste, religion, kinship, polity and law are highly compatible with one another.
Archer admits that such a system creates a 'relatively privileged group' in the Brahmin caste,
as well as a hierarchy of caste groupings. However, she also argues that 'everyone has
something to lose from disruption' and so all agents act to protect the system rather than
challenging it (Archer, 1995: 220). Thus, every caste group is supplied some benefits by
members of a subordinate caste, and these benefits would be lost if caste differentiations
were not maintained (Archer, 1995: 220-1). Furthermore, attempts to challenge the system
result in individuals becoming untouchable and losing benefits from the system (Archer,
1995: 221). In essence, all actors have a vested interest in stability13.
Archer's claims involve an analytical sleight-of-hand on her part to conceal the problems
that this example raises. In order to make a consistent analysis, she has to deny that the
hierarchical nature of the caste system gives rise to a group of actors with a vested interest in
change. This is because Archer's argument that the institutions are coherent means that
actors' goals are being met, implying system stability. If it were to be admitted that the caste
system also involved inequality, this would imply that the system both satisfied actors
(because of its coherence) and didn't satisfy actors (because of its inequality) at the same
time. Thus, Archer has to suggest that all actors have a vested interest in stability, but this
contravenes her general account of what such interests entail. Archer shifts the meaning of
an interest in stability from being 'relative advantage over the majority of actors' to being
'relative advantage over somebody'. Of course, possession of the latter does not entail
possession of the former, and when analysed it must turn out that, on Archer's initial
definition, a large proportion of actors have a vested interest in change because of their
relative disadvantage in general societal terms14. Certainly, we can accept that individual
'deviants' from the existing order face the penalty of dropping into the untouchables, but this
does not mean that a large organised group of the disadvantaged could not avoid this
outcome. Organising resistance may not be straightforward. However, whatever the
difficulties, in Archer's terms actors still have a 'vested interest' in finding a way to
13 All actors except the untouchables, that is, although Archer does not make this explicit, or discuss
their attempts to challenge the social system.
14 To insist that relative advantage is to be understood to mean 'relative advantage over somebody'
would be to argue for the stability of all social systems given that nearly all members of a society
have relative advantage over somebody.
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challenge the system. Archer resists this proper working through of her logic because the
result is analytical confusion. She is committed, ultimately, to arguing both that a social
structure facilitates actors' interests (because of its coherent institutions) and does not
(because of its hierarchical nature).
This difficulty is another consequence of the science/society division, which is here
present in Archer's attribution of dual interests, arising both from structural configurations
and a more general competitive logic of the social. I would argue that actors' interests can
be more plausibly located by identifying them only at the structural level, which can account
for both unity of interest and conflict of interest. Such an analysis would examine how
problems and tensions within institutional structures generate divisions of interest between
actors rather than assuming, as Archer does, that such divisions must inevitably exist at the
'social' level. Thus, if the caste system produces conflicts of interests, the basis of these
must be located within its institutional structures, instead of suggesting that such structures
are 'coherent', allowing all actors to achieve their goals unproblematically.
Although the empirical details of Marx's analysis have turned out to be erroneous, his
mode of analysis is an example of the general approach recommended here. Marx argues
that divisions of interest arise from particular modes of production, rather than existing as a
necessary feature of all human interaction. His arguments are oriented to demonstrating why
capitalist institutions generate divisions of interest, and how these divisions can be overcome
by the transformation from capitalism into a socialist mode of production. It seems almost
certain that Marx did not correctly locate the problems and tensions existing in the social
structures of modern European societies. However, his attempt to institutionally locate
social divisions and find a way to transcend them is exemplary of how social science can
proceed. By arguing that divisions of interest must always exist on the social level, Archer
hobbles such a possibility from the very beginning.
3.4 Culture, structure and interests
So far, we have been considering Archer's analysis of social structure, and the problems
generated by her separation of the objective characteristics of structure and the subjective
apprehension of these by actors. This is not the end of the problems with Archer's account,
however, and in this section I want to consider various difficulties that arise from Archer's
attempt to separate issues of 'culture' from those of 'structure' and 'interest'. Archer argues
that all items of culture with propositional content exist in the Cultural System. This is then
separated off from the constituents of the Socio-Cultural level which are social groups with
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material and ideal interests to pursue. This whole sphere is then separated again from that of
'structure' which contains the objective social structures dealt with by social actors, and the
properties of agents that are independent of structure. The architectural principle behind
Archer's system is that the qualities of these various levels can be specified independently of
one another. Unfortunately for Archer, this edifice turns out to be an unstable one.
In the first place, Archer's analysis requires that the interests of actors (residing on the
Socio-Cultural level) can be separated from the constituents of the Cultural System so that
interests can be specified independently of the logical relations of beliefs. However, it seems
plausible to see 'interests' themselves as elements of the Cultural System. In order to be
counted as part of the Cultural System, an item has to be:
(i) intelligible; that is 'capable of being grasped, deciphered, understood or known
by someone.' (Archer, 1988: 104)
(ii) a proposition which asserts truth or falsity. (Archer, 1988: xvi)
(iii) an item to which 'the law of contradiction can be applied.' (Archer, 1988: xvi)
In relation to the first, if actors are to be motivated by their interests than they must have
some understanding or comprehension of these. Archer's account of Socio-Cultural
interaction is based upon the idea that actors pursue their interests, and unless they do so
unconsciously, then these interests must be formulated as understandings15. This suggests
that interests meet criterion (i) for entry into the Cultural System. Statements of interest
must also assert the benefit for actors of pursuing a certain course of action, such as: 'It is in
the interests of the Conservative Party to defend hereditarianism'. Such statements are
propositions16 which assert something to be true, meeting criterion (ii). They are also items
to which the law of contradiction can be applied. For example, the above proposition is
contradicted by the statement: 'It is not in the interests of the Conservative Party to defend
hereditarianism'. As a result, they meet criterion (iii), and must therefore be included in the
Cultural System17.
15 One of Archer's own examples illustrates this point. She discusses the situation where a social
group realises that they are not benefiting from some cultural configuration. Archer writes that such a
group 'makes comparisons with other social groups with which it interacts and can hardly fail to note
that some of its competitors are beneficiaries of cultural support whereas their own promotive efforts
attract cultural opprobrium' (Archer, 1995: 314). Clearly, what is taking place here is a conscious
assessment of what is in the groups interest.
16 Or can be formulated as propositions by the insertion of relevant specifications (time, location etc.).
All that is required for entry into the Cultural System is that this can be done.
17 It might be said that this argument elides the distinction between interests and their statement.
However, it seems reasonable to assume that unless actors have some 'direct' and non-cultural
apprehension of their interests, it is in fact their understandings of their interests that motivate their
action, and not the interests 'in themselves', whatever they might be.
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This undermines Archer's attempt to specify interests independently of the Cultural
System and explain morphostasis and morphogenesis by the variation between logical
relations and interests. Her model explains cultural developments by analysing how beliefs
are defended or challenged by actors pursuing interests that are external to the Cultural
System. However, because interests have to be taken as beliefs within the Cultural System,
this mode of explanation cannot be sustained. Interests, instead of varying independently of
the objective logic of belief, are intimately bound up with the latter. If interests are beliefs,
then their uptake would surely have to be affected by questions of their logical contradiction
or coherence. Likewise, those beliefs relevant to statements of interest would be influential
not only by their logical relations, but by whether or not they offered viable statements of
what will benefit actors18.
This points to wider problems in Archer's account of the relation between culture and
structure. Archer wants to separate out these spheres in order to analyse their
interconnection. However, the influence of structure cannot be understood without being
given a cultural apprehension, and the importance of logical relations between theories and
beliefs cannot be explained without considering how this relates to resourceful activity. If
we take the issue of structure first, Archer's mode of argument is to insist on the causal
influence that structures have regardless of the interpretations placed on them. She states:
...why do the effects of famine, conquest, of a demographic structure or an income
distribution require reading? Their objective influence may be to leave many dead,
enslaved, poor or disadvantaged, in a way which can be consequential in itself,
could be independent of their having readers (nuclear holocaust), and often have an
efficacy regardless of any readings which are placed on them.. .(Archer, 1995: 112)
Archer is correct to argue that there are some causal influences which have an impact no
matter how they are 'read' or 'interpreted' by actors. However, whenever social scientists or
lay actors attempt to understand such influences, these understandings are interpretations
which are subject to assessments of validity. Statements of structure are thus cultural, and to
argue otherwise would be to reject the entire thrust of post-positivist philosophy of science.
Oddly enough, Archer seems to recognise this in relation to natural science. In Culture and
Agency, she argues that both natural scientific theories and the empirical 'facts' that they
deal with are theoretical and are elements of the Cultural System (Archer, 1988: 151-3). The
argument that facts 'speak for themselves' is taken to represent the 'fallacy of empiricism'
18 It should be noted that this differs from Archer's claim that actors take up beliefs which will
advance their interests. Archer's claim implies the externality of 'belief and 'interest' whereas here
the belief itself is a statement of interest.
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(Archer, 1988: 151-3). Thus, Archer recognizes that there can be no non-cultural account of
the structures of natural science. Logically speaking, we would expect the structures of the
social world to be treated in the same way, because their character as structures is based in
their materiality and necessity, i.e. the same features as structures in the natural world. In
that she analyses social structures outside of the cultural realm, Archer inverts the normal
contrast between natural and social science, implying that the structures analysed by the
latter have a more direct determining force than those of the former. It is surely more
plausible to argue that in both the natural and social sciences our access to structures is
indirect, and is mediated by our cultural understandings. This foregrounds questions about
the validity of the analyst's account of structure, removing the problematic implication that
this account captures the characteristics of structures as they are 'in themselves'.
The converse difficulty emerges for Archer in her analysis of culture, and her attempt to
capture the 'force' of logic. Archer goes to great lengths to show that logical categories are
cross-culturally applicable, and she moves from this to the claim that logical relations of
belief have a 'causal influence' upon actors. However, Archer does not attempt to explain
why beliefs about logic are prevalent, nor the source of their apparent forcefulness. It may
appear as if her emphasis on issues of legitimacy offers such an explanation. Archer argues
that actors frequently subscribe to beliefs in order to claim legitimacy for their ideal or
material interests, and if actors hold contradictory beliefs then this legitimacy is undermined.
Unfortunately, the connection of coherence and legitimacy does not account for the power of
logical relations, but merely reflects it. We can agree with Archer that coherent belief is
taken to be legitimate, but this gets us no further in explaining why this, rather than the
reverse, is so.
A plausible reason for Archer's failure is that an explanation of the power of logical
relations requires that culture is not separated from structure. Archer tries to split questions
regarding the adequacy of belief (logical relations) from questions of adequate interaction
with the material environment (structural relations). However, it is only by connecting
culture with the realisation of practical goals that we can account for the power of logical
relations such as coherence and contradiction. In respect of natural scientific theories, a
coherent theory is powerful because it allows us to successfully account for processes in the
world. This contributes to our ability to respond adequately to these processes and produce
outcomes that we desire in our relations with them. Likewise, if a theory is contradictory,
then some aspects of the process it theorizes are unintelligible and unpredictable, limiting
human ability to deal successfully with it. For example, although offering a powerful
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account of the motion of planets, Kepler's laws came to conflict with later observational
accounts of the movements of Saturn and Jupiter. This contradiction meant that certain
aspects of planetary motion could not be accounted for using Kepler's laws, and were thus
unintelligible and unpredictable until Newton's law of universal gravitation made the
observed variations explicable by theorising the forces of attraction between planets
(Pannekoek, 1961: 261-281). By restoring the coherence between the broader theory and
observational accounts, Newton's work made the processes in question more intelligible and
predictable19.
The nature of relations between beliefs is as important in other aspects of human activity
as it is in natural science. The pursuit of human goals using contradictory beliefs, or the
pursuit of contradictory goals, results in outcomes that do not conform to the intentions of
actors. The former case is directly analogous with substantive questions in science in which
contradictory understandings lead to unpredictable results. To illustrate the latter, one could
argue that it is not possible to achieve both a continuing increase in the standard of living of
Western nations and the preservation of the natural environment. Successful achievement of
one goal necessarily undermines successful achievement of the other. The relations of
contradiction or coherence between beliefs thus have force because they relate to human
capacities to interact with the environment and achieve desired goals20.
The failure of Archer to connect issues of cultural coherence with practical success is
demonstrated in her treatment of the logical relation of 'constraining contradiction'. In this
situation, a social interest group 'a' invokes theory A, which requires theory B to operate,
but is contradicted by it. For Archer, if the social group is powerful, it will be to their
advantage to suppress knowledge of this contradiction, so that other social groups do not
learn of it and use it to undermine group 'a' (Archer, 1988: 189-197). This involves the
claim that it can be in the 'interest' of a social group to hold contradictory beliefs so long as
no competing groups become aware of this contradiction. However, if we reconnect issues
of logical contradiction with practical activity, it is dubious to argue that it can be in the
interests of a group to continue holding contradictory beliefs, even if other actors are not
aware of this. Rather, the employment of contradictory beliefs in activities would undermine
the interests of the group because it would lead to their non-fulfilment. Either the group
19 Of course, as is commonly noted, it is not only the broader theory which may be subject to
reformulation when there is a clash between a theory and an observational account. Both of these are
theories and subject to reformulation when necessary.
20 This suggests a reason why coherence is associated with legitimacy: if a social group can give a
coherent account of why the pursuit of their beliefs and goals will be to the benefit of all, then this
provides such a group with legitimacy.
101
Archer and Realism
would be unable to achieve their ends because of contradictions in their knowledge of
means, or they would be unable to achieve all of their desired ends because the ends
contradicted one another. To have an 'interest' in contradiction would be to have an
'interest' in error, which surely goes against the scientific ethos ofArcher's realism.
These arguments indicate that there are serious problems with attempting to separate
structure and culture. Giving a non-cultural account of 'structure' implies that the analyst
has some form of direct, unmediated contact with the world. Likewise, a non-structural
account of 'culture' separates the force of relations between beliefs from the practical
outcomes of employing such beliefs. It thus cannot explain why logical relations have any
force at all.
3.5 Conclusion
To conclude this chapter, I would like to consider further how this analysis of Archer's
work relates to the wider themes of the thesis. Archer's insistence that the analysis of
society must be separated into the components of structure and agency is a clear example of
a dualist approach to science and society. For Archer, the structures apparent in social life
are of the same kind as those discovered by natural science. Structures have the
characteristics of materiality and necessity, and their operation can be identified through
scientific investigation. What is special about society, for Archer, is that human beings have
agency, which operates as well as structure. A realist analysis of society thus proceeds by
theorising the interplay of its two constituents, objective structure (the scientific element)
and subjective agency (the social element). It is crucial to note here that society's distinctive
feature is that it involves something in addition to that which can be analysed scientifically;
the extra 'social' factors being considered are therefore those elements that are not
scientifically explicable. If we take science to be the measure of success in interactions with
the material world, as realists do, then the social must consist in those factors which are not
related to success. Nevertheless, Archer attempts to give a positive characterisation to this
extra social dimension, suggesting that it encompasses morality, retlexivity and strategic
action. I have argued in this chapter that none of Archer's claims for a positive divergence
from structure can be born out. Her account of moral agency made it appear inexplicable or
self-interested, and a structural analysis provides a better account of the existence of moral
action. Archer's account of social interests that 'reflexively' diverged from the objective
logic of the situation was equally problematic, and if such interests were indeed pursued,
they would result in suboptimal outcomes for the supposedly reflexive actors. Likewise,
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Archer's association of the social with strategic competition could not be made coherent with
analysis of the possibilities provided for actors by structure. In summary, Archer fails to
locate a positive or even neutral extra dimension to social action over and above successful
relations with the environment. Any divergence from the possibilities contained within
structure turn out to be inexplicable or suboptimal.
It is important to recognise that this is the same problem that emerges in the work of
Giddens. Archer attempts to clearly distinguish the realist perspective from Giddens' anti-
naturalistic approach, on the basis that realism involves a scientific investigation of the
material structures of social life (Archer, 1995: 108-117). Nevertheless, Archer shares
Giddens' claim that human agency gives society special features beyond those of material
structures that are knowable through science. As with Giddens, Archer fails to give positive
substance to these extra features, which are ultimately associated with an unsuccessful
relation to structure. Rather than providing a genuine alternative to Giddens' work, Archer's
theorising shares the problematic division between science and society.
This division also has consequences for the term on the other side of the dualism, resulting
in a problematic conception of science. I have already pointed out that by separating
structure from culture, Archer implies that understandings of social structure can be
somehow non-cultural. There is, however, a more general difficulty with Archer's account
of the objective features of analysis, that applies to both the structural and cultural spheres.
Archer suggests that in each sphere, the objective characteristics (of structure or logic) be
separated from the subjective or social apprehension of them. Analysis then proceeds by
theorising the interplay of the two levels. Archer does not acknowledge that this requires the
social scientist to have a non-social apprehension of the structures that presently exist21.
Accounts of whether structures and beliefs22 are coherent or contradictory are presented as if
these were final and unchallengeable products of scientific investigation, which is conceived
of as offering a completed and unproblematic account of the existing objective relations.
This problem connects to the difficulties identified in Bhaskar's realism, considered in
Chapter 1. It will be recalled that Bhaskar distinguishes the real and the actual, the real
being the level of generative structures, and the actual being the level of events. Bhaskar
suggests that agency may produce differences between what is structurally explicable (on the
21 Of course, Archer suggests that new institutions and beliefs may be generated, which would
necessitate an expansion of the stock of knowledge. Nevertheless, this doesn't alter the finality of
claims about current institutions and beliefs.
22 As I argued above, strictly speaking it does not make sense to separate the objective logics of




level of the real), and what occurs on the level of events (the level of the actual). I argued
that this allows current understandings of structure to be reified, as events which cannot be
structurally explained can always be attributed to agency, meaning that structural accounts
can be treated as fully adequate. It is this reification that links the realist accounts of Archer
and Bhaskar. Just as Archer's division of structure and agency implies that science can show
structures as they truly are, Bhaskar's division of the real and the actual allows claims about
structures to be taken as final. Although neither overtly sanctions an empiricist conception
of science in which theories have 'direct' contact with the world, each produces an account
which allows structural statements to be interpreted in this fashion.
As an alternative to this form of realism, I would suggest that scientific theories are
theoretical mediations, the 'structures' that they postulate being the positive categories of
understanding. This means that accounts of 'structures' are subject to reconstruction in the
process of investigation, in which the adequacy of theories is assessed. Anomalies cannot be
ignored by assigning them to 'agency', but must be dealt with by transforming accounts of
structure to improve theoretical adequacy. Such an approach suggests how the two terms of
Archer's dualistic analysis can be transcended. Instead of a foundational notion of science
and a conception of social activity that excludes issues of success, both scientific
investigation and other social activities should be understood as historically located practices
oriented to successful relations with the material world.
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Part III
Science and Society Reconciled?
New Sociology of Science
4
Science as a Social Construction:
The Strong Programme and Success
4.1 Introduction
In Part II of the thesis, I argued that the dualism of science and society is present in both
naturalistic and anti-naturalistic sociological theories. Part III is dedicated to an exploration
of whether sociological accounts of science, having a direct concern with the interrelation of
science and society, avoid a problematic division between the two. The sociological analysis
of science has a long history, and there are many different approaches to its study, reflecting
the diversity of approaches within sociology itself. Nevertheless, a crucial turning point in
this history was the attempt to offer a completely 'social' analysis of scientific investigation,
including a sociological explanation of the content of scientific theories. This is to be found
in the work of the Barry Barnes and David Bloor, who developed the 'Strong Programme'
approach in the 1970s. Barnes and Bloor were concerned that earlier analyses had a
restricted sense of what was 'social' in character, placing limits on what could be
sociologically explained. Previous analyses had either focused largely on the social
character of scientific institutions (as in the case of Merton and his followers) or considered
only certain kinds of knowledge to be social in nature (as in the case of Mannheim (1936)).
The effect of this in both approaches was to retain a science/society division, separating what
was socially constituted (whether institutions or certain kinds of cultural belief) from what
was not (valid scientific knowledge, logic, mathematics)1. In essence, these approaches held
that valid scientific knowledge developed through a logic distinct to that of social processes,
and could not be explained in the same way as the latter. This view was encouraged by those
philosophers who wished to separate out that which could be 'rationally' accounted for in the
1 Both Mertonian and Mannheimian approaches have been defended by adherents responding to the
Strong Programme criticisms (see Gieryn (1982) and Pels (1996b) respectively). Although they
usefully emphasise the subtleties of these modes of analysis, they also reinforce the sense that such
modes are dualistic in orientation. Gieryn argues that a Mertonian approach avoids 'sociological
reductionism' and analyses knowledge by considering inputs from both the natural world and social
institutions (Gieryn, 1982: 287-9). Likewise, Pels claims that Mannheim's work involved a
'productive indecision' in which reductionist accounts emphasising only the cognitive or the social
were rejected (Pels, 1996b: 41-3). In other words, these authors argue for a combinatorial approach
which retains the dualism of science and society.
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history of science from that which was amenable to a sociological explanation (Lakatos,
1978; Laudan 1977). Barnes and Bloor rejected these restrictions on sociology's scope,
offering instead a fully social account of all belief, including scientific knowledge. In their
view, all understandings, whether considered true or false, reliable or unreliable, are to be
treated as sociologically explicable. There is no sphere of rational belief that is untouched
by social processes. Rather, all beliefs are 'socially constructed', made from the fabric of the
social.
This chapter examines the Strong Programme position, taking it as exemplary of social
constructionist analyses of science. There have certainly been important developments in the
sociological analysis of science since the Strong Programme's early manifesto statements.
Nevertheless, the Strong Programme arguments provided a crucial foundation for analysis in
the sociology of science, and their claim that science is a fully social activity is considered
by many to be unshakeable. Much important work in the area has been done by analysts
who were closely affiliated with the Strong Programme (see for example Steven Shapin
(Shapin and Schaffer, 1985), Donald MacKenzie (1981), Andrew Pickering (1984)) or
defended positions with similar characteristics (see for example Harry Collins (1985), Trevor
Pinch (Collins and Pinch, 1982)). Furthermore, even those who challenge the Strong
Programme often accept the notion that scientific knowledge is socially constructed. For
example, reflexivists such as Steve Woolgar (1988a) and Malcolm Ashmore (1989) are in
agreement with constructionist claims about knowledge, but attempt to apply this insight
back to sociological analysis itself. I will consider one of the key breaks with constructionist
analysis, actor-network theory, in the next chapter. This chapter is dedicated to a
consideration of the social constructionist approach and its limitations.
The attempt by Barnes and Bloor to conceive of natural science as a fully social activity
was an important and useful development in the analysis of science. Furthermore, their
explicit commitment to an instrumentalist analysis suggested that their sociological
theorising would be combined with a defensible philosophy of science. However, I shall be
arguing that the Strong Programme approach fails to offer a consistent account of science
and society. The instrumentalism espoused by Barnes and Bloor is undermined by their
mode of analysis, which ends up removing consideration of the variable success of belief
from the explanatory system. This is a consequence of the notion of 'the social' employed
by the Strong Programmers. Although their approach avoids dividing science from other
social activities, this does not mean that they avoid the problems of the science/society
dualism. The reason for this is that Barnes and Bloor do not go beyond the division by
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transforming both terms, attempting instead to subsume scientific investigation under the
existing conception of the social. In the dualistic conception of science and society,
scientific knowledge is claimed to be rationally founded and successful, and issues of
variable success are omitted from an analysis of social activities. Barnes and Bloor invoke
this conception of the social, suggesting that all institutionalised understandings, whether
natural scientific or otherwise, are equally valid. In contrast, I would suggest that a genuine
analytical reconciliation of science and society should accept the social character of all
activities without omitting analysis of their variable success.
This chapter considers the difficulties with the Strong Programme (SP) analysis of
scientific investigation and other social practices. In relation to science, the focus is on
theories of classification, and their sociological consequences. I begin by considering the SP
account, termed 'meaning finitism', which is intended to make space for a sociological
explanation of the categories used by science. I argue that this approach fails because it does
not properly account for the success or otherwise of classifications. I then consider the
application of the SP approach to other social institutions, and argue that the failure to
incorporate issues of success is as problematic here as it is in accounting for science.
4.2 Theories of Categorisation
This section addresses the SP theory of categorisation. This may seem like an odd issue to
focus on, but it is, in fact, central to our understanding of scientific knowledge. As Barnes
and Bloor realise, by examining how categorisations operate, we can reflect on the important
issue of the justification of this knowledge. A consideration of processes of categorisation
raises two versions of the same epistemological problem. Firstly, to place a group of
particulars2 under a category is to assert their similarity in some respect. For example, if a
group of objects are categorised as 'red', it is being asserted that they are similar in colour.
The important epistemological problem is to what extent this claim to similarity can be
justified. Can it be demonstrated that the categorisation is an appropriate one, and that the
similarity that is claimed actually holds? Are all of the objects best categorised as 'red', or
might some of them fit a competing categorisation equally well? The other version of this
problem relates to the application of existing categorisations to new particulars. The issue is
whether categorisations provide clear distinctions, so that new particulars can be
unproblematically classified. Can it be demonstrated that a new particular is an instance (or
2 The term 'particular' refers to any entity (animate or inanimate), process or characteristic that can be
delineated and considered for classification.
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is not an instance) of an existing category? If the category 'red' is applied to a newly
encountered table, can this claim to similarity be justified?
When these questions are spelled out, they seem dauntingly abstract. Nevertheless, the
Strong Programmers (SPers) attempt to provide an answer to them. It seems accurate to say
that their epistemological perspective is shaped by the desire to make room for a sociological
analysis of categorisation processes. In order to do so, Barnes and Bloor build upon
meaning finitism, an approach to the meaning and content of categorisations developed from
the work ofMary Hesse and Ludwig Wittgenstein among others3.
Meaning finitism is an account of categorisations that is intended to apply to all
categorisations, whether these are part of our wider culture or lodged in specialised bodies of
knowledge. In that it analyses the justification of categorisations, its consequences spread
through to all forms of knowledge that call on these, including generalisations, laws,
predictions, and so on. The theory focuses on acts of categorisation, and the processes
whereby particular objects or processes found in the world are inducted into categories. It
argues that the 'meaning' or 'content' of any term is created by associating it with a set of
instances which that term exemplifies. To see how this occurs we must examine the
processes of inductive learning by which categorisations are generated.
The simplest case of learning a category is where a teacher uses ostensive definition to
demonstrate to a student the contents of some concept. Ostensive definition is a process
whereby the teacher points to a particular object and states the name of the category to which
it belongs. So long as all goes well4, this indicates to the student how the object is to be
classified. The content of this category is elaborated by the exposure of the student to further
instances (repeated induction), until they have acquired a categorisation containing a number
of members. For example, we can imagine a teacher demonstrating the category 'dog' by
wandering around a park with a student and indicating those particular items that should be
classified as dogs, such as an Alsatian, a Chihuahua, and so on. If the teaching is successful,
the student builds up a set of instances of 'dog'. For meaning finitism, this is how a sense of
similarity is built up. By categorising instances under the same term, a teacher indicates that
these instances are all 'the same' in some way, that is, they resemble one another (Barnes,
Bloor and Henry, 1996: 50). This marks them out as different from particulars that are
3 The meaning fmitist approach and its sociological development are laid out in a number of different
places, including Barnes (1981a), Barnes (1982), Barnes, Bloor and Henry (1996), Bloor (1997a).
The essentials of the position are present in all of these expositions, with no significant divergences.
4 That is, some clarification may be required as to what exactly was being indicated, by distinguishing
it from the backdrop in which it is placed, and from other possible aspects that might be inducted
instead (for example, a learner may induct fluffiness from an attempt to indicate rabbithood).
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members of other categories, such as those that are members of the term 'cat'. On a fmitist
account, then, the meaning of a category is constituted by the finite set of instances that it
encompasses, which are designated as 'similar'.
Up to this stage, matters are fairly straightforward. So long as already existing categories
are being taught, a teacher can draw upon the sets of instances which they know in order to
indicate which particular belongs in which term. However, according to meaning finitism,
matters are more problematic when it comes to categorising 'new' particulars that have not
been encountered before. When a new particular is encountered, one would expect that
existing concepts would provide guidance as to how this particular should be categorised.
However, the SPers argue that, formally speaking, existing categorisations of 'sameness' do
not provide any guidance whatsoever for continuing acts of classification, that is, attempts to
decide if a new case fits under some term. As they put it:
Any classification of the next case can be reconciled with what has already been
learned ostensively; however other things have been classified so far, the next thing
can be classified in any way without any formal inconsistency with earlier practice.
(Barnes, Bloor & Henry, 1996: 51)
The reasoning behind this move is fairly simple. The authors argue that the perception of
'resemblance' which allows us to classify one particular object in the same way as another
(e.g. as two instances of 'dog') is always a relation of both sameness and difference. Any
one instance of the category of dog is both similar to, and different from, other dogs (Barnes,
Bloor & Henry, 1996: 50). The SPers then claim that this kind of resemblance (both
sameness and difference) exists between any and every pair of particulars (Barnes, 1982:
28). We might want to object that we can still categorise particulars by their greater or lesser
degrees of resemblance. However, Barnes, Bloor and Henry argue that there is no possible
'metric for resemblance' and this being the case there is no objective basis for claiming that
'sameness here outweighs difference there' (1996: 51). Every particular resembles every
other particular, and there is no way of measuring the degree of similarity between them in
order to establish the formal validity of a categorisation. Whenever we try to decide whether
a new particular should fall into category C, we find that there are grounds based on C's
current membership to classify the particular as a C or a not-C (Barnes, 1981a: 313). In
other words, there is no sufficient basis that can be drawn from the existing members of C to
assert whether a new particular is an instance of C or not. Putting it in the terms used in
Chapter 1, the act of categorisation is underdetermined by the available evidence, and no
decisive claim can be made. To return to our example, even when a student is well-versed
with the instances that we classify under 'dog', this categorisation does not supply enough
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information for them to unproblematically categorise new, previously unexperienced
particulars as 'dog' or not-'dog'. Each new particular will be like a 'dog' in some respects
and unlike a 'dog' in others, providing no solid basis for categorising them either way.
One response to this finitist claim would be to argue that the meaning of a term is not
merely in its set of members, but also in its relations to other terms. Such relations might
then be used in order to evaluate whether a new particular can properly be assigned to a set,
cutting down the indeterminacy claimed by finitists. Certainly, the finitist position accepts
the relevance of other classifications to the meaning of a term (Barnes, 1981a). Such
relations can be of various kinds. A term may be related by being connected through a
generalisation such as 'dogs have paws', linking the membership of one set (dogs) with the
possession of an attribute defined by another set (paws). In another kind of connection,
learning the meaning of a term involves learning that of a contrasting but similar category.
So, our learner who is being taught the meaning of 'dog' may attempt to classify Tiddles the
tabby-cat as a dog when they try out their understanding of the category. To indicate more
precisely what a dog is the teacher will point out that although cats have four legs and are
roughly the same size as dogs, Tiddles and her kind do not deign to fetch sticks that have
been thrown for them. Learning about other related categories helps to delineate more
precisely the classification being taught.
Connections between categories are thus relevant to the meaning of those categories.
Does this mean that we can use these other connections in order to achieve a successful
classification of new particulars? If so, we could use the fact that dogs are defined by their
possession of paws as a guideline to help us work out if our new item is a dog or not.
Finitists argue, however, that although we use our routine intuitions about such connections
in these cases, cross-category relations offer no help at all, formally speaking, in making a
classification (Barnes, Bloor & Henry, 1996: 52). To decide if a new particular is a dog, we
would have to check to see if ifhas paws. We then come across the same problem as before,
because the category 'paws' is constructed from a finite number of instances of resemblance,
and the items on the end of our new animal's legs bear both a similarity and a difference to
those items categorised under 'paws'. We thus end up with a further question: are they paws
or not?
This attempt to connect up with other terms cannot remove the indeterminacy of
classification. No matter how many secondary descriptive categories we attempt to apply,
we have to make a judgement about the resemblance of members of a category to a new
particular (Barnes, Bloor & Henry, 1996: 52). These judgements of resemblance are always
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problematic because there is no formal way of measuring whether the similarity of a new
case is close enough to established cases to induct it into the category.
So far, the problem of resemblance has resulted in difficulties with classifying new
particulars. In a finitist account of matters, the limited (finite) number of instances that
constitute a category cannot determine or provide any guidance as to whether a new
particular should or should not be included as a member. However, it is not only the case
that new objects cannot be definitively claimed to be members of a category on the basis of
resemblance. It is also true that existing members of a category may be reconsidered and
reclassified with no formal constraints, if actors change their mind about the appropriateness
of the classification (Barnes, Bloor and Henry, 1996: 57). After all, the resemblance of
existing members of a set to one another is just as formally problematic as the set's
resemblance to a prospective new member. We are perfectly within our rights to examine
existing members of the category 'dog' and decide that some of these members have been
misclassified. If a student wishes, they can claim that Chihuahuas are not dogs, and a
teacher_can give no definitive argument as to why Chihuahuas must be classified as dogs.
So, not only are future instances of a category problematic, but the current content of a
category is formally unstable as well.
It is important to note the generality of the finitist claims. The examples that I have given
are from our common-sense learning of animal terms. However, meaning finitism applies to
all concepts, including those of a more precise, scientific nature. Thus it is as true of
'carbon' as it is of 'dogs' that new cases of classification are always open-ended, and
arguments can be made both ways for whether a new particular should be considered
'carbon' or not5. For example, diamond and carbon black are both classified as 'carbon'
even though their chemical behaviour is distinct in a way which problematises their
classification as 'the same' element (Barnes, Bloor & Henry: 1996: 67). In other words,
diamond and carbon black are both similar to and different from each other, and there is
nothing in nature or logic which instructs us to categorise them as the same or different. All
beliefs or generalisations that we hold are constructed out of concepts of a finite, open
character. Just as any new particular may reasonably be included in a specific set, formally
speaking, any event or experience may be reasonably incorporated into specific beliefs and
generalisations.
5 Scientific concepts frequently refer to processes rather than objects, but this causes no problems for
the SP approach. Process concepts are learned through ostension and analogy with other inductively
produced concepts, whereby initial common-sense experiences are refined and reflected upon to
produce the more technical understandings in question (Barnes, Bloor & Henry, 1996: 60-1).
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Meaning finitism is largely a negative doctrine. It argues that no act of classification can
be definitively justified given a finite set of existing instances and a new particular to be
dealt with. Although the SPers support these claims, they do not conclude that the decision
to classify one way rather than another is a random one. Rather, they insist that to make
classification intelligible we must bring another factor into the equation: the socially defined
goals and interests of actors. How, therefore, does reference to the goals and interests of
actors bring determinacy to an instance of classification?
Essentially, groups of actors have goals and interests that may be achieved by classifying
particulars in one way rather than any of the formally possible alternatives. These interests
provide the motivation for the group to push for one kind of classification over another. As a
result, alternative classifications that are equally reasonable in a formal sense will not be
equally attractive to 'interested' or goal-driven actors. By including reference to social
interests, one can make intelligible classificatory decisions that were not explicable by nature
or logic alone. Barnes and Bloor's approach is thus 'instrumentalist', emphasising that
knowledge is an instrument used by actors in pursuit of their aims and purposes.
A useful example of interested classification is outlined by Barnes, Bloor and Henry in
Scientific Knowledge: A Sociological Analysis (1996: 121-4). The particular classificatory
dilemma involved was whether certain types of red dye, derived from aniline, were to be
categorised as 'the same' or 'different'. This became a salient issue during a court case in
which the company Renard Freres argued that its patent was being broken by manufacturers
selling the 'same substance' as that which it had patented. In accordance with meaning
finitism, the SPers argue that, formally speaking, the classification could have gone either
way. On the one hand, the dyes of competing manufacturers sometimes had different
practical applications, and were distinctly named. On the other hand, calling on a certain
chemical tradition, it could be argued that the dyes were identical in their chemical
composition, the differences being due to superficial additives not relevant to the essential
structure. However, when social interests are at stake in the outcome of the decision, actors
have good reason to commit to one classification or other. Unsurprisingly, in this case the
members of Renard Freres, its lawyers and supporters held that all the aniline dyes were 'the
same', and their opponents, with attendant lawyers and supporters held that they were
importantly different. What was undecidable using nature alone became decidable to the
groups as they pursued their interests.
From the account of the case given so far, it could be argued that although each side had
its own interests to pursue, and thus had clear motivation to classify in one way or another, it
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might be possible to appeal to neutral scientists to make a decision in a disinterested fashion.
However, Barnes Bloor and Henry argue that this could not have helped to settle matters.
Although independent experts have no specific vested interests in the outcome of the case,
they have other commitments and interests located in their disciplinary practice. So, it is
quite feasible to imagine that a 'realist' chemist from one tradition and a 'positivist' chemist
from another might disagree upon the classification of the dyes because of their approaches
to classifying substances. In such a case, different kinds of disciplinary practice, involving
different aims and interests, would provide the motivation for opposed classifications.
Summarising the issue, Barnes, Bloor and Henry argue that there is no way for scientists to
be entirely disinterested. They state:
...in the absence of any project at all, in a situation where goals and interests have
no role, the question of the sameness or difference of the aniline reds is
undecidable and would be experienced as a meaningless one. (Barnes, Bloor and
Henry, 1996: 124)
Thus processes of classification and the construction of knowledge can only be properly
understood when the motivating goals and interests of actors are taken into account.
This leads us to a further, important aspect of the SP account of interests which must be
considered here. Barnes argues that many accounts of knowledge subscribe to a 'Manichean
myth' about the nature of the interests involved in knowledge generation (Barnes, 1982: 106-
8). When the interest is taken to be oriented to 'prediction and control', this is seen as
legitimate, expressing as it does the generalised human need to deal successfully with the
environment. On the other hand, when the interest is taken to involve specific ideological or
socio-political aims, this is seen as illegitimate, and such interests are held to distort or bias
the knowledge produced.
Barnes, however, does not subscribe to this myth. He argues that there is no essential
difference between socio-political interests and those related to prediction and control. In
other words, socio-political interests are always also to be understood as predictive and
oriented to dealing successfully with the environment. Likewise, there can be no issue of
'purely' predictive interests aside from the socially sanctioned concerns about which
predictions are to be considered important and which are to be discarded as irrelevant.
In order to illustrate these arguments, let us consider two of Barnes' examples. To show
the social aspect of predictive interests, Barnes discusses the development of the existing
category 'male', on the basis of a new interest or goal that emerges in a subculture (Barnes,
1981a: 326-8). This new goal is to make predictions about the physiological states of the
'males'. In order to achieve this, existing exemplars of 'male' are subjected to empirical
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investigation to discover as yet unknown features of this group. However, such
investigations may not unproblematically reinforce the pre-existing sense of who should be
in the category 'male'. For example, it may be that when investigating 'males', scientists
discover that nearly all people categorised as 'male' have the XY chromosome. By altering
the category 'male' so that it includes only those who have XY chromosomes, a particular
predictive goal is served, and generalisations like 'males secrete testosterone' or 'males grow
beards' are made more successful (Barnes, 1981a: 326).
To the SPers, of course, this particular development of the category 'male' is a contingent
one. There is no formal reason why 'male' must be developed in a way which emphasises
correlations with factors such as the secretion of testosterone and the growing of beards.
When a group argues that this is how the category should develop, they do so on the basis of
particular social interests that may not be shared by all. For example, there may be other
subgroups who believe that developing 'male' in relation to personality or status
characteristics is a better option (Barnes, 1981a: 326). Furthermore, each of the possible
developments has its own predictive advantages, making a 'purely technical' decision an
impossibility. As Barnes states:
Similarity relations can appear in any number of generalisations, and what makes
one better to guess with will invariably make some other worse...There is no logic
to determine the relative technical advantages of the alternative strategies of
concept application: people simply have to agree which generalisations they will
take account of, and agree in their practice how they will be taken account of.
(Barnes, 1982: 109)
Another example provided by Barnes illustrates the way in which social and political
interests influence classification. In this case he discusses the dispute between 'conservative
hereditarians' and 'liberal environmentalists' over gender differences (Barnes, 1982: 105-9).
He suggests that each group could be said to have interests in sustaining opposed beliefs
about the source of gendered characteristics. The hereditarians argue that gendered
differences in behaviour, such as degree of aggressiveness, are the result of biological
factors. Likewise, environmentalists argue that differences in gendered behaviour are
learned, and that such characteristics are not based in nature but society.
According to Barnes, no matter what evidence is produced in the course of this dispute,




Conceptual fabrics can always be maintained by Duhem-type strategies so that,
whatever their form, they remain both internally consistent and also consistent with
experience...Hence the protagonists of hereditarian and environmentalist
ideologies could indubitably keep their respective systems consistent in just this
way. (Barnes, 1982: 106)
Any evidence that emerges provides just one more new 'particular' to be classified, and,
formally speaking, there is no reason why it must be classified in one way rather than
another. Classificatory decisions are underdetermined by reason and evidence alone.
Instead, groups will classify such evidence in relation to their social and political interests.
For example, evidence that shows the variability of male aggressiveness in relation to
environmental factors can be construed differently. Environmentalists will claim that it
strongly supports their case, whereas hereditarians will argue that it merely illustrates the
ways in which innate male aggression can be masked. Each side may be said, then, to be
learning from the evidence and making 'reasonable' classifications, without needing to give
up their core claims. To Barnes, this suggests that neither group can be interpreted as
defending a 'social interest' instead of an interest in prediction and control (Barnes, 1982:
108-9). Rather, although divergent classifications serve different social interests, both
groups can be said to be 'learning' from the evidence while continuing to defend their central
beliefs.
This completes my exposition of the SP account of categorisation. Their account offers
answers to the epistemological questions raised at the start of this section, regarding the
justification of categories. Barnes and Bloor hope to have demonstrated that categories do
not have an internal logic of their own which determines their application. In doing so, they
open up space for a sociological account of how categorisations are applied. The next
section turns to a critical evaluation of their approach.
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4.3 The social and the instrumental
The SP approach to categorisation looks an attractive one, claiming as it does to
synthesize a sociological perspective with an instrumentalist orientation. In this section I
investigate whether this synthesis is successfully achieved. I argue that, ultimately, the SP
analysis fails to incorporate an instrumentalist concern with the success and failure of
understandings. In their actual analytical framework, the SPers employ a conception of the
'social' which removes issues of the success and failure of knowledge from consideration.
This conception of sociality is the consequence of a dualism between natural science and
other social activities, rather than a transcendence of this division. Two consequences ensue.
Firstly, Barnes and Bloor's account turns out to be an implausible strong conventionalist
position on the nature of knowledge. Secondly, the SP notion of interests turns out to be a
problematic one. Although the SPers see the 'social' as 'interested', they cannot explain
how the resources to which an interest is oriented are produced. Before considering these
arguments however, we must examine the SPers' explicit commitment to instrumentalism.
In many respects, the instrumentalism espoused by Barnes and Bloor is close to the
position advocated in Chapter 1. They emphasise that it is not possible to assess the
correspondence of knowledge with reality. As Bloor puts it:
At no stage is this correspondence ever perceived, known, or, consequently, put to
any use. We never have the independent access to reality that would be necessary
if it were to be matched up against our theories. (Bloor, 1976: 40)
Instead, the assessment of a theory is internal, concerned with creating a coherent account of
experience and avoiding anomalies (Bloor, 1976: 39).
The SPers also suggest that the theories employed by actors may be more or less
successful. As Barnes puts it:
Knowledge arises out of our encounters with reality and is continually subject to
feedback-correction from these encounters, as failures of prediction manipulation
[sic] and control occur. We seek to eliminate such failures, but so far reality has
sustained its capacity to surprise us and dash our expectations. (Barnes, 1977: 10)
In other words, practical success is never guaranteed by our desire to achieve a certain
goal: there is always a question of better or worse knowledge6. To cite one of Barnes'
examples, although cancer research has been strongly supported in the post-war era, the
small returns from this research suggest that the will to solve a problem may not easily
transform into its solution (Barnes, 1974: 103).
6 Bloor concurs with this point, arguing that since our beliefs are created as instruments, 'we must
distinguish those which work from those which do not' (Bloor, 1991: 40).
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We can see, then, that at the level of stated commitment, the SPers offer a plausible
instrumentalist orientation7. However, it is important to ask whether their theoretical system
of analysis can properly incorporate such a concern. I shall argue, in fact, that this system is
set up so that instrumental success, or a lack of it, does not have an explanatory role. The
first issue to consider here is whether a social group can achieve an interest or goal whatever
experience arises. If a social group sets up a certain classification or knowledge claim in
order to pursue an interest of theirs, is it always the case that this classification successfully
serves that interest? In other words, can an 'interested' classification be successful no matter
what experiences the world throws up for the social group to deal with? In line with the
SPers' explicit pronouncements, we should expect the answer to these questions to be 'no'.
The desire to reach a particular outcome does not necessarily produce that outcome. With
reference to cancer research, just because researchers set up categorisations and
classifications to try to predict and control the causes and development of cancer, it does not
mean that they successfully manage to do so.
Somewhat surprisingly, when it comes to the SP theoretical system we find that this
pragmatic8 attitude is dropped. Instead, the SPers argue that any experience whatsoever can
be made consistent with an interested classification, and thus any interested classification can
always be seen as successful. The clearest statement of this position is to be found in
Barnes' T.S. Kuhn and Social Science (1982). In this work, Barnes employs Duhemian
arguments to suggest that if a social group has an interest in a particular classification or
generalisation9 they need never find anything in experience that undermines their success
(Barnes, 1982: 73-6).
7 The main difference between the SP's espoused pragmatism and the critical historicist position
defended here is that Barnes views historical knowledge as 'primarily instrumental' (Barnes, 1977:
15). Barnes writes that historians' findings are 'properly thought of as predictions of subsequent
archaeological or paleological discoveries; their reconstructions of the past may constitute virtual
experiments on the basis of which to leam [sic] how to predict, or even influence, the course of social
change' (Barnes, 1977: 15). It seems implausible to describe the aim of historically oriented
investigations as predicting the results of other historically oriented investigations! Barnes' use of
modifiers such as 'primarily' expresses doubts that a fully instrumental account of historical
knowledge can be given, although he offers no suggestion as to what the 'secondary' aspects might
be. In the previous chapter I suggested that practical efficacy is a subcategory of wider sense-making
activity, and I would argue that historical understanding is a form of sense-making that may or may
not have practical consequences.
8 For the purposes of this chapter, I use the terms 'pragmatic' and 'instrumentalist' as synonyms.
9 For example a generalisation that predicts connections between two categories such as 'geese eat
grass' (Barnes, 1982: 74-5).
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Talking of the consequences ofDuhem's claims, Barnes states:
Not only, as a result, is reality incapable of giving lie to an isolated hypothesis; it is
no more capable of indicating the existence of deficiency in a whole set of
connected hypotheses. A whole conceptual fabric can always be made out as in
perfect accord with experience, if the community sustaining it is of a mind to do so.
(Barnes, 1982: 75. Author's emphasis)
That is to say, a group can always reasonably claim that experience is confirming their
classifications, no matter what actually occurs10. As such, they can always claim that their
knowledge is 'pragmatically successful', whatever the outcome.
A question still remains as to how this can actually be done. After all, we might accept
that although all categorisations are 'formally' open, once they are employed for a pragmatic
purpose they have a determinacy which cannot be ignored. For example, if we are interested
in correlating mobile phone use and developments of a form of cancer, some experience
gleaned from research will support this view, with other experience challenging it".
According to Barnes, however, this is not the case. He argues that, when applying an
interested classification to new experiences, those phenomena that are found to fit with the
category may be inducted into it. Likewise, whatever appears to be anomalous to the
existing classification can be placed under a new category, leaving the previous knowledge
as it was. Thus, Barnes states:
...whenever anything of nuisance value arises out of experience, it can always be
deemed a new kind of thing or event, and assimilated under a new concept, leaving
the existing structure unaltered. (Barnes, 1982: 75. My emphasis)
To return to the above example, if one wishes to assert that mobile phone use causes
cancer, this can always reasonably be done, and any evidence which appears not to 'fit' with
these claims can be justifiably placed in another category which does not problematise
them12.
10 In a debate with Woolgar over the status of interests, Barnes makes a similar remark: 'Almost
everyone who accepts the Duhem-Quine hypothesis will recognize that any theory can be maintained
compatible with any findings by appropriate strategies of application and interpretation, and that the
strategies involved are just those which maintain our actual accepted theories as our accepted
theories' (Barnes, 1981b: 493).
11 Of course, the determinacy here cannot be specified with absolute precision. The precise level of
correlation required can be debated in relation to other similar research, and so on. However, to
acknowledge a certain amount of flexibility is not to view this as total. Furthermore, the specificity of
one's interest gives more determinacy to what counts as 'cancer' and a 'mobile phone' than the total
formal openness that exists when no particular concern is involved.
12 Logically speaking, the converse claim is equally plausible. One can reasonably defend the claim




It seems fairly clear that on such an approach, pragmatic success and pragmatic failure are
no longer distinguishable. If one cannot differentiate between what is anomalous to a claim
and what coheres with it13, any claim may be treated as correct (or wrong), and any interest
may be said to be successfully (or unsuccessfully) pursued. Pragmatic success does not need
to be striven for by investigation: it can be defined by fiat, regardless of what is experienced.
This clearly has important consequences for a sociological approach to knowledge. If the
SPers are correct, then an explanation of why actors hold certain beliefs will require no
consideration of the practical success or failure of belief. Whatever the interest pursued by
actors, this can be said to be fulfilled by their current beliefs and classifications.
Furthermore, the pragmatic improvement of a category cannot be a legitimate explanation
for changes in a belief, given that there are no grounds for imputing pragmatic failure to the
belief at its earlier stage.
I would argue that these claims cannot be sustained. Some of the difficulty with the SP
arguments can be demonstrated by returning to one of Barnes' examples, the debate between
hereditarians and environmentalists over the causes of sexual difference. Here, I would like
to pick up on Barnes' claim that regardless of the evidence brought to bear in this debate, the
hereditarians (or the environmentalists) can claim that their theory allows them to
successfully deal with the subject matter in question. Barnes asks us to imagine that
evidence of environmental influences has emerged in such a way that the hereditarians
appear to be on the back foot, desperately trying to protect their thesis against refutation
(Barnes, 1982: 109). He suggests, however, that such manoeuvres can equally be
characterised as 'learning' for the hereditarians, in which they come to comprehend those
environmental factors that can mask innate characteristics such as male aggressiveness. For
Barnes, the hereditarian theory can always be defended as a successful one, whatever the
evidence produced by inquiry.
I would argue, however, that Barnes misdescribes the process of this debate. It is true that
in the face ofpowerful evidence for the environmentalist position, the claim that heredity has
some influence on behaviour may still be defended. However, this involves shifting from a
'strong' hereditarian view in which most or all behaviour is caused by heredity, to a more
moderate position that accepts both environmental and hereditary influences. If the evidence
pushes hereditarians to accept that some behaviour is influenced by environmental factors,
13 See Barnes (1982: 100) for the claim that anomalies are not forced upon theories but are taken to be
such for other reasons. Certainly we might argue that the priorities given to resolving anomalies may
alter depending on the structure of a research programme and its other successes. However, it cannot




then they can no longer legitimately defend the strong view, regardless of their interest in
doing so. Although rhetorically the environmental factors may be described as non-primary,
if hereditarians admit that they have to be employed to successfully describe human
behaviour, then evidence has produced a shift in the debate14. In other words, the 'success'
of their attempt to describe behaviour as caused mostly by hereditary factors is thrown into
doubt.
Even using an example chosen by Barnes we can see that actors may not easily be able to
construct knowledge that achieves their aims and purposes. Nevertheless, we need to tackle
more directly Barnes' argument that those particulars (or pieces of evidence) that appear
anomalous to interested classifications can always be dismissed by not classifying them at
all, or by inventing new categories that remove their problematic character. If this argument
was indeed adequate, then it could be said that the hereditarians had needlessly capitulated
from their 'strong' position. Any group could always reasonably argue that their socially
constituted aims and purposes were being successfully achieved.
In order to address this issue, it will be helpful to consider what it means for a piece of
knowledge to be 'useful' to an actor. Essentially, it means that certain classifications or
generalisations are put together for the purpose of reaching a desired goal. Pragmatic
knowledge is thus designed to successfully produce a certain outcome for the actor. This
should give us pause for thought in relation to Barnes' argument. It is central to his position
that actors can ignore particulars that are anomalous to a category by inventing new
categories for them or ignoring them altogether (Barnes, 1982: 75; 1981a: 322). However,
the very purpose of the classification is to deal successfully with these kinds of particulars.
If it does not do this (as apparent when anomalies emerge) then merely shunting off the
anomaly to another category does not help matters in the slightest. In fact, it is precisely a
failure to deal with particulars that actors wished to successfully relate to.
I would argue that when the genuinely instrumental concern of action is taken into
account, the kind of reclassifications advocated by Barnes cannot make sense to actors. To
illustrate this point, we can consider Barnes' discussion of the classification of whales, in
'On the Conventional Character of Knowledge and Cognition' (1981a). Barnes discusses a
community who classify creatures into fishes and animals'5 in a similar way to us. However,
14 Furthermore, the required shift has not been on the 'periphery' of the theory as Barnes suggests, but
very much relates to its core premises.
15 I have followed Barnes' usage here, in which 'fish' and 'animal' are alternative and exclusive
classifications. However, it should be noted that fish are actually animals. Barnes' arguments make
more sense ifwe take him to mean 'mammal' instead of 'animal'.
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he asks us to imagine that they have never encountered a whale before. When they do so,
the question arises as to whether this new particular conflicts with their existing system and
forces a reworking of the community's categories. After all, the whale has characteristics
split across existing classifications, being 'live-bearing' and 'air-breathing' like animals, but
'finned' and 'sea-dwelling like fish' (Barnes, 1981a: 322).
According to Barnes, the community has a range of options in its classificatory response.
They can classify it as a fish, although this could threaten their categorisation of fish, as the
whale breathes air; they can classify it as an animal, although this conflicts with
generalisations about animals living on land; or, they can designate it as a new type of
creature altogether, a 'whale', which is neither fish nor animal. Barnes argues that this last
approach is particularly interesting as by creating a new category 'no existing generalizations
need be disturbed' (Barnes, 1981a: 322). In other words, an instance that is problematic to
existing categories can be made unproblematic by creating a new category for it.
There is something slightly fishy about these arguments. Firstly, it is not the case that a
new category has no bearing upon existing classifications. After all, by creating a new
category of creature, we alter understandings about how many kinds of creature there are,
and how the characteristics of creatures are distinguished. For example, now the
categorisation 'sea dwelling creature' will include not only 'fish' but 'whales' as well. Some
part of the actors' network of theories is necessarily disrupted by the incorporation of an
anomaly, contrary to Barnes' arguments.
More importantly, in line with the SP, we must argue that classifications are made in order
to achieve a certain purpose. This means that the categories used to classify creatures exist
in relation to generalisations found useful and important by the social group. For example,
one difference between fish and animals is their method of breeding, and knowledge of this
difference is of interest to humans in relation to their husbandry of resources. Likewise, it
may be useful to know the domains of creatures in order to avoid the dangerous ones. Very
simply, to avoid sharks, one should stay on the land.
It is therefore in the interests of the actors to put the characteristics of whales into a proper
relation to existing categories, so that they can successfully relate to whales as well. To
avoid classifying whales, or to put them in a separate category which does not 'disturb'
existing categories is to avoid dealing with a whale in a way that is useful to the community.
Unless the whale can be fitted in with the understandings of the community it will be
unpredictable and difficult to deal with. Although successful classification may require the
reconstruction of understanding, it can hardly be in the community's interest not to improve
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their understanding of phenomena that impinge upon them. And yet this is precisely what
Barnes suggests in relation to anomalous occurrences'6. The strategies suggested by the
SPers to avoid problematic phenomena necessarily result in the restriction of actors'
knowledge and capacity in relation to their interests. Such strategies would not be pursued
by actors, as practical success is a genuine issue for them. In order to understand shifts in
hereditarian claims or the way in which a community classifies a whale, analysts must
incorporate a concern with the success of the categorisation in relation to the interests
involved.
These points are relevant to the more general analysis of classification. We can accept the
meaning fmitist point that at some general level there are no grounds for validating one
categorisation over its competitors. However, when actors have an interest in achieving a
certain result, then a categorisation can be demonstrably better or worse at achieving this. It
may systematically allow the production of desired effects, or may fail in this task, leaving
interactions with the world unpredictable. By denying this, the SPers take the general
argument about the indeterminacy of categorisations and apply it to specific socially
interested cases. But this is the same fallacy as the arguments for strong underdetermination
criticised in Chapter 1. Both claim that a theory can be maintained as consistent no matter
what evidence arises. Although this is formally true, what it fails to acknowledge is that
without positive reconstruction of categories in the face of anomalous evidence, consistency
can only be maintained by strategies that sacrifice resourcefulness. Anomalies can be
'deflected' to save a category. However, it is in the interest of actors to reconstruct their
categories so that they facilitate successful interaction with the environment.
Summarising the argument so far, it seems that the SP approach ends up disconnecting
social interests from successful categorisation. Initially, social interests were said to be
oriented to a concern with prediction and control, that is to say, an interest in successful
categorisation. However, the SPers end up suggesting that any categorisation produced by
actors can be defended as 'successful' through the employment of strategies to deflect the
disruptive power of anomalous instances. I have argued that this misrepresents the process
of creating successful categorisations, in which anomalies must be dealt with by
16 Barnes makes similar moves when discussing how actors relate to earlier classifications. His
argument is that these classifications come with no particular goals and interests attached, but are
available to actors as a 'resource for those willing to take them as a resource' (Barnes, 1982: 1 13). I
would argue that this is somewhat misguided. After all, those classifications were developed for
some purpose, and were more or less successful in achieving it. Any actors who wish to achieve a




reconstructing knowledge rather than by engaging in defensive strategies which limit
understanding. Equally problematically, the SPers end up offering a concept of 'social
interests' which is non-instrumental. Groups are held to have an 'interest' in defending a
category as 'successful' even when it cannot deal with the particulars that it was intended to
predict and control.
Our analysis of the SP system cannot end at this point, however. So far, our attention has
focused on issues of successful classification. Now we must turn to consider the nature of
'interests' further. In their explicit statements, the SPers emphasise that an actor's 'interest'
in an outcome is an interest in prediction and control. Having an interest involves wishing to
control the course of events so that a particular desired outcome or class of outcomes result.
Logically speaking, then, the viability of an interest and its continued pursuit by an actor
depend upon their ability to achieve this result. The sense in pursuing an interest is related to
the success of the understandings which are employed. As we have seen, however, the SPers
argue that actors can always be said to 'successfully' achieve their aims, whatever
experience throws up in relation to their categorisations. With the success or otherwise of a
classification no longer a matter of concern in the SP system, interest statements are not
located in relation to the particular modes of prediction and control that make them viable.
Instead, they are treated as if they are independent of such concerns. Because the content of
categorisations is treated as 'indeterminate', categorisations can be unproblematically
manipulated to achieve whatever 'social interest' is being pursued at the time. Nothing
within a categorisation can cast into doubt the viability of the 'social interest' being pursued.
A useful example of this style of analysis can be found in Bloor's Knowledge and Social
Imagery. In this work, Bloor discusses the institutionalised mode of classification whereby
the Azande attribute the status of'witch' to clan members (Bloor, 1991: 138-146). Witches
are considered to be trouble-makers by the Azande. They are identifiable by the witchcraft-
substance that they have in their stomachs, the existence of which can be confirmed by a
post-mortem. Furthermore, this substance is inherited from parents, and any parent bearing
it will hand it down to children of the same sex.
Given the nature ofwitches, it might be inferred that once one witch has been located, this
status must also be attributed to all same-sex members of the family line. However, Azande
do not do so. When the suggestion was made to them that they should make this inference,
the Azande saw the sense in it, but did not accept that this conclusion had to be drawn.
Some analysts have suggested that this demonstrates the disinterest of Azande in logic,
particularly in a logical inference that might problematise the institution by creating too
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many witch attributions. Bloor believes that such analysts are wrong. He states that the
apparent logical contradiction inherent in this institution has no force, because it can always
be 'negotiated' away (Bloor, 1991: 141). For example, Azande sometimes argue that just
because a person has witchcraft substance, it doesn't mean that they are a witch. Rather,
witch-hood it is a potential that may or may nor be actualised, and only in the former case is
a person to be ascribed the status 'witch'17. As Bloor states: 'Logic poses no threat to the
institution of witchcraft, for one piece of logic can always be met by another' (Bloor, 1991:
141).
In Bloor's mind, this illustrates the general point that actors' support for an
institutionalised mode of classification has nothing to do with a reasoned analysis of the
content of that institution. Arguments about the validity of an institution are always
indecisive, and cannot produce a rational conviction one way or the other. Importantly,
Bloor argues that it is our commitment to an institution that leads us to defend it as
'reasonable', rather than our belief in the 'reasonable' nature of the institution that makes us
committed to it (Bloor, 1991: 143). Likewise, if we experience an argument against an
institution as 'forceful', this is not because logical inferences have power, but because we are
critical of the institution already (1991: 143).
Although this argument is not couched in terms of interests, it clearly fits with the SP
model to 'explain' an actor's commitment to an institution in these terms. Furthermore, it
illustrates the way in which the SPers view 'social factors', such as commitment to an
institution, as entirely independent from a reasoned and knowledgeable analysis of the
institution. Having an interest in defending an institution has nothing to do with reasoned
arguments for justifying the institution. Interests and knowledge/reasons are disconnected
from one another.
The problem with this separation arises when one tries to specify what it means for an
actor to have an 'interest' in an institution. Drawing on the preliminary remarks above, it
means that through prediction and control, an institution successfully produces some desired
result or benefit for the actor. In order to continue receiving this benefit, the actor supports
the institution and its continuation. Likewise, if an actor has an interest in altering
institutional arrangements, it is because they believe that their goals will be better served in a
new configuration. Locating an interest thus means identifying the structure of the
institution, and how it produces and distributes the resources (benefits) which are pursued by
actors in their interested activity.
17 One might thus suggest that Azande are ontological realists.
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This means that actors have interests because of the effects or outcomes that an institution
can produce for them. However, as we have seen, no outcomes can be achieved
unproblematically. An institution may be more or less successful in producing the resources
desired by actors, depending on the pragmatic success of the knowledge embodied in it.
Importantly, this suggests that debate about the validity of an institution is a reflection upon
its practical adequacy for providing benefits to the actors involved. It is not a form of
sophistry in which a claim of institutional validity can be defended whatever the evidence,
but an argument about the pragmatic success of an institution from the location of particular
actors.
Actors' interests and knowledge of the adequacy or validity of an institution are thus
intrinsically connected. Actors do not have interests in defending or attacking an institution
regardless of its pragmatic success in producing resources for them. Rather, they have
interests only because of the success or otherwise of an institution. It is not logical for
analysts to hypothesize interests for actors that are not located in relation to an institutional
structure of knowledge. Such ascriptions fail to explain how the resources to which that
interest is oriented are produced, and thus what knowledgeable activities the institution
embodies in order to make a certain interest possible. It cannot be that actors have an
'interest' in supporting or challenging an institution regardless of the success or adequacy of
that institution in dealing with the material world.
These problems with the SP account are closely connected to the difficulties that emerge
within realism. In the previous chapter we saw that Archer postulated a strategic logic of the
social that was not based in the success or otherwise of institutions. Likewise, the SPers
argue that conflicts over the validity of an institution are not based in its failure to meet the
needs of some actors. In both cases, the existence of social conflict is not properly
accounted for, and, instead, floats free of any institutional location and explanation. The
difficulty for Barnes and Bloor is that any attempt to provide an explanation for conflict
must necessarily consider resources and their generation, bringing issues of success back into
a mode of analysis that has ruled them out of consideration.
When interests are reconnected with knowledgeable institutional frameworks, this means
that they are subject to alteration and development in the light of developments in
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understanding18. As an example of this we can return once more to the debate between
liberal environmentalists and conservative hereditarians. It is possible, as Barnes suggests,
that evidence will come in that supports the environmentalist account of behaviour rather
than the conservative theory. As this evidence accrues, two shifts may happen. Firstly,
conservatives may decide that it is no longer in their interest to defend their social and
political resources using a theory which is shown to be weak in its account of human
behaviour. If the theory is used to justify existing status and influence, its explanatory
paucity may undermine such justifications, and conservatives will wish to look for these
elsewhere. They will thus reconceive which claims it is in their interest to investigate and
defend; put more strongly, their 'interest' in supporting hereditarianism may have been
misconceived given that it undermines their political claims.
Secondly, (some) conservatives may change their political affiliation on the basis that
hereditarian claims are not defensible. If the greater adequacy of an environmentalist
account has been established, they may come to believe that it is in their interest to
participate in a society which actualises the possibilities of all actors and not just those of a
certain group. That is to say, they may decide that their 'interest' in maintaining existing
status and influence while living in a society which deforms human capacities is less than
their 'interest' in living in an egalitarian society with fully realised human beings. Of course,
such a serious alteration in political ideology is unlikely to be brought about by a shift in one
specific debate! However, a number of such shifts may make a change in 'interest' a
plausible outcome.
To take another example, we can consider the case of 'narrow professional vested
interests', which are a standard kind of interest referred to in SP accounts (see for example,
Barnes, 1982: 114-8, Bloor, forthcoming). A typical account of professional vested interests
suggests that scientists seek to defend a particular theory or practice because of the resources
of various kinds (status, financial, technical) that accrue to them when this theory is
sanctioned by the larger collective. To gain such resources, scientists are taken to have an
interest in defending their particular procedures and knowledgeability regardless of how
successful these procedures actually are. Or, to put it in SP terms, a group of scientists can
always give reasons for the claim that their work is 'successful'.
18 This explicitly breaks with the SP approach, because of its explanatory framework. Given that the
SPers argue that all knowledge is 'finite' in character, then interests too would have to be 'finite'. As
such, they could no longer be the determining factor which explained how classificatory choices get
made. If interests have a 'finite' character, then the decisions made by actors about how to follow
them require explanation themselves, as with values and norms (see Barnes, 1995: 53-60; Barnes,
1982: 123-4; Bloor, 1991: 172-3).
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In order to respond to such an account, it is necessary to reiterate that procedures and the
knowledge that they embody cannot always be made to appear successful at dealing with
some subject matter. When comparing competing approaches, it is often possible to decide
which is better at handling the phenomena in question. When a theory has to resort to the
kind of protectionism advocated by the SP, it is necessarily limiting the scope of its
application, and competing theories may exist that can handle the anomalies that it does not
deal with. In such cases, judgements about relative success can be made.
Of course, scientists within a research group wish to present their own approach in the
best possible light, so that they can gain the resources at stake in the scientific enterprise.
However, it will not be in their long-term interest to continue defending a procedure or
theory that is manifestly less successful for than that of its rivals. In such a case, the
'interest' in defending a theory diminishes, even when it is a theory that has well-established
successes behind it. When resources come to be allocated to more practically successful
theories, there is no longer an 'interest' in defending the theory in question. This kind of
shift is part of the dynamic of science.
Such points bring us on to territory explored by Andrew Pickering in The Mangle ofPractice
(1995). Pickering emphasises that there can be no such thing as a 'purely' social interest
which stands outside of the practical success or otherwise of scientists' interactions with the
material world. He argues that goals and interests are reconfigured as investigation
continues, and are interrelated to the outcome of scientific work and its more or less
successful character. Pickering then uses these arguments to criticise the SPers for their lack
of concern with how practical activity can generate a change in interests. He states:
The tendency is to write as if the substantive interests of actors were present and
identifiable in advance of particular passages of practice, setting them in motion
and structuring outcomes without being themselves at stake. (Pickering, 1995: 64)
Bloor has responded to these arguments, suggesting that they misrepresent the SP
position. To show that the SP can deal with the practical and reconstructible nature of
interests, he considers how we might analyse the development of a scientific paradigm
(Bloor, forthcoming). Bloor asks us to imagine that this paradigm is becoming
'progressively consolidated'. When this occurs, it is likely that a divergence of interest will
result between those who founded the paradigm, and those who joined later in order to
develop and articulate its details. The founders will have an interest in making sure that their
work continues to be used in the development of the paradigm. Newer recruits, however,
will see their interests as being served by breaking the existing paradigm in order to search
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for a radical new approach, of which they would be recognised as founders. The
consolidation of a paradigm thus results in a shift in interests for those involved.
Bloor is correct to assert that this kind of SP analysis is a dynamic one, in that it does not
rely on social interests remaining unchanged. However, the important issue here is not
simply whether 'interests' change or not, but whether these changes are adequately
theorised. Bloor's example, in keeping with the SP approach, analyses shifts in 'interests' as
if they could be located without consideration of the adequacy of the scientific activity they
are bound up with. Questions of adequacy are relevant, however, to understanding the
interests of the actors involved. If, for example, the development of a paradigm along
traditional lines continues to provide new insights and illumination, then it is in scientists'
interests to keep working along these lines. Likewise, if it appears that such lines are being
exhausted, it is in scientists' interests to break away from the tradition. Without an analysis
of the paradigm's success, however, such interests cannot be correctly identified. The
implication of Bloor's analysis is that it is always in the interests of actors to be 'founders' of
a paradigm. This seems fundamentally implausible, and implies that novel analysis will
always be rewarded by the scientific community, no matter how successful it is in
accounting for phenomena. Surely it is more likely that credit is given to successful new
developments, whether this involves founding a paradigm or developing it. Bloor's claim
that later generations have an interest in rejecting a paradigm is only defensible in cases
where a paradigm's insights are close to exhaustion and a successful alternative can be
developed. However, neither of these factors can be incorporated into the SP account.
In this section I have argued that the conception of 'social interests' employed by the
SPers is unpragmatic in two important respects. Firstly, they argue that the knowledge
produced in order to achieve a 'social interest' can always be characterised as 'successful' no
matter what experiences arise. This wrongly suggests that actors and analysts cannot make
pragmatically defensible discriminations between knowledge that is more or less successful
for a task. It also negatively characterises 'social interests' as interests in defending
knowledge that is unsuccessful, that is, knowledge that has anomalies. Secondly, they do not
locate 'social interests' in the practical success (or otherwise) of the knowledgeable
structures of activity in which actors participate. As such, statements of 'social interest'
become inexplicable in pragmatic terms, as do conflicts of interest. Furthermore,
considerations that 'social interests' may change and develop through reflection and the
development of knowledge are ignored. The overall outcome is that the SP theoretical
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system reverts to a notion of 'the social' which is indeed antithetical to interests in prediction
and control.
Two quite different conclusions can be drawn from the criticisms of the SP presented
here. The internal contradictions within the programme could be taken as further evidence
for the illegitimacy of constructing a fully sociological account of knowledge. The
arguments offered here could then be added to those put forward by many other critics of
social constructionist accounts of science, who see the failure of the SP as a demonstration
that a completely 'externalist' account of the content of scientific knowledge is not possible
(see, for instance, Bunge, 1991; Slezak, 1994). I would argue that a different conclusion can
be drawn, however. The SP argument is that a sociological account of knowledge should be
a instrumentalist one, emphasising that social interests must be seen as interests in reaching
certain outcomes through successful prediction and control. I suggested that this seems to be
a plausible way of interpreting interests which coheres with a defensible philosophy of
science. The problem with the SP is not, therefore, its attempt to construct a social account
of knowledge, but its failure to see this project through properly. As we saw, instead of
social interests being intelligibly linked to prediction and control, they are used to account
for commitments to knowledge that cannot be justified in those terms. Identifying a
commitment as 'social' is thus tantamount to indicating its anti-pragmatic orientation, much
as Barnes and Bloor try to imply otherwise. Having a social interest in knowledge comes to
mean defending this knowledge even when it is against an actor's interest in prediction,
control, and the achievement of desired outcomes to do so.
There is no need to treat social interests in this fashion. Contrary to anti-sociological
philosophers, if we take a social interest to be a concern with the production of resourceful
outcomes, then not only is this a legitimate input into science, but it is the very stuff from
which science is made. Such interests can be driven either by narrow professional concerns
or wider socio-political goals. Contrary to constructionist sociologists, it cannot be assumed
that the process of investigation will not affect the validity of these interests. Having an
initial interest in producing a result does not mean that such a result will be viable. What
investigation shows to be possible may well transform a group's interests, either by showing
them the difficulties with achieving their existing goals, or by suggesting new possibilities
that would result in better outcomes for the group. Both of these aspects are present in the
example of the hereditarians, in which processes of investigation show their claims to be
hard to defend and suggest a different way of conceiving what course of action is to their
benefit. Scientific investigation is thus a process of transformation of interests rather than
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simply a reflection of the interests that existed to begin with. It is not unique in this respect,
and all social practices share its character as oriented to achieving some outcome. What is
impressive about natural science is how successful it is in investigating how outcomes might
be reached, and in transforming our sense of what outcomes are possible in our interactions
with the material environment. Nevertheless, this is not a reason to see it as qualitatively
different to other social activities.
4.4 Social institutions and success
Up to this point I have been considering the SP attempt to analyse natural scientific
investigation as a fully social activity. I have suggested that this attempt fails because the
conception of sociality employed is one which cannot account for the variable success of
interested belief. Instead of transcending the natural science/social activity dualism, Barnes
and Bloor attempt to analyse the former using an unreconstructed conception of the latter.
However, this addresses only part of the problem with the SP position. The argument of this
thesis is that natural scientific investigation is an activity that has the same characteristics as
other social practices. If this is the case, then the SP approach must be just as problematic
when applied to other social institutions as it is when applied to natural science. In other
words, the failure to consider the variable success of institutionalised activity must
problematise analysis of other social activities in the same way as it does the analysis of
natural science. In order to see the links between the SPer's analysis of science and other
social practices, we must move on from theories of classification, and consider their account
of social institutions. This theory unites the analysis of natural science and other practices,
and we shall consider its application to both in order to show that the same problems arise in
both cases.
The account of social institutions developed by Barnes and Bloor is a general theory of
how sociologically relevant phenomena are to be understood". It provides a basic
characterisation of the institutionalised modes of knowing and acting which are constitutive
of social life. Whenever we see a regularised mode of interaction undertaken by human
beings, we can consider this to be a 'social institution' in which the shared understandings
that make the interaction possible are 'social constructs'. On the SP account, the key
19 The theory of institutions is based in Barnes' paper 'Social Life as Bootstrapped Induction' (1983),
and is discussed further in his book The Nature of Power (1988). Bloor has been responsible for
more recent developments, particularly in relation to the sociology of natural scientific knowledge
(see Bloor, 1996; Bloor, 1997a; Bloor, 1997b). Martin Kusch has also elaborated on the theory, and
applied it to debates around psychological knowledge (Kusch, 1999).
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features of social institutions are that they are self-referring and self-validating. To say that
an institution is self-referring is to say that it only exists because people believe and act as if
it exists. It is solely because of the beliefs and actions of a social group that an institution
has any reality whatsoever (Bloor, 1997b; Barnes 1988). Although such a conception seems
obscure, some examples may help to make it clearer. One important social institution is
money. Money has no existence except when actors believe that it is money20. As Bloor
puts it:
Money is an institution. Now, something is money, and can only operate as
money, only if its users treat it as money, and think of it as money. We can sum
this up by saying: money is money only if it is called money. (Bloor, 1997b: 12.
Author's emphasis)
Another example that Bloor uses is that of leadership. Someone is only the leader of a
group if they are taken to be the leader by group members. It is a construction that applies to
a person if the members of a group believe and act as if it applies. Otherwise, it has no
purchase or existence (Bloor, 1997b: 13). To call an institution self-referential, then, is to
say that it owes its character purely to the belief of those actors who create it. Only by their
'reference' to the institution does it have a form and existence.
The SPers also argue that if an institution is self-referring it must be self-validating
(Barnes, 1988: 46; Bloor, 1997a: 38). An institution is only constituted by the claims about
it made by actors. Therefore, suggest the SPers, these claims are fully constitutive of its
character. Given that an institution is created by actors' beliefs about it, it can have no
character other than that ascribed by those beliefs. If, for example, a social group treat a
person as a 'leader' then this person is validly described as a 'leader'. As Bloor suggests,
analysing a social institution in this way treats it as an 'actor's category' in which the actor's
beliefs are the final word21. Nothing can be gained by close scrutiny of a social institution in
an attempt to understand it better than the actors involved (Bloor, 1997a: 33-5). Actors'
understandings are valid understandings.
These arguments run directly parallel to Giddens' claims about 'mutual knowledge' that
were considered in Chapter 2. Giddens suggests that in order to understand actors' beliefs,
20 Of course the material substances such as paper and discs would still exist if nobody believed they
were money, but they would not exist as money (Bloor, 1997b: 4).
21 In an odd footnote, Bloor argues that the notion of an 'actor's category' is not an actor's category.
Instead he says that 'It is part of a perspective which is beginning to go beyond that of actors
themselves and represents a new level of self-awareness' (Bloor, 1997a: 150, fn6). Presumably the
'self that becomes 'aware' is also an actor, and thus the categories that this self uses are subject to the
standard SP analysis regarding their self-referential character. Certainly, further elucidation is
required by Bloor to explain how why his own analysis is not a form of action.
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analysts must treat them as valid on their own terms. When beliefs are apprehended in this
way, no criticism of them is justified. However, there is a difference between Giddens'
approach and that of the SP. For Giddens, natural scientific beliefs do not need to be treated
as mutual knowledge in order to be understood. For the SPers, conversely, all
understandings, including those of natural science, should be considered as social constructs
and thus self-referential in character22 (Bloor, 1997b). Bloor contends that the social
institution model is the only possible way to account for the meaning of natural scientific
concepts and beliefs. His argument goes as follows. Imagine that we are trying to
understand how actors classify a particular and thus create a piece of knowledge. If we
exclude social processes, all we have are individuals coming to independent judgements
about the similarity or difference of this particular to other particulars. The question is, can
an individual's judgement of similarity or difference be considered right or wrong?
An individual making judgements will have to rely on their innate biological and
psychological capacities (Bloor, 1996). Put simply, they have 'pattern matching' capabilities
which can be used to discriminate between particulars based on the input received through
the senses. The activities of such pattern-matching machinery will produce an output which
indicates whether a new particular fits a category or not, depending on whether the pattern
matches or not. However, there is a problem with using such outputs as the basis for
discriminating right and wrong judgements. It is always possible that the machinery will
function inconsistently, classifying the same inputs in different ways due to malfunctions or
shifts in the mechanisms. Unfortunately, there is no way for the lone individual to detect
these changes, as the machinery provides the only discriminatory capacity that they have.
As Bloor puts it:
The pattern-matching process has no measure outside of itself to determine
whether its matching is going well or ill. There is no standard of a right match or a
wrong match. Whatever seems right to the pattern matching machine is right,
which means that the word 'right' has no real application here. (Bloor, 1996: 847).
22 Barnes and Bloor seem to view this issue differently. Much of Bloor's recent work has relied on
the notion that natural scientific knowledge is self-referential. However, some of Barnes' remarks are
more equivocal, particularly in The Nature ofPower. For example, at one point Barnes suggests that
'...knowledge of nature may be confirmed or discontinued by processes involving reference to states
of affairs that exist independently of the knowledge...' (Barnes, 1988: 52). Two pages earlier, Barnes
expresses a seemingly contrasting view suggesting that 'Natural order is just as much a system of
conventions as social order' (Barnes, 1988: 50). Given that, for the SPers, a convention is self-
referring and self-validating, it is hard to see how it can also be confirmed or discontinued by an
independent state of affairs. It seems to me that seeing natural scientific concepts as self-referring
coheres better with the general SP approach than the alternative.
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In other words, because of their reliance on a mechanism which they cannot check or
standardise, individuals cannot, on their own, make a 'right' or 'wrong' judgement. The
judgements that they make are subjective.
Bloor then argues that for there to be a genuine standard or knowledge claim, there must
be factors involved that are external to the individual. This is where sociological analysis
comes in to the picture. Unlike an individual, a social group can create a genuine standard
for correct and incorrect classification. The standard will provide grounds for asserting that
a classificatory judgement is right or wrong, in a way that transcends the individual, and
represents the judgement of the collective (Bloor, 1996). It is this standard which determines
which particulars are correctly classified under a concept and which are not. Of course,
given its social character, this standard is a self-referential institution. It is constituted solely
by actors' references to it in their classificatory practices, and its reality and character
consists only in these uses (Bloor, 1996: 848). As Bloor puts it:
Just as money is created by self-referential processes, and just as leadership is
constituted by self-reference, so the standards of right and wrong concept
application, and hence the content of concepts, is similarly constructed. The
conclusion could be expressed by saying that concepts with an empirical reference
are, and must be, social institutions. (Bloor, 1997b: 15. Author's emphasis)
Clearly, this is a strong claim, and Bloor is aware that it may appear to locate scientific
knowledge purely in the realm of the social, rather than grounding it in physical reality. He
then suggests, however, that this would be a misinterpretation. His approach is intended to
incorporate both natural and social components as necessary aspects of an account of
scientific knowledge. As we have seen, the social component provides the meaning and
content of scientific concepts. Nevertheless, such meaning is connected to the physical
realm, in that the particulars to be classified are identified through their causal impact upon
actors, which involves both the causal powers of objects and the biological capacities of
individuals.
Bloor illustrates his approach by analysing Marie Curie's discovery of radium (Bloor,
1997b). He poses the question: is a sociological analyst required to say that instead of
'discovering' radium, Curie 'constructed' it? Bloor's reply is to emphasise that Curie and
her fellow researchers did not 'construct' the actual substance radium23 - they discovered it.
However, something was socially constructed in the process - the natural scientific concept
'radium'. Curie developed and reconstructed the concepts of the scientific community in the
23 Of course the researchers did work physically on the substance with various devices, but did not
'construct' it out of social processes by referring to it.
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course of her investigation. Her resultant understanding of 'radium' is a social institution
and the analyst can examine 'how it is used to build up the idea of the object thought to
correspond to it' (Bloor, 1997b: 19). Bloor's analysis of this episode thus retains both the
material character of the substance radium and the social character of the scientific concept
'radium'.
The difficulty with relating the material and the social in this way is brought out by
Latour, in a recent debate with Bloor. Latour asks how, in the SP account, the material
world that we encounter makes a difference to the content of the scientific concepts that we
develop to understand it. It seems that, for Bloor, the world's impact upon our concepts is
minimal (Latour, 1999b: 117). Certainly, as Bloor argues in his reply, the causal forces of
the material world must provide the stimulus that leads actors to classify them (Bloor, 1999b:
134). But what influence upon the categorisation do they have apart from this? In order to
conform to the SP account, the answer must be 'none'. This is because, for the SPers, the
content of scientific concepts is self-referential and self-validating. If indeed causal inputs
were to have an impact upon the meaning of the concepts developed to classify them, then
these classifications would no longer be self-referential. At least part of the content of the
classification would be determined or influenced by something other than the concept which
the social actors saw fit to bestow upon it. Latour argues that because of this stipulation, the
SPers end up treating particulars and sensory inputs as 'tokens' which bear whatever
classification is socially and self-referentially determined by actors24 (Latour, 1999b: 117-8).
This criticism is borne out by Bloor's account of the discovery of radium. He argues that
a sociological investigation of the concept 'radium' cannot proceed by considering the
adequacy of the concept in relation to the substance radium. Rather, to employ Bloor's
words once again, sociology focuses 'on the concept itself and on how it is used to build up
the idea of the object thought to correspond to it' (Bloor, 1997b: 19). Sociological analysis
must not treat the substance radium as if it could influence the 'concept' which describes it.
Instead sociology should treat the concept as a social institution, self-referentially constituted
24 The force of this claim is illustrated by the fact that both money and scientific concepts are held to
be self-referential institutions. In the case of money, the meanings are socially constructed, and the
discs and papers are mere tokens bearing that meaning. In the case of scientific understandings, the




by the actors who create it. Therefore, the substance itself is only relevant to an account of
the concept insofar as it is a token bearing socially generated understanding25.
This outcome directly parallels the meaning finitist approach discussed in the previous
section. It suggests that actors can categorise particulars in any way, and that such
categorisations can always be defended as reasonable on their own terms, as they are self-
validating. When we have grasped how actors classify, there is no further task for the
sociologist in considering the success or failure of the classification. Furthermore,
explanation of how classifications change and develop cannot call on the intrinsic
characteristics of the classification itself, but must be accounted for using extrinsic 'social
factors' such as interests. Once again, this cuts an analysis of social interests loose from the
success or otherwise of the mode of activity engaged in to realise them.
An alternative approach is to take the pragmatic character of classification more seriously.
In particular, this means questioning the idea that categorisations are self-validating. On a
pragmatic account, classifications are created in order to help deal successfully with the
world. However, if all classifications were self-validating, there would never be a genuine
issue of success or failure in relation to them. Every classification could be said to be
successful for its intended purpose, so long as the community believed that it was successful.
Given that a social institution's content is exhausted by actors' descriptions of it, there could
be no issue of further investigation to decide if it really was an adequate classification26.
Contrary to this, I would suggest that the adequacy of classifications can always be
questioned on pragmatic grounds. It is precisely the issue of pragmatic success which allows
a social group to inquire into the adequacy of their understandings, and which suggests that
understandings should not be taken as self-validating. In fact, our understandings are
25 Bloor attempts to make these claims seem plausible by separating out the interests of a sociological
analyst from those of a scientist, suggesting that their interests are different and non-contradictory
(Bloor, 1997b: 10-11). A scientist is interested in how a concept stands to 'reality', and how well it
describes this reality. A sociologist, on the other hand, is interested in how a concept has come to
have its content through its construction by social processes. Contrary to Bloor, it is fairly clear that
these interests are not different from each other. In effect, both scientific actors and analysts have an
'interest' in trying to explain how the content of the concept 'radium' emerged. Scientists, however,
try to explain this by claiming its contents is^d result of a (more or less) thorough investigation of
reality, which the concept (more or less) thoroughly describes. Conversely, SP sociologists try to
explain this content by its emergence through self-referential social processes. These explanations are
competing: if one is correct the other cannot be. There is no divergence of 'interest' as Bloor
suggests, but a divergence of substantive claims, which cannot be treated as complementary.
26 This point is echoed in Barnes' discussion of rule-following where he states: 'When the collective
applies a rule in a given way, carefully and honestly, it is unclear how a sense of incorrectness can be
generated with respect to that application at that time (although the collective may well later change
its practice and hence its evaluation of what it had earlier done)' (Barnes, 1994: 28-9). Quite why
such a shift would occur is not apparent, especially given the self-validating and thus unproblematic
character of the earlier rule-following.
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constantly undermined by the problems that emerge when we apply them to some subject
matter in order to achieve prediction and control. These problems necessitate the
reconstruction of our concepts so that we can increase our capacity for successful action.
If we take the example of radium, we should certainly accept that the concept of 'radium'
is a human construction, and one which cannot be directly compared to radium 'itself in
order to assess its adequacy. However, we can ask how well this concept allows us to
interact with physical reality. Bloor describes how the new experimental results produced by
Curie led to changes in the existing corpus of understanding, with earlier concepts being
reconstructed and new concepts being developed (Bloor, 1997b: 17). We are entitled to ask
why, if understandings are self-validating, such a reconstruction had to occur. On that view,
the 'new properties' displayed by radium could have been unproblematically incorporated
into those of an existing element category such as uranium, without the need to create the
new category of 'radium'. Surely it is more plausible to argue that the evidence
problematised existing categorisations and necessitated a new category which offered a more
coherent theory of the elements and their nature.
The general point is that because of their purposive nature, classifications contain implicit
or explicit criteria for their successful application. When these classifications are applied in
practice they frequently fail to meet such criteria, requiring them to be reconstructed in order
to be applied more successfully. In other words, theories generate residual categories
containing anomalous outcomes, which necessitate the reconstruction of the theory in order
to achieve success. Because beliefs can fail to live up to their requirements, it is wrong to
view knowledge as self-validating. To create a classification in order to achieve a purpose is
not the same as having a classification which actually achieves that purpose. It is in this
sense that analysts can do more in relation to actors' understandings than merely grasping
their content. Such understandings can also be scrutinised as to whether they successfully
achieve the results which are intended by actors.
Of course, it could be argued that actors sometimes have an interest which limits their
concern with phenomena that do not fit with their classifications. Certainly, understandings
may be useful in relation to particular purposes which can be achieved to the technical
requirements of actors involved, even if residual categories are produced. Nevertheless, two
further points should be noted. If a theory emerges which produces a greater systematic
capacity and removes earlier residual categories, the technicians would be able to recognise
the superior reach of the theory, even if it was of little interest in relation to their concerns. It
would not be the case that their theory was 'equally valid' despite its anomalies. Secondly,
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we should not reify the purposes of actors at some particular time, as these purposes are
possibilities intrinsically connected with the knowledge available. Thus, when knowledge
develops, it is possible that people's sense of the important 'purposes' to pursue will also
develop in relation to the increased capacity. Instead of seeing 'goals' and 'interests' as
fixed boundaries upon the development of knowledge, we should see them as evolving along
with this development.
Having discussed the problems of analysing natural scientific knowledge as a social
institution, we must now turn to consider whether the social institution model can deal with
other social processes. Frequently, constructionist arguments are held to be implausible in
relation to natural science, because of the independence of the object from the knowledge
about it. Such a perception may, however, differ when considering those 'social' practices
and institutional modes of behaviour which seem to lack an independent referent. However,
to accept a distinction between the two is to invoke an untenable dualism of natural science
and social activity. Non-scientific social institutions are no more self-referring and self-
validating than those of natural science. When considering the adequacy of natural scientific
knowledge, I argued that the grounds for critique and development could be found in the
failure of classifications on their own terms. That is to say that categorisations can be
criticised for failing to meet the goals that they are supposed to fulfil. In order to critically
assess other social institutions we need no further consideration than this. Institutions can be
analysed in relation to the purposes and goals that they are supposed to facilitate, and one
can theorise the extent to which they achieve their purpose.
Perhaps the most persuasive of the SP examples is that of money as a self-referential and
self-validating social institution. The SPers argue that money is only money because actors
take it to be so, referring and acting on the nature of this belief. As Bloor puts it, 'It is not an
exaggeration...to insist that if we abandoned references to money, money would indeed
vanish' (Bloor, 1997a: 30). Money persists as an institution because people believe it will
persist; each time this belief is put into action, it helps to sustain the institution of money
further (Barnes, 1988: 83). Money's past reliability convinces actors that it is trustworthy,
and in treating it as such, they sustain its trustworthy character.
However, if we attempt to locate the institution of money a little more carefully, it
becomes doubtful whether it can be considered self-referring and self-validating. In the first
place, it should be emphasised that the institution of 'money' is not an aesthetic creation of
actors intended to embroider their culture with yet another self-referential pattern of
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activity27. Rather, it emerges as an attempted solution to certain difficulties in the realm of
exchange, and it is intended to resolve these difficulties in a productive and sustainable
manner. In other words, actors support and use the institution of money because it helps
them to realise certain purposes28. As is commonly noted in monetary theory, there are
various functions that money can fulfil, including operation as a store of value, means of
payment, unit of account and unit of exchange. When it fulfils these functions successfully,
money is a central part of an economic system, contributing to the production and
distribution of the goods produced therein. As Victor Morgan notes, the development of
money as a medium of exchange was an important factor in the development of a division of
labour, facilitating the ease of trade required to make specialisation viable (Morgan, 1965).
To see the problems of viewing money as a self-referential institution it will be useful to
consider one of the functions that money serves within capitalism. If money is to contribute
to trade, it must act as a reliable means of exchange whereby it retains its purchasing power
in the periods between exchange. That is to say, the money accepted for one kind of good
should retain its value so that a market equivalent good can be purchased using the same
amount ofmoney. When a monetary system achieves this, it provides a generalised medium
of exchange which successfully facilitates the production and trade of goods.
I would argue that the self-referential picture of money cannot account for money's
successful operation because it excludes consideration of the external conditions to which
actors' belief in the institution ofmoney is intimately related. The first such condition is that
the money supply must be limited for money to function properly. With no such limits,
money stops being a successful medium of exchange, and large variations in supply impact
upon exchanges being made, to the extent that actors cannot assume that the money they
gain from a sale will purchase the equivalent of what they sold. It should be emphasised that
such variations in the money supply may have an impact upon exchange and the value of
money even though no actor understands the causal factor at work. That is to say, it is not
just that agents must 'trust' that the money supply is limited, as Barnes argues (Barnes, 1988:
184, fn 29). This is a claim that would add the need for self-referential confidence in issuing
agencies to the self-referential confidence in money. Rather, no one may actually
27 Bloor's account in Wittgenstein, Rules and Institutions comes close to this position. He states that
the development of money 'is a striking exercise in pure creativity' continuing that 'A group of
people have brought something into existence simply by thinking about it and talking about it' (Bloor,
1997a: 29). To be fair to Bloor, his account of the institution of 'promising' later in the work has a
more concrete historical dimension.
28 This is not to say that money is the only institution that could serve such purposes, and Jacques
Melitz discusses how sophisticated bartering arrangements fulfil some of the same functions of
money in certain social structures (Melitz, 1974).
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comprehend that a large increase in the money supply will in fact undermine confidence in
money as a medium of exchange29. The problems generated by such an increase are not
created because actors lose 'trust' in the issuing agency, but because an excess amount of
money drives up prices. This leads to problems of exchange not based in a lack of self-
referential 'belief in money, but the failure of institutions to regulate the money supply so
that successful exchange is facilitated.
It is just as important to emphasise that confidence in 'money' is not a purely internal,
self-validating phenomentmbut closely related to the success of economic production. This
becomes particularly salient when governments no longer underwrite the value of money by
guaranteeing convertibility into an intrinsically valuable commodity such as gold. As
Parsons argues in his discussion of power, continuing faith in the value of money is then
related to the practical economic success with which money is bound up (Parsons, 1967:
334-5). If the money supply expands with an increase in economic productivity, then actors
can be confident that money will successfully facilitate their economic transactions.
Likewise, if the money supply outpaces productivity increases, the result is inflation and
problems with the functioning of money, which may be more or less severe (Parsons, 1967:
335). It is therefore successful economic processes that provide the real value of money, as
it is economic resources that money can ultimately be used to acquire. Confidence is thus
based in the practical success of the economic institutions. Interestingly, Barnes misses this
connection of resourcefulness and confidence when he reconstructs Parsons' argument
(Barnes, 1988: 14-9). He notes that money must, for Parsons, operate on the basis of
institutionalised confidence but does not link this confidence to productivity.
The key to this issue is not to deny that there are issues of confidence in the institution of
money, but to properly locate this confidence. The successful functioning of the institution
is produced by the management of money in relation to other institutions, both those issuing
and controlling money, and those relating to the production and distribution of goods. A
consideration ofmoney should focus upon the conditions required to make money work, and
to continually engender the confidence of actors30. By viewing institutions such as money as
29 The inflationary pressures of increased money supplies (caused by an influx of precious metals into
an economy) were misunderstood in medieval times, and price increases were blamed upon the
'malpractices of traders' (Morgan, 1965: 181).
30 This returns us to a view of cycles of confidence more akin to that ofMerton, who emphasises that
institutional management may stop or limit self-destructive spirals of belief (Merton, 1957). There is
a certain irony here, given that Barnes' work on self-reference and self-fulfilling prophecies is
inspired by Merton's approach (Barnes, 1983).
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self-validating, the SPers ignore the complex measures required to keep it (and processes of
production and exchange) functioning at all.
Furthermore, the SP account cannot explain how an institution that is successfully set in
motion ever comes to change. The implication must surely be that once a self-reinforcing
circle is brought about, it has an unstoppable logic of its own, its reliability in the past
producing its reliability in the future. Of course, institutions do change in character. The
operation of money has altered over time with the gold standard being introduced and
abandoned, the expansion of credit, and so on. Particular monetary systems have also
changed in status, being successful at some point and then failing. Countries which have
been subject to hyper-inflation may abandon their currency and start anew. It is hard to see
how any institution that is self-validating would ever be undermined in this way.
In order to address this kind of issue, Barnes resorts to an explanation based on factors
'external' to the institution. Thus, in the parallel case of the success or failure of a bank,
Barnes suggests that contingent events may begin to undermine a bank, such as 'inexpedient
economic policies' or 'military adventures' (Barnes, 1983: 538). But this is to insist that
confidence in the bank is not self-validating after all. If confidence in a bank truly is self-
validating, no one need pay any attention to other factors. As with natural scientific
knowledge, 'Duhem-type strategies' can always be employed to show that the institution is
functioning successfully. Any switch in belief from 'confidence' to Tack of confidence'
would be inexplicable, given the supposedly self-sustaining nature of confidence. To
explain change, Barnes has to resort to types of factors which undermine the consistency of
the SP framework. In many ways, this difficulty is the same as that encountered in the SP
treatment of 'radium'; that is to say, the (supposedly) self-validating character of money
makes changes to the institution as inexplicable as the changes made to (supposedly) self-
validating chemical theories in order to incorporate Curie's experimental results. It is more
appropriate to say that just as problems with the functioning of 'money' may lead to
institutional reform, problems with the functioning of existing chemical concepts may
necessitate their reform. Neither should be treated as seif-vaiidating.
The problems with the SP approach are similar to those arising in Giddens' work
(considered in Chapter 2). Giddens suggests that in order to understand actors' beliefs they
must be treated as self-validating (i.e. as mutual knowledge). He also argues that once social
beliefs are understood, they can be subjected to empirical criticism. However, if actors'
beliefs could be correctly understood as completely valid knowledge, there could be no
grounds for criticising them. By committing to the idea that actors' beliefs are, at some
141
Social Constructionism
level, fully satisfactory, both Giddens and the SPers run into difficulties. For Giddens, the
difficulty is finding a role for criticism, whereas for Barnes and Bloor, the problem is
explaining change.
Another illustration of an SP analysis of social institutions can be found in Barnes'
discussion of status groups and class analysis (Barnes, 1995). Barnes wishes to argue that
the study of many social organisations can be enhanced by analysing them as status groups.
Importantly, this includes redescribing 'classes' as 'status groups'. So how does Barnes
characterise these different types of collectives? For Barnes, a status group is a collective
that attempts to monopolize resources such as goods and opportunities (Barnes, 1995: 130-
1). This monopolization is to be effected by setting up boundaries that divide social actors
into members and non-members, and then pursuing strategies to maximise the advantage of
the former. A key feature of such groups is that their constitution is in some sense arbitrary.
That is to say, there is no underlying structural logic which makes the emergence of a
particular status group intelligible (Barnes, 1995: 143). Rather, argues Barnes, an
'innumerable' range of groups might have emerged, each one of which could have generated
a profit if it had successfully enforced a monopoly. It is only once certain groups actually
start coalescing that structured interests emerge for actors to pursue, rather than such groups
forming around pre-structured interests31 (Barnes, 1995: 143).
On this characterisation, we can see that a 'status group' is envisioned as a self-referential,
self-validating phenomenon. The interests associated with such a group are not based in
some 'objective' or 'external' feature of the structural position of their members. Rather,
these interests are generated by the self-referring beliefs of actors that they constitute a group
with certain interests. It is only through acting on this belief that such interests genuinely
emerge, through the processes of monopolization and exclusion which are subsequently
pursued.
Although Barnes offers various criticisms of 'class' analysis, it is arguable that his key
reason for rejecting it is that it does not conform with the social institutional model. Class
theories postulate that because individuals share a common economic situation, they have a
disposition to organise and act together in order to pursue the interests based in this situation.
Such action will be an attempt to further the objectively given interests of the group (Barnes,
1995: 173). However, such analysis is contrary to Barnes' argument that social institutions
31 Of course, this does not mean that no conditions must be met for a status group to form as a
collective actor. Status groups are typically based on an existing interaction network that is somewhat
distinct from that of other groups, as such distinction helps to generate a sense of boundaries between
group members and others. There must also be mechanisms for reinforcing group membership and
maintaining this sense of distinction.
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are self-referential and self-validating. If there are real, knowable interests given in social
structure, then these interests exist despite actors' understandings: it could be the case that
actors believe themselves to have one interest when, in fact, they have another. Actors'
beliefs would not be self-validating, but instead would be potentially sub-optimal in relation
to their possibilities.
For Barnes, then, class analysis misconceives the nature of interests. There can be no
structural statements of the interests that actors have despite their knowledge. Interests can
only emerge when social interaction leads to organisation, and such interests will be 'locally
defined' by the sanction of a 'specific interacting collective' (Barnes, 1995: 182). Certainly,
groups may organise around economic issues, but they do so through self-referring
constructions of interests, not in relation to objective social positions. Interests are the
product of collective belief, and nothing else.
Barnes' arguments are not without their problems. We can start off by considering that
although status group analysis focuses on the monopolisation of resources in their
distribution, these resources also have to be produced. Issues around the production of
resources cannot be treated as independent from those of distribution, as the two are
mutually implicated. This can be illustrated by two examples. The first relates to the
distribution of prestige in an imagined scientific community. This community sets up an
award process whereby those scientists who are particularly outstanding in their research are
bestowed titles and treated with great respect by members of the community. The
mechanism operates successfully at first, distributing the group's prestige to those generally
accepted as the most insightful. However, at some point, it is co-opted by a sub-group of the
community, whom we can consider a Barnesian 'status group'. This sub-group finds a way
to control the committee which bestows the awards, so that members of the sub-group
receive titles even when their work is below the standards of other scientists. In other words,
this status group has found a way to monopolise the 'prestige' resources of the community.
When analysing such a development, it is crucial not to focus only on the activities of the
status group and the immediate distributional effects. The attempt to monopolise the
prestige resources of the community will have a downstream effect upon the production and
distribution of those resources themselves. Once it becomes generally recognised that titles
are no longer being handed out on the basis of research excellence, title holders will no
longer be treated with honour by community members, as the title no longer represents the
general approbation of the community. The 'resource' of prestige stops being produced by
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the community, and what is left to be distributed by the awards process is nothing more than
the self-valuation of members of the sub-group.
The point of this example is that the 'interests' of a status group are not self-validating.
These interests rely upon the monopolisation of resources produced elsewhere, and the
attempt to realise such interests may well have an effect upon the production and distribution
of such resources. Another way of putting this is that status-group members may be wrong
in their perception of their interests. They may believe that the monopolisation of resources
is in their interests, but the attempt to do so leads to the non-production of the resources that
were valued in the first place. As a result, the conception of interests held by a status group
is not self-validating; the interests of the status group are bound up with wider processes of
the production and distribution of resources.
These questions of production and distribution are particularly salient when we consider
economic resources. Barnes certainly acknowledges that these resources have to be
produced through institutional structures and practices, those within capitalism including
private property and alienable labour as Marx emphasised (Barnes, 1995: 190-2). However,
he views the character of the institutions making up capitalism as a 'gigantic self-fulfilling
prophecy' which exist only because actors treat them as if they exist in order to calculatedly
achieve their goals (Barnes, 1995: 191). This point is also emphasised by Barnes in his
article 'Social Life as Bootstrapped Induction'. He suggests that if capitalism is believed to
be stable by actors, then this helps to 'constitute that stability'. Likewise, if actors would
only start to think a socialist society into existence, then such a society could emerge. As
Barnes states: 'If everyone would treat society as a different pattern, then it would be a
different pattern' (Barnes, 1983: 536).
It is undoubtedly true that if actors started to believe and act in different ways, then the
character of society would change. However, what cannot be guaranteed, in either a
capitalist or socialist mode of production, is that the resources desired by actors will actually
be produced. To believe that capitalism will meet the needs of actors is not the same as
capitalism being a structure which can in fact meet such demands, and the same goes for
socialism. It certainly could have been the case, as Marx argued, that although actors
believed that the capitalist mode of production would provide resources for all, its way of
organising production was chronically unstable, leading to crises of various kinds. One
could agree with Barnes that Marx's predictions about capitalism have not come true,
without then agreeing that social institutions have whatever character actors believe them to
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have. Marx is correct to suggest that practical, resource generating activity may have
consequences for actors and their interests which go beyond current understandings.
This is relevant to the analysis of status groups. It once again suggests that the interests of
a group are not self-validating, but have roots in wider social and economic structures.
Barnes himself suggests a case where the standard status-group goal of monopolising
resources is not in the interests of actors. He argues that, within capitalism, the bourgeoisie
give up some of the surplus that accrues to them through the production process, in order to
avoid crises of over-production (Barnes, 1995: 190-1). In other words, the bourgeoisie, as a
status group, would be mistaken if it defined its self-interest as monopolising as many
resources as possible. This is despite the fact that such a conception of interest should, in
Barnes' terms, be self-validating. This policy would be mistaken because it would
undermine the structures of capitalism by producing crises of under-consumption (over¬
production), thereby jeopardising profit-making activities in general. The point here is that
the structural features of capitalism give the bourgeoisie an interest in certain behaviours
which is not self-defined, but is a result of the wider logic of the system.
In this sense, a sociological analysis of the bourgeoisie as a 'class' is more defensible than
one that treats them as a 'status group', because the former emphasises that their interests are
not self-defined and self-validating. Of course, to locate the interest of a group in a structure
is not to claim that such a group will necessarily act in their best interest, as this interest may
not be properly grasped by the members involved. It is, however, to stress the Lukacsian
point that if they do not act in their best interests, they will have to live with the suboptimal
outcomes that result. Furthermore, the problems that result from suboptimal understanding
provide a stimulus or tension for groups that motivates a reconception that removes such
problems. It is in this sense that having a structural social interest can be said to stimulate
action oriented to that interest.
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter has considered the work of Barnes and Bloor as exemplary of a social
constructionist approach to science and society. Although their attempt to understand natural
scientific investigation as a fully social activity is a step in the right direction, I have
suggested that it does not avoid the problems produced by the division between science and
society. Those who make this division argue that the variable success of scientific theories
can be assessed, and that successful theories are non-social in character. It is then argued
that other social practices are not variable in their success, but are adequate on their own
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terms. Barnes and Bloor do not transcend this division, but accept the notion of social
activity generated by it and apply it to both science and society. This results in two
erroneous claims. Firstly, they argue that all institutionalised understandings, whether
scientific or otherwise, are self-referential and self-validating. I have suggested that this
makes the development of belief unintelligible, and that institutions are variably successful
in their relations with the material world. Secondly, they claim that the interests of actors in
supporting or challenging an institution are not affected by the success of this institution. I
have criticised this, suggesting that actors only have an interest in supporting an institution if
it is successful in producing the resources that they are oriented towards.
The weakness of social constructionist analyses of science is not that they illegitimately
extend sociological analysis into a realm which is non-social in its constitution. Rather, it is
that their conception of the social is an inadequate one, and is as problematic in analysing
other social activities as it is in analysing natural science. Only by reconstructing our
understanding of sociality to incorporate an analysis of the variable success of institutions






In the previous chapter, I argued that the social constructionist analysis of science runs
into analytical difficulties because it does not transcend the division of natural science and
society. There is no doubt that, from the 1970s onwards, constructionist approaches have
been central to the sociological analysis of science. However, since the 1980s, social
constructionism has been progressively challenged by analyses that theorise science as a
practical activity. The relevance of this development is nicely captured by Pickering in his
editor's introduction to Science as Practice and Culture (1992). Pickering suggests that
constructionist analyses tended to focus on scientific knowledge, analysing it from an
epistemologically relativist perspective. This was done to make room for a sociological
account in which social forces were held to determine the direction in which knowledge
developed. In contrast, when science is considered not as knowledge but as a continuing
flow of practical activity, it seems much less plausible to separate the 'social' factors and
identify them as the only determinants of what occurs. Instead of being 'socially'
constituted, natural scientific practice appears to be a heterogeneous activity constructed of a
range of elements (Pickering, 1992: 9). As Pickering puts it in his summary of Ian
Hacking's approach:
Scientific culture is made up of all sorts of bits and pieces - material, social,
conceptual - that stand in no unitary relation to one another. (Pickering, 1992: 8)
In other words, the direction in which science develops is not determined solely by 'social'
factors, but a range of other elements, including the conjunctions of cultural items which
allow new lines of inquiry to develop, the character of existing instrumentation, and so on.
Furthermore, as a practical activity, science is necessarily transformative. The inputs that go
into science (social, cultural, material etc.) are altered in the process of activity. Thus the
'social' does not operate externally upon science, but is a contributing element which is
reconstructed in the process of investigation.
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It is arguable that the large-scale move towards analysing practice was brought about by
an increasing interest in studies of technology, which led to the broadening of the sociology
of scientific knowledge into science and technology studies. Writers such as Wiebe Bijker,
John Law, Donald MacKenzie, Judy Wajcman, Andrew Pickering, Michel Callon and Bruno
Latour were instrumental in these developments, publishing many articles of their own, but
also editing collections of work analysing scientific and technological practice (for an early
collection, see MacKenzie and Wajcman, 1985).
Interesting and important as these studies of technology are, in this chapter I want to focus
on the consequences of the shift to practice for the analysis of science. To do so, I shall
examine actor-network theory, which rejects the idea that scientific activity is socially
determined, in favour of seeing it as part of wider processes of world-making in which both
the 'social' and the 'natural' are transformed. Actor-network theory thus attempts to avoid
dichotomising the social and the natural, instead seeing them as elements that are altered by
processes that order and reorder the world. This approach is also applied beyond the
analysis of science to theorise other relations in society.
In this chapter, I will focus on the work of Latour, a founding member of the actor-
network school. I shall be arguing that Latour is an insightful critic of social
constructionism, and correctly rejects the separation of scientific knowledge and social
interests that characterises both constructionism and realism. However, I shall also claim
that he fails to offer a coherent alternative to these positions, and that the problems with
Latour's account of natural science are transferred across into his philosophy of social
science, leading him to unnecessarily limit the role that social science can play in social life.
5.2 Natural science in action
Latour's first notable contribution to the science studies field was Laboratory Life: The
Social Construction of Scientific Facts (1979), co-written with Steve Woolgar. Woolgar
became a prominent exponent of the reflexivist move within science studies, which operated
by applying the constructionist principles of the new sociology of scientific knowledge to
sociological accounts of science themselves. Latour travelled in quite a different direction,
and worked with Michel Callon to develop the actor-network approach, which has been
highly influential within the field of science studies. Latour's important writings include The
Pasteurization of France (1988a [1984]), which combines an extended case study of
Pasteurian science and society with a philosophical treatise on the nature of being, and
Science In Action (1987) and Pandora's Hope (1999a), which contain Latour's most detailed
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accounts of how scientific activity should be analysed. These works are supplemented by a
range of interesting and challenging articles about the problems of existing social science,
particularly in relation to technological and natural scientific analysis. I shall start by
discussing Latour's general approach to social activity, then look more specifically at how
this applies to studies of science. Most of the key aspects of the actor-network mode of
analysis are outlined in Callon and Latour's article 'Unscrewing the big Leviathan: how
actors macro-structure reality and how sociologists help them to do so' (1981), and it is to
this that we shall now turn.
Probably the most fundamental tenet of actor-network theory is that society is constituted
by actors struggling to define one another. For Callon and Latour, the structure of society at
any given time should be understood as the current state in the ongoing struggle over
definition on the part of actors. Society is not a set of relations with predefined
characteristics, but an ongoing definitional contest. In actor-network theory, a definition is
the way in which an actor uses 'negotiations, intrigues, calculations, acts of persuasion and
violence' to become a spokesperson for another actor (Callon and Latour, 1981: 279). If a
definition is successfully accomplished, the defining actor has the 'authority to speak or act
on behalf of another' (Callon and Latour, 1981: 279). In other words, they can state what
characteristics the defined actor has. They can also call on that actor's capacity in their
activity; the actor has been enrolled for their purposes. As Callon and Latour put it:
Whenever an actor speaks of 'us', s/he is translating other actors into a single will,
of which s/he becomes spirit and spokesman. S/he begins to act for several, no
longer for one alone. S/he becomes stronger. S/he grows. (Callon and Latour,
1981:279)
To the extent that definitions of reality are seen as the 'constructs' of actors, actor-network
theory has similarities with constructionist positions such as meaning fmitism. Nevertheless,
there is a relevant difference between the two approaches. Whereas finitists see definitions
as self-referential and self-validating, Latour argues that definitions may fail, in which case
the defined actors do not behave as expected (Latour, 1988a, 195-8; see also Callon, 1986).
Actor-network theory could thus be said to contain a genuine pragmatic element in which
actors' attempts to construct the world may fail to 'work' in practice, leaving them lacking in
capacity.
Callon and Latour argue that at an early stage of the definition process few actors have
had their characteristics defined, and actors have a basic equality of capacity. However, as
time goes on, some actors successfully manage to define the nature of others resulting in
differentiation based on asymmetries of capacity. Certain actors have defined the nature of
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others for their own purposes; others have been defined. Any particular state is never the
final one, however, and competition over definition continues. Offering a biological
metaphor, Callon and Latour suggest that we
imagine a body where differentiation is never fully irreversible, where each cell
attempts to compel the others to become irreversibly specialized, and where many
organs are permanently claiming to be the head of the programme. (Callon and
Latour, 1981: 285)
At a point when an actor has successfully defined the characteristics of many others, this
actor gains in capacity and influence not because s/he has changed in character, but because
of the other capacities that s/he has enrolled and which are working for his/her ends. The
power of the actor is not present within the individual but in the joint capacity of those that
s/he has successfully defined (Latour, 1986).
The idea that society should be understood as a series of competing definitions on the part
of actors is not the only important move made by Callon and Latour. They also argue that
one cannot view society simply as a set of definitions of humans achieved by other humans.
To do so would be to ignore the important capacity that is generated by actors when they
define non-human, material entities, and associate themselves with the power of these
entities. Without non-human entities, human attempts to define each other would be easily
overturned because of the limited capacities that can be drawn upon to make them stick. In
order to make networks durable, more solid components and resources must be drawn upon.
Humans manage to create relatively stable networks in which their definitions of others
persist, and this is because they also define non-human, material resources which are fairly
durable in character. In doing so, they replace 'unsettled alliances' with 'walls and written
contracts', and social distinctions are physically marked by 'uniforms and tattoos', in a
process which solidifies definitions, and limits their sudden reversibility (Callon and Latour,
1981: 284). Actors thus define networks of human and non-human resources which expand
their capacity.
According to Latour and Callon, when society is analysed in this manner, distinguishing
between humans and non-humans is an irrelevance. As such, the term 'actant' is coined as a
neutral way of referring to what is defined, whether human or non-human. This is a strongly
counter-intuitive notion, but needs to be considered in the context of the wider actor-network
approach. What Callon and Latour are claiming is that when one takes as a starting point the
actor trying to gain capacity through his/her definitions of others, it does not matter whether
these others are human or non-human. The only important factor is whether or not the
definition is successful or unsuccessful, and whether it is durable or easily subject to
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renegotiation in the future (Callon and Latour, 1981: 286). In this sense, it doesn't matter
whether an actor is associating with human beings, material elements or anything else.
Associations within human societies will typically be 'heterogeneous' in the kind of entities
that constitute them, and it is not the specific character of the constituents that is important
but their strength and durability. For example, in Callon's study of scallop researchers, the
important question is whether both scallops and fishermen can be enrolled into the project in
a way that produces the desired outcome for the researchers (Callon, 1986). When we ask
whether the researchers have successfully enrolled these different actants we are asking
whether the actants will act in line with the desires of the defining researchers.
With these basic principles in mind we can now turn to examine the characteristics of
science from an actor-network perspective. Latour challenges the science/society division,
arguing that we must not treat 'science' as a special kind of activity that is qualitatively
different from the everyday practices of agents within societies. Rather his claim is that
scientific activity is constituted by exactly the same processes of definition involved in other
forms of conduct. To suggest otherwise, argues Latour, would be to grant science some
special, supplementary, definitional force produced by its supposed connection with
transcendental reason or nature (see particularly part 2, section 4 of Latour, 1988a). Latour
dismisses these kind of arguments as nothing more than magic thinking. Science is not
successful because of its mystical, unearthly properties; it gains its success by the standard
processes through which capacity is always generated, the association of a range of human
and non-human allies.
Although, for Latour, there is nothing that qualitatively distinguishes science from other
practices, science is of interest because of its impressive quantitative success at amassing
resources. In particular, suggests Latour, science is at the forefront of the 'proof race', or the
competition to define actants in society and thus build up resourceful networks (Latour,
1987: 172-3). His goal, then, is to account for this quantitative success without moving
outside the basic actor-network presuppositions regarding the nature of all social activity. So
how is this success achieved?
Most generally, the advantages gained by science can be attributed to its ability to change
the scale of a dispute over definition, so that one side ends up with considerably more actants
enrolled, and thus backing it up, than the other. One way that this can occur is through
processes of 'collection' which involve 'the mobilisation of anything that can be made to
move and shipped back home' (Latour, 1987: 225). Once these elements are mobilised, they
can be successfully worked upon by scientists in order to enrol them in their networks. As
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an example, Latour suggests that the science of zoology became possible through the
standardised collection of samples from around the world that did not disintegrate before
they reached the zoologists who wanted to analyse them (Latour, 1987: 225). This, of
course, was contingent upon existing networks of travellers with the ability and motivation
to traverse the world and collect samples. However, once resources were amassed in one
place, the basis was laid for a definitional advantage. Whereas the 'ethnozoologies' of other
cultures were limited to those species encountered in their own (more or less) local activities,
zoology drew upon resources from many places around the globe. As Latour puts it:
The zoologists in their Natural History Museums, without travelling more than a
few hundred metres and opening more than a few dozen drawers, travel through all
the continents, climates and periods. (Latour, 1987: 225)
As a result of this mass of materials, zoologists could exercise an advantage in their
definitional work, having many elements to compare and contrast all within their reach. This
in turn made their definitions of species appear 'general' in contrast to the 'local'
ethnozoologists of other cultures. There was no mystery to the start of this science, but
merely a change in the scale of activity1 (Latour, 1987: 225).
Another way in which scientists produce a 'change of scale' is through work in the
laboratory. Laboratories are set up so that they can easily and cheaply conduct experiments
and tests on various entities. For Latour, such tests are attempts to define the properties of
the actants involved, which may be more or less successful. In everyday life, such failures
are obvious and public (Latour, 1983: 165). What is special about a laboratory is that it
permits the multiplication of attempts at definition so that the possibilities of a successful
definition are increased along with knowledge of what modes of definition fail and why
(Latour, 1983: 164). Once again, this does not demonstrate something special about the
cognitive structures or methodologies of scientists. It is merely an increase in the quantity of
definitional activity that can be conducted compared to that of laypersons.
By either relocating resources to a centre, or increasing the number of definitions
performed, scientists contribute to the quantitative success of science. However, in both of
these cases the extra resources or tests that are gained are not enough in themselves. After
all, as Latour points out, a sheer mass of entities or results may overwhelm a few actors
trying to manipulate them (Latour, 1987: 233). What is required is some kind of
standardised way of dealing with these which makes them less overwhelming, and allows the
1 Here, as elsewhere (see for example Latour, 1988a), Latour is disputing the idea put forward by
epistemologists such as Bachelard that the shift from common sense to science involves a qualitative
shift in understanding, that is, an 'epistemological break'.
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scientist to 'dominate' them instead of the being dominated by them (Latour, 1987: 226).
Latour emphasises that we should think of this as a 'logistical' problem. There is no
question of some special 'logical' operation being performed; what is required is the
practical manipulation of elements. For Latour, this is where the importance of inscriptions
comes in.
In the first place, inscriptions (such as instrument outputs, graphs and tables) allow the
summary and classification of many disparate elements. A scientist cannot look directly at
hundreds of thousands of samples, or just 'see' the economy by looking out of the window.
These can only be 'made visible' by a large scale effort of classification and standardization
followed by synopses and summaries (Latour, 1987; 1990). The successful definitions of
zoology rely upon such methods resulting in inscriptions that simplify the thousands of
samples and make it possible for human actors to grasp and employ them in argument.
Likewise, performing a whole host of experiments is of no use if the results of these are
not 'archived, saved, recorded and made easily readable again' (Latour, 1990: 164). When
trials are recorded, and one can summarise these inscriptions, the resulting tables and graphs
can be used to increase the 'certainty' of one's own definitions and decrease the likelihood of
dissent from others. By gathering samples or experimental results scientists have attempted
to make themselves strong, but this multiplication of resources must be followed by a
recompression so that these can be comprehended and employed by humans engaged in
definitional battles. This is where the power of inscriptions comes in. The 'average person
on the street' cannot compete with a list ofmany test results presented by a scientist.
More generally, inscriptions have properties that make them especially suitable for
changing the available scale of definitional activity. Because of their portability, stability of
character, and ease of combination and comparison, inscriptions can multiply the number of
elements that are processed and defined (Latour, 1990). They aid definitional activity by
recording outcomes, summarising large numbers of cases, and making new definitions
possible by facilitating comparisons and juxtapositions. Inscriptions thus simplify the
process of defining actors, and make it logistically manageable. This is the fundamental
contribution that they make to the quantitative success of science.
Latour's analysis of the character of science is a rich one, and I have omitted mention of
some interesting and important concepts such as that of the black-box or machine2 (see
Latour, 1987). However, these are based on the same general principles as Latour's other
2 A 'black box' is a definition that has become stabilised and can be taken as unproblematic by actors
(Latour, 1987: 2-3, 80-3). Such definitions then require a large commitment of energy on the point of
challengers to be 'reopened'.
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concepts. They contribute to a mode of analysis which examines how definitions are more
or less successful, stronger or weaker, and eschew notions such as representational adequacy
in place of examining how actors enrol actants for their own purposes.
5.3 Beyond constructionism and realism?
It is now time to consider the contrast between Latour's approach and other accounts of
natural scientific knowledge. Latour offers his philosophy with the explicit intention of
transcending social constructionist and realist theories, neither of which, he claims, can
properly account for the development of natural scientific activity and the transformations
this effects on human beings and the natural world. Turning first to social constructionism,
Latour agrees with the basic constructionist tenet that the pursuit of scientific knowledge is
an interested activity. However, he disagrees with the conception of interests mobilised by
constructionists. For constructionists, social interests stand outside of debates, determining
which statements are taken to be credible and which are not, and the content of the dispute is
an epiphenomenal expression of clashes whose source is elsewhere (Latour, 1999b: 118-9).
For Latour, on the other hand, scientific investigation plays an active role in resolving
debates and transforms interests themselves. In the case of scientific disputes, actors define
non-human actants in order to increase the strength of their claims. As Latour puts is:
'Science is not politics. It is politics by other means' (Latour, 1988a: 229). In other words,
for a group to win a scientific dispute they must be able to put into play forces that are not
available in 'purely political' situations, that is, situations involving only relations between
human beings. Instead, groups build up both human and non-human allies in order to pursue
the outcome that they desire. Therefore, contrary to the social constructionist position, the
content of the debate is not epiphenomenal but is central to determining who wins an
interested struggle. To take the example of the spontaneous generation debate between
Pasteur and Pouchet, although each had 'interests' in defending a certain position, these
interests could not be realised without backing from non-human actants (Latour, 1987: 84).
Pasteur attempted to define micro-organisms as something that did not appear
spontaneously, but were an external introduction into a sterile environment; Pouchet tried to
enlist micro-organisms onto his side by designing an experiment to show that they could
appear in a sterile environment, even when no germs were introduced. Each actor attempted
to win the debate by recruiting non-human allies.
Latour also argues that interests themselves may be transformed in the course of scientific
practice. Such an idea is antithetical to social constructionism, as the constructionist claim
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that knowledge is self-validating means that interests are never undermined or altered by
outcomes of scientific experiment or theorizing. As we saw in Chapter 4, Barnes argues that
those with an interest in defending a theory can do so consistently no matter what results
emerge (Barnes, 1982). Therefore, no result ever has an impact upon the interests of those
defending a claim. Latour does not accept such an analysis. Rather, he argues that scientific
activity may transform the interests of actors (Latour, 1999a: 122-7). As Latour states:
The congenital weakness of the sociology of science is its propensity to look for
obvious stated political motives and interests in one of the only places, the
laboratories, where sources of fresh politics as yet unrecognized as such are
emerging. (Latour, 1983: 157. Author's emphasis)
That is to say, the definition of new actants in the laboratory brings about shifts in interests
and politics that would not occur otherwise. An intriguing example can be drawn from
Latour's The Pasteurization of France. He argues that Pasteur's successful definition of
microbes led to a transformation in the interests of social actors. Reformers called upon the
theory of the microbe to argue that it was in the interests of the rich to be concerned with the
poor because, to quote Gibier, 'The wretchedness of the poor distills a bitter and virulent bile
that reaches as far as the rich man's goblet and contaminates the veins of his children' (cited
in Latour, 1988a: 37). In other words, because the health of the poor may effect that of the
rich, it was in the interests of the latter to be concerned with the health of the former.
Scientific investigation brought about a shift in the interests involved. This can be
contrasted with Barnes' treatment of interests in the debate between hereditarians and
environmentalists (see Chapter 4). For Barnes, no matter what evidence arose in this debate,
the interests of the actors involved were not altered, as their positions could always be
defended as adequate on their own terms. In contrast, Latour's analysis of the Pasteur case
suggests that the outcome of scientific investigation changed the interests of actors, making
new courses of action more rewarding for them. Before Pasteurian science, it may have been
in the interests of the rich to ignore the living conditions of the poor; after Pasteurian science
it was not.
A further consequence of Latour's emphasis on the enrolment of non-human actants is
that the symmetry principle defended by social constructionists such as Barnes and Bloor
must be rejected. For the Strong Programmers, every theory that can be institutionalised is
equally valid (Barnes, 1976), so belief in the validity or otherwise of a scientific theory must
be explained by the social interests that support or challenge it, having no justification
outside of this. Such an explanation is 'symmetrical' in that it explains perceptions of
validity and lack of validity using the same types of social cause (Bloor, 1991). In contrast,
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Latour argues that scientists establish the validity of a theory by mobilising various human
and non-human resources, and they attempt to make resilient claims that cannot be dislodged
without a greater accumulation of resources on the part of their disputants. Although at the
start of a dispute conflicting beliefs may be equally valid (resourceful), as the debate
continues, one side will build up more resources than the other, establishing their account as
valid (Latour, 1987: 96-100). An explanation of why one belief ends up being taken as more
valid than another cannot call symmetrically on social factors because beliefs become more
or less plausible by their connection with networks of human and non-human resources that
back them up.
This claim has a methodological correlate in Latour's account of how to go about studying
science. Instead of starting from the assumption that beliefs are always equally valid and
analysing them symmetrically, one must follow the practical activity through which beliefs
are made more or less valid. When a dispute is open and neither side can definitively
establish their claims, then the sociologist can note the equal validity of claims at this point.
However, when one side has closed the debate by amassing enough resources to make their
account the only plausible one, it does not make sense for analysts to treat these beliefs as
equally valid. To assert equal validity at this point would be to come up against a powerful
scientific account with nothing but a few epistemological arguments to hand, a battle which
Latour suggests sociologists are always likely to lose (Latour, 1987: 94-100).
Of course, those who subscribe to a social constructionist position have not simply
capitulated in the face of Latour's attack. Probably the key constructionist response has been
to criticise Latour's suggestion that non-human actants have a role in explaining why
scientific debates are resolved in one way rather than another. Constructionists argue that
every time Latour tries to specify how a non-human actant contributes to the resolution of
the debate, this account can be demonstrated to be a social construction (Schaffer, 1991;
Collins and Yearley, 1992a). In other words, an account of the characteristics of a non-
human actant is only one perspective, defended by a specific social group; another group
with different social interests could present an equally defensible account of the actant which
contradicts the first. By not recognising this, suggests Schaffer, Latour tacitly sides with the
winners of the debate who were able to establish their (challengeable) theory as
representative of reality. So, for example, when Latour suggests that microbes
enthusiastically behaved as Pasteur wanted, he fails to acknowledge that there was a lengthy
controversy between Pasteur and Koch over the characteristics of microbes (Schaffer, 1991:
187). Schaffer, along with Collins and Yearley, argues that the only viable approach to
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scientific disagreement is to symmetrically analyse the social motivations behind different
accounts of actants, and show how the ultimate acceptance of one account over another is a
social process (Schaffer, 1991: 189-90; Collins and Yearley, 1992a). Contrary to Latour,
actants cannot be said to play an independent role in the development of knowledge.
These responses are essentially a restatement of the social constructionist position. As
such, it is not clear that they successfully deal with Latour's most damaging criticisms of
constructionism. Firstly, they do not respond to his argument that the notion of a purely
'social' interest or influence is a dubious one. As I argued in Chapter 4, it is hard to see what
the substance of a social interest can be unless it is related to the successful production of
resources. Latour's argument that humans pursue their interests by defining non-human
actors to increase their resourcefulness makes a similar point, although I shall argue later that
his account of this is not unproblematic. The constructionist claim that the content of
scientific theories can be explained using social factors does not go any way to explaining
the character or force that these factors have independent of successful truck with the natural
environment.
Furthermore, the relevance of non-human actants seems to be particularly strong in
relation to the transformative aspects of scientific activity. As we have seen, Latour argues
that the successful definition of new actants can change the interests of social actors. The
idea that shifts in interests might be connected to new capacities in dealing with nature at
least provides a basis for explaining how interests change. It is not clear that social
constructionists can offer a coherent account of why or how interests change, due to their
separation of interests from issues of resourceful interaction with the world (see Chapter 4
for further discussion). Given these points, it is not clear that constructionism provides a
sound basis for sociological analysis.
Having considered Latour's criticisms of constructionism, it is now time to turn to his
critical appraisal of a realist analysis of science3. Latour's objections to realism centre on
two points. Firstly, he claims that realists wish to exclude the influence of socially interested
behaviour upon scientific knowledge. They argue that genuine science bears the impress of
nature alone, and human's interested behaviour can only be a disruption to this. Realists
wish science to grasp the 'objective object' and produce knowledge that has 'no human
origin, no trace of humanity' (Latour, 1999a: 13). They believe that genuine science can tell




us once and for all whether an object does or does not exist, producing knowledge that,
because of its grounding in nature, is beyond revision (Latour, 1999a: 155-7).
Secondly, and connectedly, Latour argues that realists have a static and unhistorical
conception of nature. One needs to be careful to avoid misinterpretation here. As Latour
points out, realism can cope with the evolution of nature in terms of the development of
living species and other processes that involve change over time (Latour, 1999a: 146). He
suggests, nevertheless, that realism cannot deal with the historicity of nature in relation to
human interactions with it. Realists consider that the properties of nature are not
transformed by human influence. If, for example, there is a shift in scientific argument from
viewing spontaneous generation as feasible, to regarding it as impossible, realists do not
suggest that nature itself has changed (Latour, 1999a: 155). Rather they suggest that it was
true all along that spontaneous generation did not exist, and it is just representations of
nature that have changed. Realists thus split epistemology and ontology, arguing that human
representations of nature may change (have a history) but nature does not (Latour, 1999a:
146).
As we have seen in this thesis, there are two main strands of realism, epistemological and
ontological, which offer different conceptions of natural scientific activity. A moment's
pause is necessary to establish whether Latour's arguments apply to ontological realists,
epistemological realists, or both, as he does not make this distinction himself. In relation to
Latour's claim that realism sees science as bearing the impress of nature alone, this definitely
applies to epistemological realism. Although epistemological realists would argue that
understandings are theoretically mediated, they nevertheless wish to infer from the success
of a theory to a claim that it provides a description of the world that is (at least partially) true.
Genuine science is thus marked by its correspondence to reality. Likewise, mature science
can legislate with a great degree of certainty whether an object truly exists or not.
It is not quite so clear that these points apply to ontological realism. Ontological realists
do not make an inference from the success of theories to their truth, and argue that theorising
always contains a social input as weii as that from the natural world. They also emphasise
the potential revisability of knowledge in the face of later investigation, and do not make a
final judgement about the reality of objects or structures. Although this may appear to
exempt ontological realism from Latour's criticism, I would argue that this exemption cannot
be complete. O-realists argue that knowledge refers to ontological structures, and see the
input of nature as the causal influence of these structures. It would seem, then, that the ideal
state pictured by ontological realists is that in which scientific knowledge successfully
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corresponds to the structures in the natural world, and thus bears the impress of nature alone.
Although the social is admitted to be a factor, it is hard to see how this can operate as
anything but a blockage to such knowledge. Neither is the question of the finality or
otherwise of knowledge clear-cut in ontological realism. Although O-realists admit that
accounts may always be revised in the future, I argued in Chapter 1 that their postulation of a
gap between the real and the actual is used to justify the preservation of accounts in the face
of evidence that contradicts them. Thus, reconstruction is admitted as a possibility, but O-
realism contains a get-out clause that can be used to protect accounts of structures
indefinitely, and give them an air of finality.
Turning to Latour's criticism of static conceptions of nature, this straightforwardly applies
to both epistemological and ontological realism. Both philosophies argue that
representations of nature have a history, but that nature does not, in Latour's terms. Neither
would accept that if a phenomenon was held by scientists to exist for some period of time, it
should therefore be granted ontological status even if it is now held to be non-existent. They
would thus accept the separation of epistemology and ontology4.
Having clarified the nature of Latour's criticisms, it is now time to consider his positive
alternative more fully. The essence of Latour's position is that both human beings and
nature are altered in the process of scientific activity. In relation to the social realm, actors
are transformed, as are interests, by the definition of non-human actants in science. As to the
natural world, the very ontological status of objects is altered in the course of scientific
investigation. What Latour means by this is best grasped by looking at his discussion of
Pasteur and the lactic acid ferment (Latour, 1999a, Chapters 4 and 5).
Pasteur's contribution to understandings of fermentation was to argue that a 'specific
micro-organism could explain fermentation', something he attempted to demonstrate in
relation to lactic fermentation (Latour, 1999a: 116). Prior to Pasteur's important paper on
the subject, it was not known what caused lactic acid fermentation, although it was believed
to be a purely chemical process. Pasteur argued that a yeast played the principle role, and
thus that the process was not just chemical but had a biological input. His laboratory work
was dedicated to defining the yeast and its properties. Pasteur was then able to show how
swiftly lactic fermentation could be produced using yeast, and demonstrate why previous
methods were slow and clumsy by comparison (Latour, 1999a: 121).
4 Bhaskar might well criticise epistemological realism for failing to separate ontology and
epistemology properly, and for accepting a Humean account of laws. However, this is an issue that
does not need to be dealt with here.
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Latour argues that this experimental process and its reception transformed both humans
and nature. The transformation of human beings occurred on the level of individuals and
also in the organisation of knowledge production. In relation to individuals, Pasteur changed
from being secondary in the field, behind important scientists such as Liebig and Berzelius,
to being a central figure who undermined the chemical theory of fermentation (Latour,
1999a: 117). Pasteur's successful definition of a new actant changed his location in the
scientific hierarchy of this field. Looking at broader shifts, the organisation of human
knowledge-producing activities is altered as an outcome of the scientific activity. Pasteur's
work made the specialism of biochemistry possible, meaning that scientists no longer
engaged in only biology or chemistry (Latour, 1999a: 144). A new disciplinary
configuration emerged to deal with the new kind of actant that had been defined.
If these are the transformations that take place among human beings, what are the
transformations of nature that occur? Latour argues that one can trace the existence of the
yeast and its changing 'ontological status' throughout the course of Pasteur's scientific
activity (Latour, 1999a: 116-122). Initially, Pasteur did not describe the yeast as a tangible,
fully-constituted phenomenon, but instead listed a set of low-level sense-data (colours and
shapes) which described aspects of the process of lactic fermentation. At this stage, the yeast
was nothing more than 'a cloud of transient perceptions' (Latour, 1999a: 118). However, as
Pasteur continued his work, the yeast became more clearly defined as a particular bounded
actor. The first step in this direction was to list a set of actions or 'performances' that could
be witnessed in the laboratory, for instance the triggering of fermentation, formation of
crystals, and so on (Latour, 1999a: 119). These performances were then attributed to a
substance, yeast, which was understood to be their origin, and which expressed its nature
through them (Latour, 1999a: 120). Thus, at the end of the process, yeast became a 'full¬
blown independent entity' that had a specific kind of influence upon events, being the cause
of lactic fermentation.
It is fairly clear that this experimental process could be interpreted in different ways. The
most typical approach within the philosophy of science would be to argue that Pasteur's
work produced a change in the 'representation' of a pre-existent nature. However, Latour
rejects such a view, arguing that we should take the shifts brought about by science as
alterations of the ontological characteristics of objects themselves. Thus he writes:
...we should be able to say that not only the microbes-for-humans changed in the
1850s, but also the microbes-for-themselves. Their encounter with Pasteur
changed them as well. (Latour, 1999a: 146)
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This is what Latour means when he says that nature is transformed by scientific activity.
Objects can change from scattered perceptions to solid entities with determinate properties,
moving between different ontological states. As a consequence, Latour suggests that we
should speak of the 'relative existence' or degree of ontological solidity of an entity, rather
than asserting its simple existence or non-existence for all time5 (Latour, 1999a: 156).
One might summarise Latour's views by saying that both scientists and nature have a
history (Latour, 1999a: 150). Science does not simply reveal or discover what already
existed in a stable natural realm, but produces new configurations in both society and nature.
Latour uses the concept of an 'event' to analyse science's transformative capacity, which is
contrasted with a 'zero-sum' model of science (Latour, 1999a: 126). On the zero-sum
model, subscribed to by realists and constructionists, scientific investigation does not
produce any new outcomes. For realists, experiments reveal nature as it always was; for
constructionists, experiments reveal social interests which remain unaltered in the process.
Characterising the zero-sum position, Latour states:
Nothing more happens in the history of science than the discovery of what was
already there, all along, in nature or society. (Latour, 1999a: 126)
By contrast, Latour's understanding of science as 'event' emphasises that the inputs going
into a scientific investigation from nature and society are altered in an unpredictable fashion
by it. Both human and non-human actors come out of the process with different
characteristics, and the process is not one of discovery of what was always there, but the
production of a new configuration. Thus, the history of nature and of society is characterised
by fresh and unpredictable developments in both, through their interaction with one another
in science.
Having laid out Latour's views, it is now time to assess how successful his move beyond
constructionism and realism is. It will be helpful to begin by probing Latour's conception of
historical ontology a little more carefully. Ontology refers to the being or existence of
things-in-themselves, as Latour acknowledges. However, in order to historicize ontology,
Latour assigns it features which seem to belong not to the 'things' in question, but to the
subjects who are attempting to know those things. The clearest example of this can be found
5 On the basis of these arguments, it is worth noting that Latour does not reinstate a (naive) realism, as
suggested by critics such as Collins and Yearley (1992a) and Gingras (1995). These authors argue
that the ascription of influence to non-human actants in actor-network accounts suggests that Latour
and others have a realist understanding of the properties of the natural world and its impact upon our
knowledge. However, Latour does not justify accounts of actant influence by appealing to their
correspondence to reality or success in accounting for ontological structures. Furthermore, his
embrace of the idea that ontology can shift over time is completely out of keeping with realism.
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in Latour's analysis of the changing ontological status of the lactic ferment (yeast). In the
early stages of Pasteur's work, this ferment is characterised only by low-level sense-data
relating to colour, shape of formation, and so on. Following a description that emphasises
only these features, Latour states:
It would be hard for something to have less existence than that! It is not an object
but a cloud of transient perceptions, not yet the predicates of a coherent substance.
(Latour, 1999a: 118)
Latour clearly intends this to be a description that applies to ontology. He writes:
It is possible to go from a nonexistent entity to a generic class by passing through
stages in which the entity is made of floating sense data, taken as a name of action,
and then, finally, turned into a plantlike and organised being with a place within a
well-established taxonomy. The circulation of reference does not take us...from
one type of trace to the next, but from one ontological status to the next. (Latour,
1999a: 122. Author's emphasis)
However, Latour's claims are misplaced. It seems an elementary point to make, but the
notions of 'sense data' and 'transient perceptions' do not apply to ontology at all, but
describe features of the knowing subject. It makes no difference to entities whether they are
analysed in terms of sense-data or have actions predicated of them, as these are aspects of the
subjective apprehension of them. Thus, the move from 'transient perception' to 'organised
being' is not ontological at all, but a shift in human understanding. Such a move cannot be
used to justify a claim that the ontological status of an entity has changed. It does not refer
to a change in 'microbes-for-themselves', as Latour suggests (1999a: 146), but simply
represents a change in 'microbes-for-humans'.
This is not to say that science never has any impact upon the characteristics of that which
it investigates. Probably most notable here are phenomena such as the selective breeding
and genetic modification of plants and animals. However, the reconfiguration of these
entities is the intelligible outcome of human manipulation of natural processes, unlike
Latour's discussion of the changing status of yeast. Human manipulation may result in the
generation of new breeds of animals; it cannot result in the shift in an entity from being a
'cloud of transient perceptions' to a 'coherent substance'. It should also be noted that not all
science alters the basic characteristics of the entities that it studies, whereas Latour's claims
about ontological change apply to all scientific activities.
If Latour is indeed wrong about the history of nature, it is necessary to pinpoint the
problems that this generates for the analysis of science. I would suggest that Latour's
arguments undermine our ability to intelligibly connect past, present and future science. The
key issue here is the alteration of nature within the scientific process. Latour argues that
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scientific activity construed as an 'event' does not amount to a 'discovery' of what was
already there in nature, but the production of new entities and objects. However, if this is the
case, then it must be difficult or impossible to compare the adequacy of past science with
present science because each deals with a different set of entities6. In Latour's terms, this is
not a matter of epistemology and competition between rival understandings, but a break
between the past and the present because of their different ontologies.
A comparison with the critical historicist view put forward in this thesis may help to
emphasise this point. Critical historicism emphasises the historical character of the scientific
process, but sees this as applying to human understandings. To say that understandings are
historical is to emphasise that they are always subject to change in the scientific process, and
it is never possible to infer either the truth of theoretical claims or the character of
ontological structures from theoretical success. Nevertheless, understandings can be
compared, and it is possible to make links between past and present science by examining
how present theories have resolved difficulties in previous understandings by reconstructing
their categories. However, such a comparison could not be made if the present was
populated by new entities, and was lacking the old entities with which past theories were
concerned. Understandings could not be compared because they would apply to different
ontological realms. Latour's claims about changing ontology undermine the possibility of
assessing theoretical adequacy, and making intelligible links between the past and present.
This also suggests problems with the actor-network account of the definitional process.
As I noted above, the actor-network conception of definition has a pragmatic character in
that it emphasises that definitions may fail. However, for Latour, these failures do not have a
systematic character, and no conclusions can be drawn from them. It is simply the nature of
actants that they may change their character and allegiance7 (Latour, 1988a: 195-8). He
states:
None of the actants mobilized to secure an alliance stops acting on its own
behalf...They each carry on fomenting their own plots, forming their own groups,
and serving other masters, wills, and functions. (Latour, 1988a: 197)
6 Bloor is equally critical of Latour's elision of understanding and reality (see for example Bloor
(forthcoming)). In contrast to the arguments here, however, he wishes to separate the two in order to
defend a relativist conception of scientific understanding. On such a conception, the variable
adequacy of theories is not an issue.
7 Latour states: 'None of the actants mobilized to secure an alliance stops acting on its own
behalf...They each carry on fomenting their own plots, forming their own groups, and serving other
masters, wills, and functions' (Latour, 1988a: 197).
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As a result, Latour places no requirement of consistency between different definitions of
actants. This contrasts with the critical historicist approach which insists that failures of
definition (understanding) are systematically explicable. They are not the product of the
perennially rebellious nature of actants, but of a failure to systematise the world properly.
The failure of a definition can then be explained by a better account, not treated as irrelevant
for other accounts.
Taking the critical historicist view does not mean rejecting Latour's claims that science is
a creative and transformative process. Critical historicism accepts that scientific activity
necessitates the creative reconstruction of theories in order to better account for the
phenomena that it is trying to grasp (Holmwood, 1996). Science does not simply or directly
reveal the character of the world, but is an attempt to improve our theoretically mediated
interactions with this world. This process also involves the reconstruction of interests as
theories turn out to be more or less successful for their purposes. However, it is not the
ontology of the world that changes in this process, but human understandings. By
postulating shifts in ontology, Latour undermines an analysis of how humans have creatively
reformulated their understandings to remove earlier problems.
Importantly, the critical historicist view also suggests that current scientific
understandings are problematic, and it will be necessary to reconstruct their positive and
residual categories in order to make further progress (Holmwood, 1996). Future science will
not involve the production of new entities (in Latour's sense) which are different-in-
themselves from the present stock of the world. Rather, if all goes well, it will have
reconstructed the categories of current science and resolved (some of the) problems of
understanding within them. Thus critical historicism does not argue that nature is directly
revealed in an experiment, nor that a presently successful understanding corresponds with
the world, avoiding Latour's charges against realism.
The problems with Latour's- account can be highlighted by his own discussion of the
relation between past and present science. Latour recognizes that scientists often claim that
the entities that they postulate have always existed, rather than seeing them as creations of
the scientific process. In order to account for this, Latour argues that scientists attempt to
spread their scientific networks of definitions not only through space but through time as
well. So, for example, Pasteur worked to reconstruct the past so that both the successes and
failures of those previously using fermentation could be explained by his theory (Latour,
1999a: 169). However, as I have argued above, Latour cannot accept this as a demonstration
of adequacy, because past and present have different ontologies, and are thus not
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epistemologically comparable. Rather, Latour suggests that Pasteur 'produces' another
version of the past, which is to be placed alongside the version adhered to by the past
fermenters themselves. Talking of Pasteur, Latour writes:
He retrofitted the past with his own microbiology: the year 1864 that was built
after 1864 did not have the same components, textures, and associations as the year
1864 produced during 1864. (Latour, 1999a: 170. Author's emphasis)
We thus end up with multiple definitions of any time period in which the events therein are
defined differently by the inhabitants of the time, and those who offer later definitions of
what was going on at the time. The result of this is that not only does the ontological status
of an entity change over time, but it may have more than one status at a particular time.
Latour talks, for example, of the enrolment of 'airborne germs' by Pasteur in 1864 (Latour,
1999a: 172-3). Having enrolled these entities, Pasteur then proceeded to argue that they had
always influenced human affairs, even before his discovery of them. In analysing this,
Latour has to capture the definitions of actors of the time, and Pasteur's redefinitions of the
past, both of which are, for Latour, ontological. In answer to the question 'were there
airborne germs before Pasteur?', Latour thus replies 'After 1864 airborne germs were there
all along' (Latour, 1999a: 173). Before Pasteur's discovery, airborne germs both existed
(according to Pasteur's definition) and did not exist (according to the definitions of the actors
of the time)8.
Instead of accepting that an entity can have more than one ontological status at a time, we
should see the difference between present and past theories as one of competition on the
level of understanding. Latour is correct to argue that the past is reconstructed by the
present, but he refuses to admit that this is simply a difference of accounts in which we can
make an assessment of the greater adequacy of one over the other. Part of this seems to stem
from a laudable desire to avoid attributing present-day science finality, and we can certainly
accept that present day understandings may be revised (Latour, 1999a: 172-3). However,
Latour actually employs ahistorical means in order to establish this. Referring to the debate
between Pasteur and Pouchet over spontaneous generation, he suggests that future science
may decide that Pouchet was right to claim that spontaneous generation exists. This
potential for reversals provides the grounds for not judging our present science to be superior
to past science. However, a revival of theories of spontaneous generation would not be a
8 Latour attempts to make this argument seem plausible by paralleling two questions: 'Where were
microbes before Pasteur?' and 'Where was Pasteur before 1822 (the year of his birth)?' (Latour,
1999a: 173). However, this just serves to heighten the unconvincing nature of Latour's approach, as




vindication of Pouchet's claims. Pouchet's argument was viable in its context because of
specific kinds of evidence that he called on in order to defend spontaneous generation. It
was these kinds of evidence that Pasteur's experimental work undermined by pointing to the
existence of microbes which generated the phenomena attributed to spontaneous generation.
No revival of spontaneous generation could argue for it in the same way that Pouchet did,
and any claims for its existence would be necessarily post-Pasteurian, having been pushed
forward by the success of Pasteurian science. Thus, the possibility that spontaneous
generation will be revived as a theory does not show that we cannot judge whether Pasteur's
or Pouchet's arguments were more adequate. It certainly does not necessitate that we see
science as a process that affects the ontological status of actants, rather than as an alteration
of accounts.
5.4 Disposing with society: the theory of associations
Having examined Latour's account of natural science more closely, it is now time to
consider the more general application of actor-network theory. I will recap and expand upon
its features, then indicate an important weakness in its account of conflict. The main critical
thrust of Latour's approach is directed towards analyses of human activity which attempt to
separate off a distinct 'social' realm which has its own internal logic and relations.
Unsurprisingly, therefore, Latour strongly criticises Durkheim and the Durkheimian tradition
for claiming that the social constitutes a distinct level of reality, the character of which can
only be explained on its own terms (Latour, 1999b; Latour, 1992). A paradigmatic example
would be Durkheim's claim in The Rules of Sociological Method that 'The determining
cause of a social fact should be sought among the social facts preceding it...' (Durkheim,
1938: 110. Author's italics). Latour suggests that such a definition conceives of relations
between human beings as having a pure logic of their own outside of the impact of material
and natural elements. His jibe at this sort of theorising is that it is a form of 'baboon
sociology'. By this, Latour means that such an approach to the study of humans treats them
as if their only resources for interacting with one another were those available to baboons,
that is, simply those provided by their bodies (See Callon and Latour, 1981; Strum and
Latour, 1984). Relations between baboons, and thus the order and hierarchy of a baboon
society, are produced using 'in-built' physical and communicational capacities, and alliances
and links are forged out of these alone (Callon and Latour, 1981: 281-6). Callon and Latour
suggest that it is only this kind of 'society' which could be said to be 'purely social' in its
constitution. Human interactions, by contrast, move beyond these parameters. Humans are
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not limited to the use of their bodies but employ all kinds of materials in their activities and
relations, including tools, uniforms, buildings, written contracts, and so on. This being the
case, Latour argues that human activities cannot be understood using categories referring to
relations purely between human beings. Rather, analysis of human activity must analyse the
links forged between humans and non-human objects. This is not an analysis of 'social'
relations but of 'associations' between humans, other humans, and a 'miscellaneous list of
extra-somatic resources' (Latour, 1986: 277).
At a meta-theoretical level, the most important aspect of Latour's actor-network theory is
its account of how and why networks form. To explain this, Latour calls upon a somewhat
abstract notion that I will call the 'will to define'. For Latour, networks of associations are
formed by actors who wish to define the world on their own terms, to order the world in a
certain way (Latour, 1988a: 166-7). A network of associations is built up by defining human
and non-human actants in a way that they will (at least temporarily) accept. By
accumulating the support of those who have been successfully enlisted, the claims of the
defining actor are strengthened, and they have defined a little more of the world. The
support of associated allies can never be relied upon, however, and it is always possible that
a competing definer will successfully redefine these allies to support their own system of
ordering and equivalence. We should be careful, once again, not to confuse this with a shift
in the 'representation' of society. Rather, a change in ordering principle alters the
ontological constituents of society itself. It is useful to recall here Callon and Latour's
metaphorical account of ordering, in which an initially undifferentiated body comes to have
set channels and specialised functions. An ordering principle makes the body as it is, and a
competing principle remakes it.
One way of summarising this position would be to say that associational analysis replaces
the 'sociology' of human interactions with the 'politics' of human and non-human relations
(Strum and Latour, 1984: 17-9; Latour, 1988a). This politics is the struggle of defining
actors to construct the world in a way that conforms to their dictates, and to create alliances
that order the world as they wish. As Strum and Latour put it:
In our definitions of resources, genes, power, language, capital, and technology, for
instance, are all seen as strategic means of enhancing one's influence over others in
increasingly more durable ways. Politics is not one realm of action separated from
the others. Politics, in our view, is what allows heterogeneous resources to be
woven together into a social link that becomes increasingly harder and harder to
break. (Strum and Latour, 1984: 19)
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These attempts to create durable definitions are frequently struggled over, and there are
political moves to dislodge one set of orderings and replace them with an alternative by
redefining the actors involved. Whoever wins such definitional contests establishes 'how
things are', that is, the characteristics of human and non-human actors.
If actor-network theory is to provide a viable alternative to realism and constructionism, it
must resolve the problems inherent in their accounts of social life. One of the difficulties
that this thesis has identified with these approaches is their arguments about the 'strategic' or
'interested' notion of the social. Conflict between groups is attributed to differing social
interests, but neither constructionism nor realism can coherently explain how these interests
arise. This is because their analysis of 'social' interests does not connect them to successful
relations with the material world that produce the resources to which interests are oriented.
By dissolving the 'social' as a realm in itself, actor-network theory appears to be a
promising alternative to constructionism and realism. However, actor-network theory does
not improve on the explanatory ability of these approaches, but exchanges unlocated 'social'
conflict for unlocated 'political' conflict. Latour argues that there are disputes over the
character of the 'social' as much as the character of the 'natural'. What his approach lacks is
an ability to explain the specifics of these disputes, and why an actor or group is pushing for
one definition of society rather than another. For Latour, this is simply a product of the will
to define. He writes:
...certain forces constantly try to measure rather than be measured and to translate
rather than be translated. They wish to act rather than be acted upon. They wish to
be stronger than the others. (Latour, 1988a: 167)
This view should be distinguished from the claim that ordering systems grow because they
successfully systematise aspects of the material environment. For Latour, that environment
is initially undifferentiated, and there is no way to assess whether an ordering system is more
or less adequate in relation to it.(Latour, 1988a: 158). Ordering produces an ontology rather
than being a reformulation of understandings to better cope with the environment. On this
approach, the conflict between forms of ordering has no explanation other than the fact that
competing wills exist which wish to order the world in different ways.
Latour's discussion of debates around the nature of society illustrate the problems with his
approach (Latour, 1986). For Latour, such debates are actually attempts to redefine the form
of society, to create new associations and configurations. Theories that try to establish the




It is clear, for instance, that if the units are two classes engaged in a constant
struggle whose form is defined and counted in terms of the use of labour value then
society is made to move in one direction: some members will be defined by others
as parasitic exploiters who hold great power. (Latour, 1986: 271)
In other words, debates over society's real character lead to its reconfiguration. The
vehemence of these debates comes from the 'entire range of groups dissatisfied with the
genealogy of their positions', providing the impetus for a definitional struggle (Latour, 1987:
270).
It is important to ask what tools Latour has to explain these struggles. Firstly, we can
enquire why a group might be dissatisfied with its currently defined place in society. A
reasonable hypothesis would be that they feel that their characteristics have been
misunderstood, and that a better representation of their nature and possibilities is required.
However, because Latour eschews epistemology for ontology, he cannot call on a notion of
'misrepresentation'. As a new mode of ordering actually reconstructs the ontological
landscape of society on its own terms, rather than altering its representation, there is no sense
in which modes of ordering can be compared for their adequacy. Rather, Latour can only
call on the existence of an abstract will to (re)define in order to 'explain' the dissatisfaction
of a group.
The inadequacy of this is particularly apparent in relation to Latour's discussion of the
Marxist 'redefinition of society'. In a footnote on this issue, Latour states:
It is never sufficiently emphasised that Marxism is in effect a mode of calculating
all the exchanges practised in a society. If labour value is used as a standard, then
the same capitalist who appeared to pay for everything at its price when counted in
exchange value, appears as an exploiter. The indignation of the exploited is
maintained as long as the accounting system is enforced. If all the exchanges in a
society are now counted in kilocalories a quite different list of the exploited and
parasites is drawn up. .(Latour, 1986: 278, n. 6. Author's emphasis)
For Latour, the Marxist mode of calculation is just one ofmany that could be used, and its
attempt to divide society into the bourgeoisie and the proletariat is equally contingent in this
sense9. It seems likely that Latour sees the Marxist definition of society as stemming from
the group wishing to be considered the 'proletariat'. A problem with this approach is to
explain why any social group would wish to define themselves as powerless and exploited.
Our standard sense is that this would contribute to a transformation of society which did
9 Latour's argument that divisions in society are contingent is similar to Barnes' contention that there
is no underlying structural logic to interest groups (see Chapter 4 for discussion).
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away with the relevant inequality. However, on Latour's account, there seems to be no
reason why a social group shouldn't skip the stage where they define themselves as
'exploited' and just define all groups as equally empowered. The claim to be exploited only
really makes sense if this is intended to offer a way of ordering society that is not simply
different to the present one, but to demonstrate the problems with the existing system for the
purpose ofmoving to an alternative that removes those problems. Thus, the Marxist claim is
that the emergence of an immiserated social group demonstrates problems with the bourgeois
order that is inscribed in capitalist institutions, in that an order dedicated to freedom
generates the unfreedom of poverty. Likewise, labour value is not intended to be merely a
different way of measuring exchanges than that provided by exchange value; rather, it is
intended to offer a better 'ordering' of activity than that provided by the concept of exchange
value. These Marxist conceptions are intended to indicate problems with the existing order
and its self-understanding, and contribute to their replacement by more adequate alternatives.
In cases such as this, Latour's abstract notion of the 'will to order' offers a poor account of
the relation between different ways of ordering the world. It obscures the links between such
modes of ordering, and the way in which a new mode is frequently an attempt to resolve
problems with an existing one. Whereas Latour sees conflict as a basic feature of social life
that requires no further accounting for, a critical historicist approach locates conflict in
problems of ordering the material world. It thus theorises how conflict arises from problems
of ordering, and examines how conflicts can be resolved by solving these problems. This
offers an explanation of the emergence of conflict in specific situations that Latour cannot
provide.
Although actor-network theory usefully undermines the idea that there is a 'social' realm
that can be theorised outside of human relations with materiality, it does not avoid the
problems that emerge in constructionism and realism. For constructionists and realists,
conflict can emerge at a 'social' level even when no account of the material basis of such
disputes can be given. For example, Chapter 3 considered Archer's argument that there may
be 'social' conflicts over resources even when material conditions allow all actors to meet
their desired goals. Actor-network theory does not locate conflict any more convincingly by
arguing that both social and natural elements are pressed into the service of clashing wills to
define. It simply replaces a problematic analysis of conflict on the 'social' level alone with a
problematic analysis of conflict referring to both 'social' and 'natural' elements. As with the




5.5 Social science inaction?
A further aspect of Latour's approach which needs to be considered here is his criticism of
social science, which has been a continuing feature of his work. For Latour, the essential
problem of the social sciences is that they are engaged in exactly the same practices as other
actors: they are trying to define the character of society. What social scientists claim to be
'descriptions' of society are in fact attempts to define actors that reinforce or challenge
existing definitions of society in the process. The success of sociologists' accounts does not
tell us anything about the nature of society, but is instead the enactment of sociologists'
definitions, as with every other actor's 'knowledge' of society (Callon and Latour, 1981:
299). Through processes of surveying, interviewing and investigation, sociologists construct
new identities which are part of the generalised struggle over society's character. Referring
to the definitional work of the social sciences, Latour writes that 'economies emerge out of
economics; societies out of sociologies; cultures out of anthropologies' (Latour, 1999c: 18).
Sociology does not describe what is already there, but produces society through its
definitions (Callon and Latour, 1981: 298-9). Sociologists fail to recognise this, and mistake
their 'definitions' for 'descriptions'.
Latour argues that there is an alternative to the sociological approach. Instead of engaging
in activities which define the nature of society, investigators should trace the definitions of
other actors. It is for this reason that the subtitle to Science In Action is 'How to follow
scientists and engineers through society'. In other words, a proper analysis 'follows' the
definitions of actors (in this case scientists and engineers), rather than attempting to make
new definitions itself. This approach explains the apparently weak conclusion to Science in
Action which, after six chapters of analytical pyrotechnics, concludes with Latour's
statement that he just wishes to clear a 'tiny breathing space' for 'those who want to study
independently the extensions of these [scientific] networks' (Latour, 1987: 257). Critics
such as Steven Shapin have found this to be more like a damp squib then a spectacular
closing barrage (Shapin, 1988: 542-3). However, it is important to see that this remark is
utterly in keeping with Latour's general orientation. Latour is attempting to avoid a mode of
analysis that is constructive and definitional, opting instead for the goal of recording the
definitions and associations of others. Any 'stronger' version of analysis would be
problematic for two reasons. Firstly, the analyst would be 'defining' actors rather than
describing them. Secondly, by getting involved in struggles of definition, sociologists would
be displaying the will to order the world.
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Rejecting such a role for sociology, Latour writes:
Providing an explanation is, in a nutshell, working at empire-building; the more
powerful an explanation, the larger the empire and the stronger the material in
which it is built. What we admire in powerful theories we should also admire in
freeways, multinational corporations, satellite networks, weapon systems,
international banking and data banks. If we do not admire these achievements,
there is no basis for using a double standard and letting the 'powerful theories'
stand apart and alone be worshipped. (Latour, 1988c: 162)
Powerful explanations are merely another expression of the will to order10. Sociology should
not seek such explanations, but follow the orderings of other actors in society.
Latour has developed this criticism in his most recent work by arguing that sociologists
who attempt to discover the true nature of society have 'legislative' pretensions (Latour,
1999c; Latour 2000). The search for structures of society unknown to actors is argued to be
an attempt to circumvent due political process. If sociology can discover the underlying
nature of society which is hidden to actors, then policy decisions can be taken without
political discussions of which ends and means are desirable. When scientific knowledge is
available, the views of laypeople can be set aside (Latour, 2000: 119). As Latour puts it,
with sociological knowledge
it then becomes possible to embark on the huge task of social engineering in order
to produce the common good, without having to go through the painstaking labour
of composing this commonality through political means. (Latour, 2000: 118)
Actor-network analysis is proposed as the pin to deflate these legislative pretensions.
Instead of looking for hidden structures behind activity, it is committed to learning what
society is purely by following the definitions of actors (Latour, 1999c: 20). Its job is to 're¬
present' the definitions that are already made, rather than claiming a better understanding
than that of lay actors (Latour, 2000: 119-120).
Although Latour criticises social constructionism in his work, his account of sociology has
strong parallels with constructionist approaches. Certainly, his theory differs from
constructionism by emphasising that both natural objects and social groups are transformed
through processes of definition. Nevertheless, the idea that actors' definitions should not be
criticised by sociologists is also a consequence of the Strong Programme approach. By
conceiving of actors' beliefs (definitions) as self-validating, the Strong Programmers
10 As an aside, it is worth noting how undifferentiated Latour's notion of power is. One can imagine
being broadly in favour, for instance, of freeways and data banks, without supporting multinational
corporations and weapons systems. The size and expanse of an association does not provide an
instant guide to its merit or otherwise.
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analytically rule out a critical perspective. If beliefs are valid on their own terms, then any
attempt at sociological critique must necessarily fail to show problems with them. There is
no more to be said about actors' beliefs than what the actors already know. All that
sociology can do is to display the content of beliefs and follow their transformations at the
hands of interested actors. Both constructionism and actor-network theory rule out the
possibility that social scientists could come to understand society better than the actors who
create it.
I would argue that these claims are unsustainable. Latour sees sociological knowledge as
inspired by a will to order which is in competition with the other ordering forces in society.
Where sociology produces convincing analyses, it does so by establishing its definitions over
and against others, recreating society in the process. Throughout this chapter I have
challenged the notion that processes of knowing and ordering can be understood in this way.
Instead of treating ordering as a reconstruction of the ontological environment itself, I have
argued that it is better understood as a more or less adequate attempt to deal with that
environment. This suggests a possible rationale for sociological analysis that diverges from
actors' accounts. Sociological knowledge can show the failings of particular ways of
ordering society, and demonstrate how these may be remedied.
This process can be illustrated by considering again Betty Friedan's arguments in The
Feminine Mystique (1963). Friedan discusses the 'problem that has no name', that is, the
depression and listlessness experienced by many American housewives in the late 1950s.
Frequently, housewives attributed this to specific problems in relations with family and
neighbours, or individual psychological difficulties. If analysis was to follow a Latourian
approach, it would simply list these attributions as the definitions of the actors involved.
Any attempt to add to these accounts by offering a general structural explanation would be
an illegitimate exercise of the sociological will to order. I would suggest, however, that a
structural analysis can serve a useful purpose here. By locating the problem in the gendered
division of labour and its restriction of possibilities for self-fulfilment, the sociologist
attempts to offer a better explanation of the difficulties experienced by actors, and suggests
how they might be resolved by a reordering of society. A successful social analysis would
not be an external imposition on actors, but provide a more productive solution to their
problems than that provided by their current understandings.
By insisting that social scientists follow the orderings of actors, Latour makes sure that
social science will make no contribution to resolving actors' current difficulties. Actors
themselves engage in problem-solving and alter their activities accordingly, and the
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Latourian analyst will always be bringing up the rear of such developments, bound to the
current understandings of actors, rather than attempting to grasp and resolve the problems
inherent in them. Latour commits analysts to 'always coming last' as humans attempt to
resolve problems of action in a resourceful manner. Instead, I would suggest that by
engaging in problem-solving in relation to current understandings, sociologists can
contribute productively to human endeavours without thereby dominating the world which
they study.
This still leaves the issue of legislation to be addressed. Is Latour right that the production
of social scientific knowledge is intrinsically tied to a legislative attitude? The perception
that this is the case is derived from a foundational conception of scientific knowledge in
which scientific investigation produces claims that are guaranteed to be true. If such a
guarantee existed, then its logical correlate would be that claims about what is best for
society could be acted upon without subjecting them to common reflection and discussion.
However, a critical historicist approach rejects a foundational notion of science, arguing that
the truth of knowledge produced by social science cannot be assumed. This means that
social scientific knowledge cannot be straightforwardly acted upon as if it provided an
infallible guide to the best way of ordering social institutions. Nevertheless, the alternative
to legislation need not be an acceptance that the views of all parties in a dialogue are equally
valid. As Holmwood argues, debate over issues of social policy (broadly conceived) is
necessary, but it is an evidential debate to which social science can submit the results of its
substantive investigations (Holmwood, 1996: 121, 132-4). Through research, sociology can
hope to improve our understandings of social activity, and demonstrate problems with
existing social orders as well as suggesting solutions to them. The validity of this knowledge
cannot be assumed, and critical examination and discussion is required to decide which
position in a debate is the most adequate. However, sociology can aspire to improve on the
understandings already present in society and show how its own theories resolve existing
problems. The pursuit of social scientific knowledge, and the production of understandings
that are different to those of social actors, does not necessarily reflect a desire to legislate,
but to offer convincing evidence for public debate.
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Conclusion:
Reconciling Science and Society
This thesis has explored the interconnections between conceptions of science and society
offered by various sociological and philosophical theories. It has focused particularly on
dualistic approaches, which argue that natural scientific investigation is necessarily different
in character to other social activities. Proponents of the dualism suggest that because science
has demonstrable successes, it cannot be fully social. Rather, its successes must be based on
foundations lying outside of social life. Likewise, dualists suggest that when a practice is
fully social, its variable success in achieving goals is not an issue. I would argue that neither
of these claims is satisfactory. In this conclusion I want to trace through the arguments
offered in this thesis about science and other social practices, in order to show how our
understandings of them might be reconciled.
The thesis began by criticising accounts of science generated by the science/society
dualism. The key problem with such accounts is that they see aspects of science as non-
social. In particular, they attribute the successes of science to its basis upon foundations that
are outside of the flux of social change. These kind of arguments were given detailed
consideration in Chapter 1. One version of the foundational argument suggests that the
empirical categories of successful science are final, requiring no further revision. Logical
positivists subscribe to such a claim, arguing that science is based upon an unchanging,
unquestionable observation language. However, the chapter also considered more
sophisticated versions of the argument, present in epistemological or ontological realism.
Epistemological realists argue that the success of scientific categories is evidence of their
truth, requiring these categories to be retained in future investigation. Ontological realists
suggest that categories may adequately describe structures even when they cannot account
for all the events that occur. In all three cases, existing successful categories are reified,
suggesting that further scientific investigation will not require their reconstruction. Contrary
to this, the chapter suggested that the categories of science are theoretical mediations whose
observational truth, theoretical truth or adequacy to ontological structures cannot be inferred
from their success. No matter how successful a theory is, its categories may have to be
reconstructed to deal with the continuing explanatory problems that provide the subject
matter for scientific investigation. The chapter also examined claims that scientific
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investigation was founded on rules of reason which guaranteed the adequacy of theories
produced. It was argued that such rules do not provide theoretical guarantees, as they
themselves are subject to criticism and change over time. Instead of providing solid
foundations for scientific investigation, such rules provide the best understandings currently
available of which forms of reasoning are reliable and which are not.
Although Chapter 1 criticised foundationalist accounts of the success of science, it argued
that meaningful assessments of theoretical validity could still be made. These are not based
on external (unchanging) standards, however, but employ the terms of the theories
themselves. The key point here is that even though scientific understandings are theoretical
constructions, they do not construct the world unproblematically. Rather, they have both
positive categories, which are coherent renderings of interactions with the material world,
and residual categories, which are those aspects of interactions with the world that are
currently inexplicable. The fact that theories have problems on their own terms opens up
possibilities of theoretical assessment. A theory can be shown to have improved in adequacy
when it expands the scope of its positive categories, and offers a more coherent account of
interactions with the world. It may also be possible for one theory to demonstrate its
superiority over a competitor by showing that it can offer a coherent account of interactions
that are not systematically accounted for by its competitor.
The critical historicist conception of science developed in Chapter 1 was then used to
criticise the foundationalist accounts that emerge within sociological theorising. The key
move in the work of both Giddens (Chapter 2) and Archer (Chapter 3) is the claim that
science is different in character to other social activities. In order to sustain this division,
each thinker ultimately suggests that science is non-social in character. Giddens
distinguishes between the social and the natural worlds, arguing that the former is constituted
by meanings and the latter by objects. However, this leaves natural science in an ambiguous
position, because it is a social practice oriented to knowing the natural world. To resolve
this ambiguity, Giddens underplays the theoretically mediated character of natural scientific
investigation. This is most apparent in his account of natural scientific innovation, which
implies that there can be direct knowledge of the object world, rather than seeing such
knowledge as a fallible social product. Archer's realist approach is similarly problematic.
Archer claims that social life has two levels, one of which contains the scientifically
knowable structures of society, and the other of which contains actors' 'social' response to
them. By arguing that the analyst can separate structures from their social reception, Archer
176
Conclusion
implies that they can be known 'non-socially'. Accounts of structure are thus presented as
final and fully adequate, rather than as fallible, socially-produced understandings.
The sociological accounts of science considered in Chapters 4 and 5 reject the separation
of science and society, and the foundationalism that goes along with it. For social
constructionists (Chapter 4) and actor-network theorists (Chapter 5), scientific investigation
has the same characteristics as other human activities. However, these approaches give rise
to difficulties of their own. Although constructionists such as Barnes and Bloor reject the
division of science and society, they do so by subsuming science under the relativist
conception of society that was generated by that division. The problems with this
understanding of society will be summarised in more detail below. The main issue,
however, is that instead of rejecting only foundationalist accounts of success, social
constructionism rejects any consideration of the variable success of theories whatsoever. For
Barnes and Bloor, theories are valid on their own terms, and can be held to be consistent
with any evidence that arises. Contrary to this, the thesis argued that theories typically
achieve some consistency, but also generate anomalies that they cannot explain. Whereas
consistent understandings allow actors to relate successfully to the environment, anomalies
represent unpredictable outcomes that disrupt their expectations. It is thus in the interests of
actors to support consistent theories and develop them in order to remove anomalies. As
such, the success or otherwise of a theory is relevant to explaining whether actors support it
or not.
The actor-network account of science, considered in Chapter 5, initially appears to be a
more promising one. Actor-network theorists such as Latour reject the division of science
from other social practices, suggesting that science is just one form of the definitional
activity which actors engage in to construct the world around them. They also reject the
blanket relativism of social constructionist approaches, arguing that definitions may be more
or less successful in establishing the characteristics of the world. However, it was argued
that Latour's account of definitional processes is a problematic one. Instead of seeing
changes in definitions as changes in human understanding, Latour argues that they involve
changes to the objects 'in themselves'. This wrongly projects the perceptions and
descriptions of human beings onto the realm of ontology. It also makes the variable success
of scientific theories impossible to compare, because each theory has its own ontological
world.
In relation to the understanding of science, the conclusion of this thesis must be that none
of the sociological approaches considered are adequate. 1 would argue that the critical
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historicist approach put forward in this thesis improves upon existing conceptions. Unlike
dualistic understandings of science, the critical historicist approach rejects the idea that the
success of science is based on non-social foundations. Unlike existing non-dualistic
theories, the critical historicist approach offers a defensible account of how the success of
scientific theories can be compared. This non-foundational account of the success of science
provides the first move towards the reconciliation of science and society. To make the
second move, we need to reconsider the accounts of social activity analysed in this thesis.
The most important conceptions of sociality considered were those based on a division
between science and society. On such an approach, social activities are said to have special
features that distinguish them from the success-oriented approach of natural scientific
investigation. The most important of these are the 'meaningful' character of social life, the
strategic or 'interested' orientation of actors, and the ability of actors to be reflexive. Issues
of meaning are at the forefront of Giddens' work, and, as we saw above, he argues that
whereas the social world is constituted by meanings, the natural world is made up of external
objects. This has consequences for how the success of beliefs is to be analysed. Firstly, the
assessment of social beliefs is not as straightforward as the assessment of natural scientific
theories. Analysts must come to understand social beliefs, by treating them as 'mutual
knowledge' that is successful on its own terms, before these beliefs can be subjected to
empirical assessment. The thesis argued against this approach, suggesting that if beliefs can
be empirically criticised, then attempts to treat them as successful on their own terms must
misrepresent their categories. As an alternative to this, it was suggested that a proper
understanding of both scientific and non-scientific categories requires the analyst to see
where they are successful (consistent) and where they are unsuccessful (inconsistent).
Secondly, Giddens suggests that the meaningful character of social life allows actors to
exercise agency. Unlike interactions with the natural world, social action involves
meaningful reflection upon options, with the result that actors have a choice as to their
conduct. Contrary to this, the thesis suggested that meaningful reflection is present in both
natural science and other social activities. However, this does not introduce choice into
matters, as the decisions of both scientific and non-scientific actors are constrained by
success. Because scientists wish to interact successfully with the environment, it would be
irrational for them not to support the most adequate theory available. Likewise, in order to
achieve the goals that they desire, social actors are constrained to draw on meanings that
allow them to achieve those goals. To choose to act otherwise would be to choose to be
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incompetent. Thus, natural science and social life share a meaningful character, and both are
oriented to success in a way that excludes choice.
Like Giddens, Archer divides social activity from science. For Archer, science provides
an understanding of the 'objective logic' of situations, that is, the material structures that
facilitate or block action. Social actors must take into account this structural logic, but the
special feature of social life is actors' ability to produce reflexive and strategic responses to
structure. The argument of the thesis was that Archer cannot explain how reflexive or
strategic responses benefit actors when they must involve a divergence from objective
structural possibilities. Her accounts of the 'reflexive' understanding of social groups show
that such understanding blocks the pursuit of their interests rather than facilitating it.
Likewise, the conception of strategic action offered by Archer merely contradicts her
analysis of the objective possibilities for successful action, rather than showing how strategic
divergence from these possibilities can be in the interests of actors. In other words, Archer
does not show how actors can gain any benefit from strategic action when it must be
contrary to action oriented to a successful interaction with objective structures. As with
Giddens, Archer fails to demonstrate that the orientation of social activity is different to that
of science.
Although they do not divide science from other social activities, the conception of
sociality offered by Barnes and Bloor shares features with the accounts of Giddens and
Archer. As noted above, this is because Barnes and Bloor's approach does not transcend the
distinction between science and society, but takes a dualistically derived conception of the
'social' realm and applies it to all practices, including science. Thus, the constructionist
argument that all institutionalised beliefs are self-validating in character can be paralleled
with Giddens' claim that social beliefs must be treated as completely valid 'mutual
knowledge'. Unlike Giddens, Barnes and Bloor do not combine this with the contradictory
claim that such beliefs can then be empirically criticised. Nevertheless, similar problems
emerge with the constructionist explanation of institutional change. Barnes and Bloor
suggest that actors may lose faith in institutions, and reconstruct them. However, if
institutions really were self-validating they would never generate any problems for actors,
and a loss of faith would be inexplicable. As an alternative, the thesis argued that actors'
commitment to an institution is based on the success that it achieves. An institution may be
reconstructed to improve its success, or abandoned if a more successful alternative is offered.
The other important aspect of Barnes and Bloor's approach is their argument, shared with
Archer, that the social has a strategic logic. They argue that actors support institutionalised
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beliefs because it is in their interest to do so, rather than because of the success of these
beliefs. The thesis suggested that this claim was invalid, and that actors' interests cannot be
independent of considerations of the variable success of belief. That is because interested
behaviour is oriented to gaining resources, and such resources can only be produced by
employing successful beliefs in interactions with the environment. Thus, the pursuit of
interests does not clash with the support of successful beliefs. Rather, actors can only
achieve their interests, and gain resources, by supporting successful belief. Because they
offer no account of how resources are produced, Barnes and Bloor fail to locate the interests
that they assign to actors. This is a consequence of leaving considerations of success out of
the analysis of social life.
The last approach considered was that of Latour, who rejects approaches that divide
science from society, as well as criticising the constructionism of Barnes and Bloor.
Nevertheless, his own account of human definitional activity does not locate the
commitments of actors any more successfully than these approaches. This is particularly
apparent in his analysis of the conflicting definitions of actors. Instead of arguing that
conflicts arise where there are problems ordering the material world, Latour suggests that
they result from the clash of abstract defining wills. This fails to explain the content of
particular disputes, or how they are resolved by finding more successful modes of ordering
the world.
From this survey, it must be concluded that existing conceptions of social activity are
problematic. The general tendency is to suggest that issues of variable success are not
relevant to an understanding of social practices. Instead, the 'meaningful' nature of these
practices, and the strategic orientation of actors, is said to differentiate social activities from
scientific investigations oriented to a successful relation with the environment. This thesis
has disputed such claims. It has argued that both natural scientific investigation and other
social practices are meaningfully constituted, and that this does not rule out an assessment of
their success. Successes are not achieved through extra-social means, but are the product of
the transformation of categories in order to achieve a more coherent understanding of
interactions with the world. It has also suggested that dualistic conceptions of strategic
action are incoherent, and that action oriented to the pursuit of interests is not in
contradiction with action oriented to successful relations with the environment. This thesis
thus concludes that a conceptual reconciliation can be achieved by analysing science and
other social activities in the same way.
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